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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

FROM WARRIORS TO WINGTIPS: THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION OF
MILITARY OFFICERS INTO THE PUBLIC SECTOR

For personal and financial reasons some retired military officers seek second careers
in the public sector. In entering local government, they are leaving a unique organization,
and encountering a very different organizational culture.
This study used grounded theory methodology to identify the key military leadership
strategies and behaviors learned by military officers and to examine their applicability to
local government. It focused on eleven retired naval and marine officers who served twenty
or more years, attained a rank o f lieutenant commander or major and above, and had worked
in local San Diego government at the mid-management or executive level less than six years.
Findings were triangulated with literature and other research.
Participant data described rapid leadership development as a military priority shaped
by early responsibility, education, mentoring and command experiences. Leadership
practices include using a contingency leadership style, firm discipline, a controlled
environment, straightforward communications, training and development, values,
camaraderie building, a command presence, standard operating procedures and centrallymandated change.
Retired officers needed to adjust some military leadership practices to respond to the
organizational systems and culture o f local government. In addition, each encountered
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stereotypes o f retired military officers that affected their image and capacity to influence
their organization.
The retired officers interviewed identified strategies that aided them in succeeding in
the public sector. These included: using a coaching style to lead staff following up on
directives, actively managing performance, adopting a less direct communications styie.
improving employee selection and development, creating ownership, actively working to
change systems, building influence and political relationships, introducing change by
influence, consciously developing their reputation and countering stereotypes o f military
officers.
Some retired officers used strategies that were less successful. These included: using
a direct communication style, using military jargon, assuming compliance, accepting and
criticizing the status quo, developing an inner circle, expecting the executive to initiate career
development and direct change, becoming frustrated, and failing to react to stereotypes.
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I

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The face o f local government in the San Diego area is shaped in part by retired
military officers who are attracted to local government employment for personal and
financial reasons. While military organizational culture, training and experience provide
a strong basis for building leadership skills, some of the resulting leadership practices
may be unique to military needs and not suited to the culture o f government
organizations, i.e. the public sector. In this study, the experiences of retired military
officers working in local government in the San Diego area will be examined to assess
the extent to which leadership strategies and behaviors practiced in the military are
transferable and applicable to leadership situations in local government.

Background of the Problem
Since 1990. over 30.000 members of the armed forces have retired annually from
active duty (Veterans Preference. 1997). A study by Barnes (1984) showed that many
military retirees settle in areas where they once served. In addition. Veterans
Administration reports show that one-third of veterans retire to California. Florida and
Texas, and these retirees generally settle in large cities and close to military facilities.
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San Diego has the third largest retired military population of any metropolitan area,
measured at 40.500 in 1992 (Snyder. 1994).
The movement o f military leaders into positions of leadership in government is a
phenomenon noted over forty years ago by C. Wright Mills (1956). According to the
400.000-member Retired Officers Association (TROA). this phenomena continues today.
TROA identified government as one of the key areas for post-military employment
(TROA. 1996. p. 9; Col. B. Buse. Director o f Officer Placement. TROA. personal
communication. February 2. 1998).
At this time, there are no reliable informational sources on the number o f retired
military currently employed in local government nationally or in the San Diego area.
There are conditions, however, which encourage employment in the public sector. Many
retirees (defined as those with twenty or more years o f active service) are attracted to
working in local government, since there are financial incentives for working in the
public sector. For example, veterans may combine their service years with public
employment years in computing retirement (Gordon. 1997). Unlike the federal
government, state and local governments have no restrictions against multiple
compensation - receiving a government pension while earning a federal salary. In
addition, local governments' hiring policies are more favorable to veterans than federal
policies (Jacobsen. 1990). Thus, there are concrete reasons for retired officers to enter
local government employment.
There are also non-tangible reasons for officers to enter government service. The
prospect o f leaving the military is intimidating to many retirees as it represents a major
life transition (Jacobsen. 1990: Savino & Krannich. 1995: TROA. 1996). Government
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employment can offer a comfortable transition to retiring military personnel as there are
some surface similarities between the public sector and the military. As Jacobsen noted:
In some ways government employment is the least disturbing form o f career
transition you can find. A familiar-looking treasury check arrives every payday,
the working environment is reassuringly familiar, and except for the quirks o f the
civil service system and the change in uniform it's almost as though you never
retired (Jacobsen, p. 93)
Public employment can cushion the shock of entering civilian life. Thus, there are clear
financial and emotional incentives for retiring officers who continue their work careers to
enter local government.
Higher-ranking military officers (e.g., Lieutenant Commander and above in the
Navy) typically have work histories reflecting high-level responsibility for complex
operations, large staff and extensive budgets. With such strong work records, they often
qualify to enter the public sector at mid-management to executive levels - levels o f high
positional leadership. Yet. military leaders are leaving a unique and deeply-instilled
culture that has been central to their adult lives, and moving into positions of high
leadership in the public sector which - while having some surface similarities - has a
very different organizational culture.
Studies show that retiring military' personnel receive little or inadequate
transitional support and are often ill-prepared for the passage to civilian life (Webb.
1990; Whelan. 1981). One factor may be that this major life transition occurs in mid-life
(generally in the early forties to fifties) when other life transitions may be occurring.
Another factor complicating this transition may be due to some of the social structures
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and aspects o f military life learned over twenty years o f military service that are not
easily adapted to the corporate or civilian world (McClure. 1992: Masterman. 1988).
As retiring officers may devote between ten to twenty-five years to their second
careers, successfully translating the valuable lessons in leading organizations gained from
their military experiences to their civilian careers is critical to their effectiveness as
public sector leaders.

Significance of the Study
With the end o f the Cold War and subsequent military downsizing, military
officers are retiring in high numbers. It is reasonable to assume that some o f these
retirees will seek employment in the public sector, bringing their experience, skills and
beliefs to a new organizational culture. The m ilitary's Transition Assistance Program
(U. S. Department o f Labor. 1998; Veterans' Employment and Training Service. 1995)
focuses primarily on career assessment and job search skills, and does not adequately
address the issues o f assessing and adapting to new organizational cultures. In a study of
122 retired naval officers done by Webb (1990). retirees criticized the military's
transition program for failing to address the differences in managing and leadership
between the civilian and military environments. The majority of the books and articles
written about retired military entering civilian employment address the strengths such
individuals bring to the workforce, but fail to address the very real issue o f transition and
adaptation (Bowers. 1996; Carrison & Walsh. 1999; Jacobsen. 1990: TROA. 1996:
Whelan, 1981). This research project did not discover any transition assistance or
executive coaching provided by public sector entities in the San Diego area to new
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employees transitioning from the military. One may conclude that retired officers have
had to rely on their own wits or the support o f associates and mentors to analyze and
adjust to a new leadership role in a new organizational culture.
During fifteen years as a public sector manager, this researcher has witnessed
some former military officers who have successfully assumed leadership roles in the
public sector, and some who have struggled in their endeavor to take on their new roles.
These observations raised questions about whether there are unique aspects to the
military experience that assist or hinder in fulfilling leadership responsibilities in public
bureaucracies.
This research is, in part, a result from a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998.
The preliminary data, based on four interviews with retired military officers holding
leadership positions in the public sector, revealed that some military leadership behaviors
did not always translate to the public sector. The indication is that retired officers may
have to adjust some military practices and concepts to be successful as public sector
leaders. Identifying these practices and concepts may have broader implications for:
•

assisting retired military officers to successfully assume leadership positions
in local government:

•

improving military transition assistance programs for retiring officers;

•

improving orientation and new employee support given to retired officers
entering the public sector:

•

and. more broadly, identifying general adjustments necessary for retiring
officers to be effective leaders outside military settings.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose o f this dissertation is to investigate the key military leadership
strategies and behaviors learned by retired officers, and assess their transferability to
leadership situations in local government. This study will employ a grounded theory
approach based on qualitative interviews o f recently-retired military officers currently
employed in local government in the San Diego area.

Research Questions
The research questions explored in this dissertation came from the themes that emerged
from a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998. The research questions are as follows:
•

What are the key leadership strategies and behaviors learned and practiced by
military officers?

•

Which o f these military strategies and behaviors are transferable to leadership
situations in local government?

•

What military strategies and behaviors are not easily transferable to leadership
situations in local government?

•

What adjustments assist retired military officers in transitioning into
leadership positions in local government organizations?

•

What are the implications for assisting newly-retired officers seeking to
integrate into local government organizations?

The experience o f retired officers will provide the richest data source for this information.
The data collected will be analyzed and synthesized into a grounded theory - where the
significant themes revealed by the data are examined for their relationship to the core
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issue being researched. The data relationships are deepened by a review of relevant
literature. The data and literature form the basis o f the resulting theoretical structure.

Assumptions of the Study
Any researcher brings a set of assumptions to any study. Responsible research
acknowledges and refers to these assumptions, both to stay focused on the underlying
purpose o f the research and to perform an ongoing check to ensure the assumptions do
not color data interpretation. The assumptions behind this study included:
1. A large number of military retirees seek second careers.
2. Local government is an attractive second career option due to the economic
incentives and the familiar aspects o f government structure and operations.
3. Officers with twenty or more years of experience develop a perspective on leadership
which is uniquely flavored by their experiences and practices as military' officers,
embedded in the strong culture o f the armed forces and further reinforced by their
mentors in the service.
4. Unique differences exist between military and public sector organizational cultures.
5. Some military strategies and behaviors may not translate well to the public sector.

Definition of Terms
The following are key terms used in this dissertation.
Leadership
There are a variety o f definitions of leadership, delineated in more detail in
Chapter Two. For the purpose of this study. leadership is defined as a social process.
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occurring in a time o f organizational change or stress, wherein leaders and followers
work in concert to mobilize the human, material and intellectual resources needed to
achieve a defined purpose.
Leadership is a multi-faceted phenomenon. The nature o f the situation drives
which aspects o f leadership come into prominence. For example, in an emergency, a
directive or command approach more effectively mobilizes resources in a rapid,
consistent manner. In a policy environment, a collaborative approach involving
stakeholders is more appropriate. Currently, the public sector is engaged in its most
significant time o f change since the Progressive Era. There are proposals and pressures
to adopt more businesslike practices, reform the civil service system and privatize
services. Such change efforts require public sector leadership that is: transformational
(Bums. 1979). informs and involves staff and stakeholders (Heifetz. 1994). defines and
articulates its core values (Senge. 1990). and takes a collaborative approach that values
diverse input (Bryson & Crosby. 1992: Chrislip & Larson. 1994).
Leaders
This researcher recognizes that organizational leaders may be found at every level
of an organization, regardless of position, title or job duties. For the purpose of this
research, only positional leaders will be studied. Military leaders have been defined as
commissioned officers. 0 -4 and above. Public sector leaders are those holding mid
management or executive positions, as designated by their organizations' internal
position classification systems.
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Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
Gemeinschafi describes a type o f organization steeped in tradition, with strong
values and beliefs, distinct levels o f authority and w ell-defined individual roles. Strong
loyalty and group cohesion characterize such organizations, e.g.. the military services.
Gesellschaft describes more traditional, rational-bureaucratic organizations that are
directed by goals, such as government agencies (Tonnies. 1887/1957). Tonnies' writings
on gemeinschaft and gesellschaft influenced Max Weber's work on bureaucracy (1946).
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture is a complex concept. Wise (1994) noted that
organizational literature listed nearly eighty components o f organizational culture. The
following theorists are most aligned with the researcher on the notion of organizational
culture. Schein (1992) defined it as the basic assumptions shared by members o f an
organization. It encompasses the observed behaviors, norms, dominant values,
philosophy, rules and climate of the organization. French and Bell (1974) identified both
formal components of organizational culture (including the goals, technology, structure
and finances) and informal components (interactions, group norms, feelings, attitudes and
values). Organizational culture cannot be viewed as restricted to specific organizational
components. It is infused and crosses over all organizational aspects. As Pacanowskv
and O'Donnell-Trujillo (1993) viewed it. "Organizational culture is not just another piece
o f the puzzle, it is the puzzle. From one point o f view, a culture is not something an
organization has: a culture is something an organization is" (p. 126).
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Public Sector
The public sector consists of government organizations at the local, state and
federal level. The local public sector includes cities, counties, joint-powers authorities
and special districts. Special districts are government entities established to provide a
specific service supported by a designated funding stream e.g.. fire districts, flood control
districts and water authorities. Joint powers agencies address broader community issues
and are composed of representatives of multiple government entities, e.g.. port
authorities, government associations, and coastal authorities.
Fit
Fit describes the integration between the individual and the organization (Argyris.
1964). Fit addresses the question of whether or not an organization can provide proper
and sufficient motivators to satisfy an individual employee's needs and whether that
employee can adapt to the job requirements and organizational culture (French. Caplan
& Harrison. 1982).
Role
A role is the set of behaviors an organization expects its members to perform. A
role defines the purpose of one's position, how that position is linked in the organization,
the expected behaviors or norms and how those behaviors are connected to organizational
values (Katz & Kahn. 1978).
Role Ambiguity
Role ambiguity occurs when an individual is uncertain about what behaviors,
norms and values are expected in the organization (Burke. 1982). Role ambiguity can
contribute to individual stress, particularly when the individual fails to understand the
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implicit norms. This can produce a resistance to change (Kahn. Wolfe. Quinn. Snoek &
Rosenthal, 1964).

Definition o f Military Terms
The following are key military terms used in this dissertation, listed in
alphabetical order.
Captain's Mast
A term, deriving from the ancient tradition o f piping the crew to assemble in the
vicinity o f the main mast to witness punishment. It is a hearing conducted by the
commanding officer to determine appropriate disposition o f alleged offenses under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Appropriate disposition may result in referral
to trial by court-martial, award o f non-judicial punishment (NJP) by the commanding
officer or dismissal o f the charge. Captain's mast is customarily preceded by an
investigation into the circumstances by the executive officer.
High-Ranking Officers
The ranks for officers in the Navy and Marine Corps eligible as participants in this study
include senior and flag officers. The comparisons in rank between the Navy and Marine
Corps are contained in the following table:
Navy

Marine Corps

Admiral (paygrade O -10)

General (paygrade O -10)

Vice Admiral (paygrade 0-9)

Lieutenant General (paygrade 0-9)

Rear Admiral (paygrade 0-8)

Major General (paygrade 0-8)

Real Admiral (lower) (paygrade 0-7)

Brigadier General (paygrade 0-7)
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Navy

Marine Corps

Captain (paygrade 0-6)

Colonel (paygrade 0-6)

Commander (paygrade 0-5)

Lieutenant Colonel (paygrade 0 -5 )

Lieutenant Commander (paygrade 0-4)

Major (paygrade 0-4)

Paygrades 0-5 and 0 -6 are termed senior officers. Paygrades 0 -7 and above are called
fla g officers in the Navy or general officers in the Marine Corps.
The Institutional-Occupational Continuum
The Institutional-Occupational continuum is the theory proposed by Charles C.
Moskos. that military organizations in this country are moving from a traditional
institutional model with normative values o f duty, honor and country, strong
organizational identity and a status system based on rank and seniority. In the
institutional military, the organization plays a paternalistic, controlling role that extends
to the spouse and family members. Moskos sees the services moving more toward an
occupational military where individual commitment is driven by more market forces such
as compensation and benefits, and less by an identification with the organization and
one's role within it. In the occupational organization, individuals identify more strongly
with their occupation (horizontal identification) than with the organization itself (vertical
identification). There is growing reluctance on the part o f spouses (who often have their
own careers) and children to accept the extensive volunteer and social duties traditionally
expected o f them (Moskos, 1977. 1986. 1988).
Military Retirees
For this study, military retirees are defined as individuals who have served 20 or
more years in a branch o f the armed forces and who receive retired pay.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

13

Abbreviations Used
The military uses a large number o f acronyms and abbreviations that facilitate
brief and precise communication within the services but are unfamiliar to much of the
general public. The following is a list o f those abbreviations used in this work.
Ranks and Paygrades
CO

Commanding Officer

XO

Executive Officer

CPO

Chief Petty Officer (paygrade E-7)

E-9*

Master Chief Petty Officer

E-7

Chief Petty Officer

E-4

Third Class Petty Officer

Military Terms
CB

Construction Battalion

NJP

Non-judicial punishment administered at Captain's Mast

ROTC

Reserve Officer Training Corps, a university-based commissioning
source for officer candidates

SOP

Standard operating procedure

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice, similar to the civilian Penal Code

* The complete list of petty officer ranks ranges from E-4 to E-9.
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Delimitations and Limitations
The population o f this study will be confined to retired Navy and Marine Corps
officers, who served 20 or more years and attained the rank o f Lieutenant Commander or
higher in the Navy or Major or higher in the Marine Corps. The participants must have
been retired six years or less and have worked in a managerial or executive position in
local government in Sain Diego County.
While many individuals in an organization act in leadership capacities, this studydealt exclusively with those in positional leadership roles. As many o f the participants
came from unfamiliar organizations, it was not possible to accurately identify individuals
who fulfilled leadership roles outside of their formal positions.
A limitation of the study is that the pool of participants was composed entirely of
white males, reflecting somewhat the demographics o f the military branches during their
service as officers. The results, therefore, may not reflect the experience of women and
non-white high-ranking military- officers.
The researcher has no military background and has thus relied on the repetition of
similar themes and experiences (data saturation) and the expertise of committee members
and subject matter experts to confirm that the data are sufficiently grounded to supply the
basis for a theory.
This research focused solely on the self-described experiences of retired officers.
It. therefore, does not necessarily address the effectiveness of the retired officers in their
leadership roles in the public sector as perceived by others. Such a study would require
the input of subordinates, peers and superiors (i.e.. 360 degree feedback) as well as long
term observation o f the participants in their roles. This approach was initially considered.
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but rejected during the proposal phase due to the difficulty in gaining permission and
access to such data.
Finally, the grounded theory method focuses solely on the core element being
researched; therefore, other themes revealed in the data gathering were not explored if
they did not relate to leadership.

Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter One provided a summary overview o f the dissertation, along with
background information on the key terms, limitations and assumptions o f the study.
Chapter Two is a review o f the literature, focusing on the core issues underlying
this study. The literature review examines the common threads and differences between
the organizational cultures o f the military and o f public bureaucracies. It also considers
the nature of major life transitions, such as retiring from the military after twenty or more
years and beginning a second career. Finally it discusses the nature o f leadership and its
role in guiding public organizations through the current climate o f significant
organizational change.
Chapter Three describes the research methodology of this study. It addresses the
rationale for selecting a grounded theory approach and describes the process for the
research, interv iews and data analysis.
Chapter Four contains the descriptions o f the participants and the research results
concerning military leadership, focusing on the central themes.
Chapter Five contains the research results related to applying military leadership
strategies and behaviors to the public sector.
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Chapter Six presents the findings and the recommendations for future research.
In this chapter, the central themes from the data are woven into a grounded theory that
describes the nature o f military leadership as described by the participants and what
aspects translate well to the public sector. This research will hopefully inspire further
inquiry.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Overview
The previous chapter provided a brief explanation of the purpose of this study identifying the lessons in leadership learned by retired military officers and examining
their experience in transferring these principles while serving in leadership positions in
local government. It summarized the economic and personal reasons for retired officers
to enter public sector employment and cited results from a pilot study, which suggested
that not all military leadership strategies and behaviors translate well to the public sector.
This chapter contains a focused review of the related literature thus providing a more
comprehensive examination o f this subject.
An underlying assumption o f this study is that, while government and military
organizations share some common history and characteristics, there are also substantive
differences between the cultures o f the military and the public sector. What follows in
this chapter is. first, a review of the development of this nation's public and military'
bureaucracies. The focus is on the common roots of the military and the government
bureaucracies: the political attitudes that shaped them: their growth in scope and
professionalism: and the formation o f their formal structures in the era of reform.
Secondly, this section contains separate examinations of their informal organizational
cultures and highlights some of their differences in cultural type, values, goals, missions.
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and citizen input as well as current organizational challenges. Next, there is a review o f
the primary issues of career and life transition, followed by an examination o f the current
change environment facing military officers transitioning to the public sector. Finally,
there is an examination of the nature of leadership and its central role in managing public
sector change.

The Intersection of Public and Military Bureaucracies
There are strong parallels between many o f the formal aspects o f military and
government organizations because they share common roots as the first large-scale
organizational structures. The key "modem’*management concepts originated in ancient
governments and military operations: the Egyptians developed centralized systems (1600
BC); the Chinese wrote about planning, directing and controlling principles (1100 BC)
and standard operating procedures (500 BC); and the Greeks (325 to 175 BC) wrote
about hierarchy, delegation, job descriptions, and motion studies (George. 1972).
According to Rickover (1971):
Bureaucracy antedates modem democracy by centuries. It persists in our society
because no one has yet invented an instrument equally efficient in performing
tasks - on a continuing basis —that require coordination o f the efforts o f large
numbers o f people, with different kinds and degrees of professional expertise
relevant to the job at hand, especially when their work must be closely
intermeshed, (p. 150)
The hallmarks of contemporary public and military bureaucracies were outlined by Max
Weber (1946) as centralized functions, standardized roles, unity o f command, centralized

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

19

decision-making, standard operating procedures, closed boundaries, and reliance on
hierarchical authority. Thus, for centuries, there have been parallels in the formal aspects
o f government and military organizations. The differences between the two are more
pronounced in their informal culture.
There are existing parallels between this country's public and military
bureaucracies that go back to their roots. The principles o f colonial government and
society were: "divided political power, local autonomy, civil control over the military,
and fear of power” (Carp. 1984. p. 14). The dominant colonial issues o f religious and
regional differences fueled the development o f isolated, fragmented local government.
Local political leaders were generally from wealthy families and many served unpaid,
establishing an expectation that government service was a noble obligation and that
government functions should cost little (Carp. 1984). Colonial opposition to the British
founded a suspicion of centralized authority - whether administrative or military (Beach
and Carter. 1997). The writings of John Locke (1690/1986) and others were used to
support the creation o f a small government with limited power. A fear and mistrust of
the military is evidenced in the Continental Congress's refusal to grant the military' the
proper authority to feed and clothe its forces - resulting in ragged and starving Colonial
troops that went from town to town both fighting and begging supplies. The founders
preferred military sacrifices to expanding both the power and the scope o f government
and the military (Carp. 1984).
The first era o f national government, roughly 1789 to 1829. saw public
administrators as the guardians o f the new democracy. Washington spoke o f “fitness of
character” as the criterion for those in government employment. Family background.
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education, honor and esteem were the basis of what Frederick Mosher calls, "the
government of the gentlemen," where landed gentry formed the pool o f possible
employees (Mosher, 1982. pp. 58-60). Class was the basis o f both government and
military service, wherein the positional leaders were from the aristocracy and public
service was regarded as an honor and obligation. Military service itself was often
considered a family tradition (Van Riper. 1971).
Thomas Jefferson, a strong opponent of a standing army, was an unlikely
champion of the creation o f the first military academy. West Point. However. Jefferson
was deeply concerned with the exclusive Federalist/aristocratic makeup o f the Army. He
created West Point to draw middle class and Republican factions into the military in
order to guard against creating a military that was an exclusive body, which enforced the
interests of the wealthy (Crackle. 1987).
Opening up public service to the common man was a notion promoted by Andrew
Jackson. He based his actions on two principles: a view that government "by the
people" meant that "the people" ought to work in the government, and a belief that
government work was so simple in nature that it did not require an established
administrative workforce:
The duties of all public officers are. or at least admit of being made, so plain and
simple that men o f intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their
performance: and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of
men in office than is generally gained by their experience, (quoted in
Richardson. 1897. p. 1012)
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In Jackson's view, it was better to exchange some degree of professionalism to ensure
against a government administered by the elite. This notion of sacrificing efficiency for
the sake o f other objectives has been central to public sector conflicts during subsequent
eras. Jackson's intent of a government o f the common people became known in the late
1800*s as the "‘Spoils System." Political patronage existed at all levels of government,
but particularly within city politics where ward bosses dispensed political jobs and favors
as rewards (Huberman. 1960). In addition, a great number of the bureaucratic positions
turned over with each election, resulting in disarray and a loss of institutional knowledge
within government agencies (Van Riper. 1971).
Jackson and some o f his successors had a similar disregard for the military.
While the territory o f the United States tripled in size within 50 years after the War of
1812. its military was slashed (Porter, 1994). The military fell into disarray prior to the
Civil War. due to poor support. Public anti-government sentiment was documented by de
Tocqueville (1848/1945) who noted that Americans chose to keep their government poor
and unfunded to keep it from becoming too strong.
At the time of the Civil War. there was an army of just over 16.000. almost 90%
o f which was stationed on the western frontier. There were three million militia on
paper, though the President could only call up units for a maximum of three months, and
their training consisted largely of “annual picnics." (Dupuy & Dupuy. 1960. p. 23). The
military promotion system was staid and careers moved at a “meticulous crawl." Future
leadership positions relied on "avoiding innovation in personal life or in military duties"
(Mills. 1956. p. 183). The Navy had only 90 craft, many of which were wooden sailing
ships. Only forty-two were in commission and none of the fleet were modem armor-clad
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vessels used by European fleets (Dupuy & Dupuy. 1960). The early years o f the Civil
War highlighted the poor preparation and performance of the military as well as the weak
national loyalty o f the servicemen. O f the 1.036 Army officers and 1.300 Navy officers.
286 and 322, respectively, resigned —mostly to join the Confederate forces (Op. cit.).
The Civil War had showcased some o f the inadequacies within the military and
government administration. The government's spoils system practice o f appointing
political allies to administrative positions allowed politicians to exercise substantial
control over both the design and the implementation o f policy, further broadening the
power o f politicians to use their offices for patronage. By the late 1800s. there was
political corruption at all levels o f government, with scandals such as Teapot Dome and
Tammany Hall demonstrating that public jobs and services were available for money and
political support (Huberman, 1960). Government administration was largely in the
hands o f bureaucrats selected more for political cronyism than for professionalism
(Ingraham. 1995: Mosher. 1982).
The post-war Navy was clinging to an old mission focused on protecting
commerce, and consequently could marshal little political support outside o f wartime.
By 1881. the United States Navy's fleet was considered inferior to the Chilean Navy
(Clark. Stevens. Alden & Krafft. 1927). With the writings, lectures and political
influence o f Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy turned from a reactive focus on commerce
protection to embracing a new mission —creating a battle fleet that would make the
United States a geo-political force in the era o f '‘Manifest Destiny" (Hagan. 1991).
As the new century approached, it was broadly recognized that the large scale and
complex issues o f an increasingly industrial nation with international interests required a
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professional and ethical administration in both the military and the government
(Ingraham. 1995: Mosher. 1982; Nelson. 1982).
Public outrage over government corruption and ineptitude grew to where,
beginning in the 1850‘s. large public protests were held to reform the personnel system.
The movement for a professional civil service system followed the reform model
promoted by Alexis de Tocqueville in Europe. Reform efforts were fought by some local
and national politicians in the United States (White. 1935). The assassination o f James
Garfield in 1881 by Charles J. Guiteau. a disgruntled civil servant who sought a better job
in the presidential administration, galvanized the American government reform
movement. Abolitionists and Progressives (who led one wing o f the movement to
establish a professional and non-corrupt public administration) adopted a high moral tone
focused on ethical reform: “The abolition o f the spoils system . . . [is] second in
importance only to the abolition of slavery" (from a 1893 speech by abolitionist Wendell
P. Garrison, quoted in Nelson. 1982. p. 121).
At the same time, the scientific management movement was pulling reform in the
direction o f efficiency, defined as the use of business practices and expertise (Nelson.
1982). The proponents o f scientific management argued that government functions
required trained professionals who made decisions and otherwise performed their tasks in
accordance with “autonomous, abstract standards" (Nelson. 1982. p. 125). One o f their
key proponents w as Woodrow Wilson who called for the establishment o f a profession of
public administration based on the principles of business (Wilson. 1887).
Abolitionists, led by Henry Adams. Wendell Garrison. Charles Schurlz and others
were committed to government reform because such political actions as the Kansas-
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Nebraska Act challenged the morals of government by strict majoritarianism. They
spoke o f reintroducing the ethical government seen during the 18th century (Nelson.
1982). The reforms they championed established: strict purchasing and contracting
regulations, standard operating procedures and competitive, merit-based selection and
promotion systems. Such reforms involved strict procedures and multi-layered checks
and balances to guard against corruption and favoritism. The systems created were
intentionally inefficient because their proponents saw ethics as the greater good:
The question whether the Departments at Washington are managed well or badly,
is in proportion to the whole problem [of corruption] an insignificant problem
after all. Neither does the question whether our civil service is as efficient as it
ought to be, cover the whole ground. The most important point to my mind is.
how we can remove that element of demoralization which now the prevailing
mode o f distributing office [political nepotism] has introduced into the body
politic. (Charles Schurtz. in a speech to the United States Senate. January 27.
1871. quoted in Nelson. 1982. p. 121)
The scientific management proponents introduced the business models of creating
smaller institutions (agencies), narrow scopes, specified job duties, specialized functions,
and separate accounting systems (Nelson. 1982). These systemic reforms in personnel,
procurement and budget affected both administrative government and the military.
Personnel
One of the most significant government reforms of the Progressive Era was the
Pendleton Act o f 1883, which sought to remove political patronage from the personnel
system and protect the rights of public employees. Based on the British model, it forms
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the basis for all contemporary public personnel systems - jobs are specifically defined:
positions are advertised publicly; candidates are evaluated by pre-established criteria: and
employees are selected based on merit. Further, the system protects employees from
dismissal without cause (Van Riper. 1971: White. 1935). These federal efforts were
precursors of personnel reform in key cities and states as well.
Most o f the forces for the Civil War. World War I . and the Spanish American
wars came from volunteer militia (Mills. 1956: Stillman. 1996). There were problems
with the leadership and technical expertise o f some generals and admirals who were
promoted based on seniority or political connections rather than merit. Secretary of War
Elihu Root spearheaded military personnel reform on the heels o f the Pendleton Act.
Root established a unified personnel system and education requirements for officers
(Mosher. 1982: Stillman. 1996).
Personnel reforms occurred in advance of unprecedented growth in government
and the military. Public bureaucracy grew during the Progressive Era. New Deal and
World War II eras in response to increasing citizen demand for services. The growth of
the military parallels this general government expansion (Porter. 1994). At the turn of
the century, the military branches consisted of the War Department and the Navy - both
established in the 1780s. With the entrance o f the United States into World War II. the
modem military bureaucracy was bom. Between 1941 and 1945. over twelve million
men and women served in the armed forces and 147 bureaucratic agencies were formed
to serve the war effort, including the Selective Service. The National Security Act of
1947 created the Department o f Defense, the Air Force and the Central Intelligence
Agency. Other military agencies were formed to administer military humanitarian efforts
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such as The Marshal Plan as well as efforts related to the developing Cold War
(Stillman. 1996).
Budgeting
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the first reform in public budgeting.
It took a rational approach to budgeting and pursued standards of efficiency by focusing
on the expenditure side (Schick & Harry. 1982). Subsequent attempts at budget reform
were a response to the complexity and cost of military weapons and Cold War programs
(Schick & Harry. 1982: Stillman. 1996). They were often first initiated in the military,
then applied to general government.
Recognizing that the long-term development o f complex and costly weapons
systems required the highest quality in decision-making. Secretary o f Defense (19611965) Robert McNamara instituted what he viewed as rational approaches to budget and
program evaluation. He believed that his system —Program Planning and Budgeting
Systems (PPBS) —would control the process and would lead to "correct" decisions
emphasizing "cost-effectiveness analyses" in managing the military (Roherty. 1970).
Many criticized McNamara's cost-effectiveness approach as discounting combat
readiness and the protection o f the forces and his focus on very specific objectives as
failing to examine the larger question o f mission - as evidenced in his decisions during
the Vietnam War (Hadley. 1986: Palmer. 1978: Roherty. 1970). McNamara's practices
and the PPBS system also brought civilians and political appointees further into decision
making roles in the military (Hadley. 1986: Palmer, 1978) which has subsequently
demanded more political skills from its uniformed leaders (Wilson. 1989).
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The budget and program evaluation reforms of the last thirty years - such as
PPBS. Management by Objectives (MBO) and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) - all
followed this same rationalistic approach and opened the door to political involvement in
decision-making and micro-management of programs (Schick & Harry. 1982: Stillman.
1996). These reforms occurred in both the military and public sectors.
Contracting and Procurement
The United States government has contracted for goods and services since the
Revolutionary War. Charges o f overpricing, excessive overheads, fraud and nepotism
have plagued contracting since its inception (Carp, 1984). In the 1880s. the Progressive
reformers challenged favoritism in the granting of contracts, that led to the development
o f parallel systems within both the military and administrative government: competitive
procurement, precise contract specifications and sealed bids (Kettl. 1993). The
hallmarks of the reforms in personnel, budgeting, contracting and procurements are still
in place after nearly 100 years.
Clearly, there are similarities between government and military bureaucracies.
They share fundamental structures and practices common to most large-scale
organizations. They share the public's concern over their role, their power and their cost.
They share a common history in their rise in complexity and professionalism. They share
common systems of personnel, budgeting and procurement resulting from the reforms
introduced in this century. These similarities between administrative government and the
military are principally in what French and Bell (1974) identified as the form al aspects of
organizational culture: the differences between these organizations lie largely in the
informal aspects.
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The Nature of Military Culture
Organizational culture is a system of backgrounds, norms, values and beliefs that
are shared among group members (Schein. 1992). French and Bell (1974) include in
their notion o f organizational culture the formal or overt features of an organization
(goals, technology, structure, and finances) as well as its informal aspects (interactions,
group norms, feelings, attitudes and values). Military sociologists and historians have
examined the informal aspects of military culture.
The Navv's Organizational Culture
The roots o f the United States Navy originated with the Revolutionary War over
the necessity o f protecting commerce. Problems with Barbary pirates led the reluctant
Constitutional Convention in 1787 to establish the federal authority to create a navy, over
the objections of those concerned with the cost and who felt it gave too much power to
the central government. The controversy was carried to Congress, which finally
established a navy in 1794 (Hagan. 1991). While West Point was founded in the 1700s
under Jefferson to teach battle strategy and tactics, the United States Naval Academy was
not founded until 1845 - Navy culture held that seamen learned at sea. not on land. The
changing technology (steam propulsion) forced a change in philosophy, as the need for a
more developed engineering background was recognized (Clark, et al. 1927: Hagan.
1991). The role o f the Navy changed with the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
(1890/1987). redirecting the Navy toward developing large warships and engaging in
fleet-centered combat and large-scale operations. With the fall of the Soviet Union in
1989. the United States Navy has faced a re-examination o f its '‘battle group" strategy.
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since, for the first time, no other country seems capable o f assembling a credible naval
threat (Hagan. 1991).
The Navy has several distinct communities or subcultures including: the "brown
shoes" (aviators), the "black shoes” (surface ship sailors) and felt shoes (submariners).
The commanding officer o f an aircraft carrier is traditionally an aviator. There is an
historic, intra-service rivalry among these communities, revealed in debates on how to
best implement the Navy's overall mission (Hadley, 1986; Halperin. 1974). Officers
with "brown shoe” background fight for appropriations for more aircraft and carriers,
while "black shoe” admirals seek more surface ships (Halperin. 1974). Despite these
subcultures, the Navy retains an integrated personality because of its mission (Hadley.
1986).
With its seagoing missions, the Navy is unique among the services. The amount
o f travel makes it the least insular (Hadley, 1986) and the essence o f the ship experience
gives a unique independence to naval officers:
Onboard ship, hierarchy is powerful and actions are constantly monitored, but
among ships there is a freedom of action and degree of isolation from the rest of
the military (and society at large) that is much greater than what a typical army
officer experiences. (Wilson. 1989. p. 58)
The shipboard experience is self-contained, and the actions of senior and flag officers are
not monitored and scrutinized to the degree that land-based forces are. Thus, the Navy's
high-ranking officers operate in an environment o f relative independence, flexibility and
isolation. Naval officers generally put in more time away from their families than those
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in the other services, yet many avoid Pentagon assignments - perhaps because the naval

officer values autonomy (Hadley, 1986).
The Marine Corps’ Organizational Culture
The Marine Corps is part o f the Department o f the Navy and constitutes the land
component of sea combat. The Continental Marines served in the Revolutionary War and
were disbanded until officially established in 1789 to fight the Barbarv pirates (Moskin.
1977). Initially, the Corps was the least-funded service, often threatened with extinction
by Congress and was frequently caught in a turf war between the Navy and the Army
(Krulak. 1987). It evolved into an expeditionary force that prides itself as an elite corps
willing to undertake the dirtiest, most dangerous duty. As retired Lieutenant General
Victor H. Krulak, USMC.

wTOte:

In a century and a half evolved an elite, almost mystical institutional personality.
Partaking variously of pride, aggressiveness, dedication, loyalty, discipline, and
courage, this complex personality was - and is - dominated by a conviction that
battle is the Marines' only reason for existence and that they must be ready to
respond promptly and effectively whenever given an opportunity to fight.
Finally, they came to accept, as an article o f faith, that marines must not only be
better than everyone else but different as well. (Krulak. 1987. p. 3)
The Marine Corps has a strong organizational culture unmatched by fewr private or public
sector organizations. As an amphibious force, its culture also differs from the Navy's.
Marine officers are subject to much more control and oversight than their counterparts in
the Navy (Hadley. 1986). As with other service branches, the Corps struggled as an
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organization after the Vietnam War. but refocused itself on combat readiness in the late
1980s (Ricks. 1997).
Informal Military Organizational Culture
While each service has a unique culture, there are also shared aspects o f military
service - informal military culture. Informal military culture relies on community and
organizational identity as the glue that binds it. Ferdinand Tonnies (1887/1957) referred
to this type o f organizational form as gemeinschaft. Such organizations are distinguished
by their strong, common beliefs and values, deep traditions, well-defined roles,
traditional forms o f authority and strong cohesion. The traditions o f the modem military
pre-date the formation o f nation-states. In his seminal work on the military. The
Professional Soldier. Morris Janowitz (1960) identified the post-feudal roots o f the
modem armed forces, when loyalty to one's lord was transformed to loyalty and serv ice
to one's country. Serving as a military leader was a calling and obligation of the
aristocracy.
Its contrasting organizational form, gesellschaft. characterizes an organization
which is created to achieve a specific end. These organizations —such as government
bureaucracies -- fit the rational, machine model and are driven by instrumental values
(Weber. 1946). Shils (1981) in his work on tradition in society, wrote that the rise of
bureaucratic rationalism beginning in the 19th century was an attempt to move away from
tradition which was seen as binding individuals. Government was seen as the agent of
rational change:
Government alone . . . is counted upon to act rationally, to disregard old ways and
to choose those means which will attain the desired ends with a minimum of
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waste . . . . No other institution has powers over the entire range of society;
government alone can make the entire society rational. Otherwise society would
be in a chaos arising from the rational self-seeking actions of individuals or it
would be a thicket o f irrational, traditional rules, or it would be both at the same
time. (Shils, 1981. pp. 288-289)
Government has both the resources and power to move societies away from what is
conceived o f as an excessive attachment to traditions and old ways and toward
rationality. The military, while also embracing rational organizational practices, retains
its long-enduring orientation toward authority, standards o f conduct and commitment to
values. The military actively seeks to preserv e the traditions of its institution, amidst
societal pressures toward legal-rationalism.
Modem military sociologist Charles C. Moskos (1977. 1986. 1988) further
developed this concept in his Institutional-Occupational organizational continuum that is
used extensively in military literature (Appendix A). As an institutional organization,
the traditional military is driven by its core values, identified by military' sociologists as
duty, honor, self-sacrifice and country (Janowitz. 1960; Nve. 1986; Dunivan. 1994).
Members see their careers as service, a calling, sometimes a family tradition. Individuals
have a strong identification with the institution itself - i.e.. a vertical identification.
Military’ members as well as their spouses and families are an integral part o f the military
community. The organization is very’ paternalistic in its relationship with members,
controlling large aspects o f their lives (Moskos. 1988).
The building o f organizational identification and unit cohesion is essential in an
organization where individuals must be willing, when necessary or on command, to
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ignore instincts o f self-preservation and put themselves in harm's way. New recruit
orientation is a key tool for instilling military culture —what Strauss and Corbin (1990)
called context. One tool used to build cohesion at boot camp and officer training is basic
training. According to McCloy & Clover (1988). the goal o f basic training is to
"deindividualize" or break down individuals, and then remold them so they bond them as
a unit. Schein (1965) observed that:
Organizations socialize their new members by creating a series o f events which
serve the function of undoing old values so that the person will be prepared to
learn new values. This process o f undoing or unfreezing is often unpleasant and
therefore requires strong motivation to endure it or strong organizational forces to
make the person endure it. (p. 6)
During this intense, often unpleasant experience, cooperation and group behavior are
rewarded. The end o f basic training is marked by a rite of passage that signifies bonding
and acceptance into the group (McCloy & Clover. 1988). Initiation rituals help identify
those suited to military life. The willingness to adopt an institution's identity suggests
that many are likely to have high affiliation needs (McClelland & Burnham. 1976) which
helps support military camaraderie.
The strongest example of this is in the Marine Corps. Marine boot camp uses lack
of sleep, total adherence to a rigid application of rules (including the proper way to hold a
cafeteria tray), dependence on the drill instructor, repetition and increasing difficulty,
danger and unpleasantness of tasks to build institutional identification. Boot camp
culminates in '‘Warrior Week" where cadets "enter as civilians and come out as Marines"
(Ricks. 1997, p. 132). The goal of Marine boot camp is to instill unquestioning
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obedience, a sense o f history- and identification, and a Marine standpoint. Ricks (1997)
followed and interviewed Marines through basic training. Key changes the Marines
themselves noticed were their new sense o f identity and camaraderie with other Marines,
and their changed view o f civilian life, which now appeared "obnoxious." lacking
"politeness” and “nasty-” (p. 231). The Corps, perhaps more than the other services, seek
to set its members apart as an elite and bonded corps, with a separate identitv
intentionallv forged by the organization.
Military officers may have undergone basic training if they were promoted
through the enlisted ranks. Other paths to commissioned officer status are the military
academies. the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). the Reserve Officer Corps
(ROC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Each o f these involves varying degrees o f
immersion into military culture. Formal military education trains officers in military
norms: both in their tasks and in how to transmit military values (Peck. 1994).
Colonel William D. Henderson. USA (1985). a combat commander and instructor
at the National Defense University, defined camaraderie as that phenomenon occurring
"when the small group, the organization and the leader come together.” ensuring that the
group functions cohesively (p. 9). According to Henderson, the military builds
camaraderie through the following: mission, policies and resources that support the small
unit, and “structural characteristics [which] de-emphasize individualism within the
soldier” (p. 10). The goal is to induce the individual to see his/her unit as the primary
group (p. 162).
The hierarchical structure of the service defines duties and roles, but also sets the
structure for command and obeying orders. The military has a blend of teamwork and
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unquestioned adherence to commands. A pamphlet written in 1899 underscores the value
the military places on obedience. "A Message to Garcia" relates a story of a man
accepting responsibility to deliver a message to someone only known as “Garcia” located
somewhere in the mountains o f Cuba, without hesitation or question:
My heart goes out to the man who does his work when the “boss” is away, as well
as when he is at home. And the man who. when given a letter for Garcia, quietly
takes the missive, without asking any idiotic questions . . . The hero is the man
who does his work - who carries the Message to Garcia. (Hubbard. 1899. p. 3)
Over 100 million copies o f the pamphlet are said to exist, giving it the largest circulation
o f any document in the world. Its popularity within the military points to the value the
military places on unquestioned obedience and the importance of carrying out orders.
Significant organizational changes in the armed forces which began in the 1950s
(Janowitz. 1960) were tremendously accelerated in the post-Vietnam era of the 1980s and
1990s. The traditional military culture has been challenged by fundamental changes in
the role o f the military from its conventional war-fighting missions of combat readiness
and unit cohesion toward more peace keeping and humanitarian missions (Dunivan.
1994: Moskos. 1977). The transition to all-volunteer forces (AVF) and the broad
expansion of civilian staff has shifted the military away from its traditional role as a
“vocation” toward an “occupation" (Moskos. 1977. 1986. 1988). The change in racial
composition o f the forces and the broadening roles of women in the military have
challenged the military's reliance on homogeneity to create unit cohesion (Dunivan.
1994). In addition, the technological complexity of the weaponry and equipment requires
both more organizational and cross-unit dependency. It also gives line commanders
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control of significant firepower, which has forced a shift o f the locus o f control
downward within the organization (Demchak. 1991).
This shift in military culture is addressed by Moskos (1977. 1986. 1988). who
stated that the military is shifting from an institutional (gemeinschaft) model toward a
more occupational (gesellschaft) model. Increasingly, there is more self-interest on the
part o f recruits and personnel who are attracted to more immediate benefits such as pay.
training and assistance with a college education. Compared to the 1960s. the personal
lives o f those in the service are more separate from the institution - off-base residency,
outside employment (by both members and spouses), less involvement o f spouses, etc.
Individuals have more of a horizontal identification with their profession, e.g.. engineers,
computer technicians (Moskos. op. cit.). Military personnel are seeking more o f a voice
in their work and their careers. At the same time, the civilian defense workforce is
expanding while the military is downsizing, which further pushes the military culture
toward occupationalism (Moskos. 1988). Officers in the services during this period
experienced significant organizational change.
Another significant change in the military is the growth in importance of
technology. One o f the strengths of the military is technological development. Space
technology, micro-circuits, computer and software architecture, robotics, simulation and
modeling, fiber optics and superconductivity are just a few o f the military technological
developments which have advanced scientific and commercial arenas (Demchak. 1991;
Stillman. 1996).
According to Demchak, (1991) the introduction o f complex technology has
changed the military. There is a higher knowledge requirement, increasing the training

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

37

investment and the cost o f turnover. Expenses have increased, which can produce risk
aversion as the cost per individual weapon platform increases dramatically. More
occupational specialties are needed, creating interconnected groups that do not fully
understand the capabilities and functions of each other. The complexity has increased to
where malfunctions are less predictable creating more uncertainty. The movement
toward complex technology creates a loss of internal expertise and unit self-reliance and
more reliance on vendors and manufacturers (Demchak. 1991). The organizational
dangers are that the technology can drive the mission (Wilson. 1989) and limit flexibility
and adaptation while increasing control (Demchak. 1991).
Military leadership development
The biggest mistake in my life was taking a military education.

General Robert E. Lee. quoted in Janowitz. I960, p. 230.
Establishing group norms requires: 1) set beliefs about what is appropriate and
required behavior for group members; 2) a commonality o f beliefs among the majority of
members; and 3) visible, institutional support for the belief, generally through a process
of rewards and sanctions (Katz & Kahn. 1978). As discussed earlier, the military uses its
orientation and education system to create a gemeinschaft organizational culture o f
defined group norms, group identity and instilled values.
The education o f career officers is a continuous process that extends over the
entire career. There are established education and experience expectations of those who
attain senior officer status, sometimes referred to as "ticket punching." Promotions are
often dependent upon length o f service, specific experiences (both command and staff
assignments), military schools and a graduate degree, as well as having a high-level
mentor and acquiring visibility (Moore and Trout 1978). In the 1970s. the services
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revised their formal evaluation and promotion system (Peck. 1994). The importance of
the evaluation has increased as downsizing has reduced the number o f high-ranking
positions. The “up or out" system requires that individuals be selected for promotion in
accordance with a strict time standard in order to remain on active duty.
The real teaching o f military leadership occurs in two places. The first is the
educational opportunities given to promising officers which usually involves technical
education and formal military schooling that provides the basis o f norms for the officer
corps (Peck. 1994).
The second source o f development is the special role of senior officers in
mentoring junior officers. A key task o f senior officers is the development of the next
generation o f senior officers. By coaching, via assignments and through example, senior
officers attempt to instill the importance of chain of command, loyalty, carry ing out
orders, and moral responsibility (Montor. McNichoIas. Ciotti. Hutchinson &
Wehmueller. 1987).
Janowitz (1960) identified three types of military leaders: the heroic leader, the
military manager and the military technologist. While technology is cutting edge in the
armed forces, the heroic leader is still held in the highest esteem. Legendary military
heroes fall into two categories: the traditionalists - managerial types such as Eisenhower.
Omar Bradley, and George Marshall: and the iconoclasts such as Frances Marion. U.S.
Grant. Jeb Stuart. Douglas McArthur. Hyman Rickover, Billy Mitchell. Ernest King and
Holland M. Smith (Janowitz. 1960).
So while the military' values and rew'ards obedience and compliance with standard
operating procedures (SOP’s), its organization and culture value the rebellious archtype.
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Many of these hero leader figures brought innovations in tactics and technology to the
services, fitting W eber's notion o f ‘’charismatic authority" which displaces the static and
traditional and then becomes the establishment itself (Weber. 1946: 1947). Yet. as the
military becomes more dependent on technology, the role o f the military manager
increases. Combat performance, however, generally carries more weight in promotions.
In summary', the key features of military informal culture include strong values
and beliefs, traditions, defined roles, a strong organizational identity', a chain o f command
and emphasis on loyalty, unit cohesion and camaraderie. This culture is instilled in
officers through the formal education process, through experience and through the
mentoring by senior officers.

The Culture of Government Organizations and the Role of Public Administrators
It is erroneous to say that there is a single government organizational culture.
Government is a network of distinct subcultures - such as environmental agencies, law
enforcement, social sendees and health (Ban. 1995: Wilson. 1989). Yet. there are some
aspects concerning the nature of government that affect the culture o f public agencies,
regardless of level, location or mission:
America has a paradoxical bureaucracy unlike that found in almost any other
advanced nation . . . . We have a system laden with rules: elsewhere that is a sure
sign that the bureaucracy is aloof from the people . . . . We also have a system
suffused with participation . (Wilson. 1989, p. 377)
While the military is part of the government, there are key differences between the
organizational cultures o f public agencies and the military.
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A review o f the literature revealed that the essence o f public sector organizational
culture is an historic and continued tension centered in these key areas: conflicting
values, changing missions and vague goals: a fragmented, mechanistic structure: a
personnel system centered on patronage versus merit: a neutral versus activist role for its
administrators; and a budgetary system based on resource efficiency (rationalism) versus
programmatic outcome (politics). Modem government was forged within the context o f
these tensions in the era o f scientific management. The strength of that legacy remains
almost 100 years later.
Conflicting Values. Changing Missions and Vague Goals
Goals are central to an organization, defining both the identity of the organization
and what it does. They determine the boundaries for its members and its relationship
with other organizations. (Thompson. 1967). An organization's values guide its
direction, decision-making and priorities. Public organizations have traditional values
that are often in competition with each other: efficiency, the public good, effectiveness,
ethics, social equity and responsiveness. In the military, the values of duty, honor and
country converge. In government, its key values are often in conflict.
Presidential advisor and theorist Luther Gulick promoted “efficiency as axiom
number one in the value scale o f administration" during the 1930s and 1940s (Gulick &
Urwick. 1937. p. 192). Efficiency ensures that public monies are spent well and focuses
on productivity measurements (Brudnev & Morgan. 1988). One of the problems in
discussing efficiency in a government setting according to Dalton and Dalton (1988) is
that there is no agreement on what "efficiency" is. Different approaches to efficiency maximizing outputs, managing inputs and processes, and supply and demand —have been
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used to measure productivity in government (Dalton and Dalton. 1988). The method o f
evaluating efficiency can shift for political reasons or with the frequently changing trends
in government budgeting systems. As Wholey noted (1983). government agencies often
select efficiency measurements that easily generate numbers rather than utilizing
measurements that are most important for managing performance and results.
While Gulick promoted efficiency as the primary value for government, the
public good would appear to be the value most aligned with the mission of government.
There are two problems in using the public good as a basis for decision-making. First,
the public good can be difficult to define. Some see the public good in utilitarian terms
(Locke. 1690/1986: Mill, 1863/1951) - as that which maximizes benefits for the most
people - while others see the public good as that which advances us as a civic society
(Bellah. 1992: Bellah. Madsen. Sullivan. Swidler & Tipton. 1991) or as that which
benefits society's poorest (Rawls. 1967). Secondly, the public good can conflict with
efficiency. Government entities often design intentionally inefficient programs to
promote a public good - such as in the 1980's when government agencies were mandated
to use a new. more expensive and poor quality product (recycled paper) to create a
national market.
Effectiveness means that programs achieve their intended results. Determining
the effectiveness o f government programs is a challenge, as most social programs have
long-term results that are difficult both to measure and to analyze for causal relations,
e.g.. improving education, making neighborhoods safer, improving the health of children,
etc. The challenge o f measuring outcomes makes it difficult to control and improve
processes (Wilson. 1989). This is further complicated by the condition that most
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programs have multiple outcomes (Dalton & Dalton. 1988). Effectiveness
considerations may, at times, indicate that more money be spent to increase results or to
reach more people, when efficiency measurements point to making another choice - e.g..
concluding that identifying and immunizing the last 3% of children carries too high a
cost. These quality versus quantity conflicts often occur in budget debates.
The ethical standard of government service is not just to act within the law. but
that actions be above the appearance of impropriety. Ethics has taken primacy over
efficiency in the design o f the civil service system and the contracting and procurement
system. These systems were designed with intentional inefficiencies considered to be
worth the price to ensure ethical government - such as the multiple steps of the employee
selection process and the redundant checks and balances in the procurement system
which safeguard against nepotism. American government has historically chosen an
approach of legalistic and procedural controls (rules and fear o f punishment) over one
promoting ethical values (Ban. 1995; Bellah. 1992).
Responsiveness addresses how well the government reflects the will o f the
stakeholders. The problem with the democratic safeguard o f participatory democracy is.
as James Madison noted in Federalist 10. there is no single will o f the people:
[When] you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights o f other citizens: or if such a motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
(Hamilton. Jay & Madison. 1788/1961)
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The United States is. by design, a pluralistic system with competing interests and this
ongoing competition “define[s] the alternatives of public policy" (Schattschneider. 1975.
p. 138). In Madison's time the ‘‘variety o f parties and interests" were solely white male
landowners. Today, they include the complete spectrum and full complexity o f society.
Particularly since the 1960s, social equity has been the driving value behind some
government programs addressing race and gender issues. The New Public
Administration movement (Waldo. 1971; 1984) argued that government administration
has an activist role to play in engineering opportunities for the less advantaged. In
government, social equity concerns can take precedence over efficiency considerations
such as when policies designate a specific percentage o f contracts for minority and
women-owned business versus to the lowest bidder.
Competing values coupled with vague missions allow the focus o f public agencies
to shift with political considerations. For example, an environmental agency can find its
mission change from strictly enforcing regulations to making an area more businessfriendly. At other times, vague direction from elected officials leaves administrative staff
with broad discretion but also positioned to receive the blame for poorly perceived social
programs (Yates. 1982). These competing values and vague mission and goals are a key
difference between the organizational cultures o f the military and the public sector.
Public Administrative Structure - Fragmented and Mechanistic bv Design
The approach to public administration was strongly influenced by scientific
management theorists and government consultants. Fredrick Taylor (1916/1987) and
Henri Fayol (1916/1987). Their approach was further developed and articulated by
British military officer Lyndall Urwick and Luther Gulick (1937) who were advisors to
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Franklin Roosevelt. They adhered to the classic “machine model" o f bureaucracies with
centralized structures, unity of command, and specialization o f functions. Gulick brought
these principles to his work on the Brownlow Commission in 1937. which overhauled
federal agencies into separate functions determined by purpose, process, clientele,
material or geography to maximize efficient delivery o f services.
This led to agency proliferation on every level o f government —from federal
down to local government - and resulted in a pluralistic bureaucracy that promotes
agency competitiveness (Dahl. 1956; Dilulio. Garvey & Kettl. 1993; Yates. 1982). This
fragmentation among agencies persists today, reinforced by funding policies that promote
agency rivalries and a proliferation o f programs that address the same issues. It
contributes to duplication o f services provided by a confusing array o f agencies involved
in a single function (Dilulio. et al. 1993; Yates. 1982). Collaboration and joint action are
complicated by the multiple agency approvals needed to carry out action (Pressman &
Wildavsky. 1973). The result is the opposite of efficiency and rationality.
Some of the standard behaviors o f public organizations include protecting one's
turf, prolonging existing programs indefinitely and avoiding controversy (Yates. 1982).
To conserve their power, public bureaucracies often cling to old missions, maintain
narrow, agency-focused perspectives, and rely on standard operating procedures and
traditional alliances when the times call for new strategies and reaching out to new
constituencies (Allison. 1971; Dilulio. et al. 1993). Agencies may respond to the need
for new programs by simply creating new procedures (Yates. 1982). Thus, the structure
o f government contributes to a fragmented, competitive approach to problem solving and
a proliferation of procedures and regulations. While there is certainly some competition
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and rivalry among the branches o f the military, the dominant drive within all military
branches is to support the defense of the country and the assigned mission.
Public Personnel Systems —Patronage Versus Merit
The roots o f the public personnel system are in the scientific management notions
o f ‘"breaking down the work o f an organization into narrow ly defined positions, each with
clearly delineated responsibilities" (Ban. 1995. p. 193). The products o f the public
personnel system are: a proliferation o f job classifications, rigidity in a manager's
staffing options, lengthy hiring processes and an expectation of a lifetime career as noted
by White, writing in 1937: “By a [government] career service. I mean a life-w'ork. an
occupation w hich one normally takes up in youth, with the expectation o f advancement,
and pursues until retirement” (p. 7). Traditional practice within government has been to
promote staff from within so there is both institutional history and the motivation o f a
career ladder (Ban. 1995: White. 1937).
There are aspects o f government service that are attractive to security-motivated
individuals - the prospect o f career employment, benefits, a guaranteed pay scale and job
protection. A concern within the public sector is also attracting staff oriented toward
innovation and risk-taking. The ongoing issue is how' to motivate staff toward high
performance when there is little tie between pay and performance and when it can take
over a year to terminate an employee with civil service protection for poor performance
(Ban. 1995: Dilulio. et al. 1993).
Pugh (1991) wTote that government is a unique blending o f “bureaucratic ethos"
focused on organizational efficiency as good government and "democratic ethos” focused
on values o f citizenship and social equity. Perry and Wise (1990) hypothesized that there
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may be motivational needs centered around values of service which draw individuals to
careers in the public sector. Ting (1997). using data from the Survey of Federal
Government Employees conducted with over 56.700 federal employees in 1991-1992.
found that 'The notion o f serving the public had no effect on the job satisfaction of public
employees" (p. 320). He also found commitment to public organizations was interrelated
with job satisfaction, but could not establish a causal relationship.
Gabris and Simo (1995) surveyed 150 employees from the private, public and
non-profit sectors and found that public employees had the lowest job satisfaction rate.
They also found no significant difference in levels of motivation toward community
service among the three sectors. Neither of these studies found any evidence of a public
sector motivation, nor did the researchers identify any such evidence in their review o f
other research efforts, though there is admittedly limited research in this area. Thus,
while there are certainly public employees who are drawn to government employment
based on the notion of service, there does not appear to be the same "service to your
country" attraction in public employment as there is in the military.
The Role of Public Administrators - Neutrality versus Activism
In the 1880s. Woodrow Wilson called for the establishment of public
administration as a profession, emphasizing scientific business practices and the
separation of politics and policymaking from administration. Administrators were to act
based on rational analysis while elected officials gave legislative and policy direction
based on political considerations (Wilson. 1887). Utilitarian phrases such as
"maximizing benefits" guided administrative decisions (Rosenbloom & Ross. 1994).
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Herbert Simon (1947) and Dwight Waldo (1948) critiqued both the neutrality
principal and the scientific management approach. Simon wTote that administrators could
not make rational, neutral decisions because they were limited by incomplete
information, particularly regarding consequences, and by their own capacities to absorb
the amount o f information relating to complex social and political programs. Operating
under conditions o f what he termed “bounded rationality." administrators needed to also
rely on values as a basis for decisions that would benefit the public. Both Waldo and
Simon criticized "economy" and “efficiency" for failing to provide sufficient direction as
operational values. They also viewed hierarchy and centralization as at odds with the
democratic principles o f access and responsiveness. Simon concluded that, operating in a
political environment with limited information, public administrators could, at best,
produce “satisficing" public policies - ones that satisfied political leaders and were
sufficient to address some aspects o f programmatic needs (1947).
The neutrality debate continues today in the area of policy implementation. The
difference is between those who hold that public administrators should strictly implement
and evaluate programs in keeping with the original intent of the authorizing legislation
(Lowi. 1979: Mazmanian & Sabatier. 1981; Thompson. 1975). and those who believe
public administrators need the authority to address pragmatic implementation and to be
responsive to their customers (Lindblom & Woodhouse. 1993: Majone & Wildavsky.
1979; Wilson. 1989). According to Lindblom & Woodhouse:
Policymaking often proceeds through trial and error, and the street-level
bureaucrats who work with a program every day are in a much better position to
observe feedback and perceive what is not working than are elected officials far
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removed from the scene. Information generated in the process of implementing
programs constantly pushes policy in new directions, and administrators rather
than top officials are the primary' implementers. monitors and interpreters of the
trials, errors and error corrections. (1993. p. 63)
Politicians, special interests and administrators form what Sabatier (1988) has called the
“iro n Triangle" o f public policy, which operates on competing perspectives. Special
interests promote their parochial views. The role o f bureaucracy is to take the long-term
view of problems, yet it also protects its own turf and interests (Wilson. 1989: Yates.
1982). Politicians are responsive to the current situations by legislating policy and (at
times) by micromanaging implementation. As such, they are often at odds:
Understandably [government bureaucrats] see themselves as experts in their
fields, yet many o f the constraints on them are the work o f people they regard as
uninformed amateurs [legislators and other politicians]. . . . If people outside
government think they are the victims o f irrelevant obligations and prohibitions,
they should see what those inside have to put up w ith.. . . (Kaufman. 1977. p. 26)
The conflicting perspectives of different agencies involved in a single issue as well as
civic input further complicate the situation of public bureaucracies, though this is critical
to the democratic process:
Although one can easily make sport of the public sector as “chaotic" and
“disorganized." those features can contribute to government's openness and
effectiveness in the broadest sense o f increasing the popular support for a regime.
(Golembiewski. 1985. p. 17)
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The pulling and hauling o f the conflict is intended to bring balanced perspective to issues.
As a result, public administrators work in a daily atmosphere of competition and conflict
where citizens have ready access to their organizations. In contrast, many military
officers who are not stationed “within the beltway" in Washington DC are distanced from
congressional pressure and defense industry lobbying.
Public Budgeting and Decision-Making: Rationalism or Politics?
Charles Lindblom (1959) took Simon and W aldo's critique o f rationalism further.
He recognized that government decisions are based on limited information and on
political will - what he called “the science o f muddling through.” Thus, administrators
are operating in an arena o f responding to short-term political conditions with
incremental decisions. Programmatic direction is adjusted on an ongoing basis, both to
gauge outcomes and public political reactions.
Inspired by Lindblom. Aaron Wildavsky (1974) debated the rationalist approach
by incorporating incrementalism to perceptions o f public sector budgeting. Wildavsky
argued that budgets are political not rational documents. Budgets essentially reflect
incremental changes based on what is amenable to change and what will stir a minimum
o f attention and controversy. Because individuals are cognitively limited, stated
Wildavsky. incrementalism serves the public good.
Wildavsky's view is bom out in the actions of government. In reality, public
agencies and programs, once established, take on a life o f their own and are difficult to
disband, regardless o f their contemporary usefulness (Kaufman. 1976). As Wildavsky
found, public managers have identified successful ways of avoiding cuts, enhancing
programs and increasing funding in a budgeting process that he observed is more game
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than rationality. In practice, the plethora o f agencies makes it difficult to coordinate and
integrate programmatic efforts, and operating in an environment o f limited resources
helps create interagency conflict (Wise. 1994).
This is an area where public agencies and the military culture are very similar.
The military shares this incremental approach to budgeting, and there are military
weapons and programs funded past the time of their strategic usefulness. The military is
also bound by the limitations of knowing and analyzing all the factors critical to decision
making. Further, the different branches o f the service are at times competing for the
same budget allocations, and replicate programs unnecessarily.

Differences Between Government and Military Organizational Cultures
The military has a strong organizational culture that pre-dates the creation o f the
United States government. The centrality o f hierarchy/chain of command is a mainstay
in this culture where orders are generally obeyed. Administrative agencies have multiple
authorities with overlapping jurisdictions. The "iron triangle” o f the legislature,
government agencies and interest groups ensures that there is no certainty o f which will
prevail. Every decision, every' policy is political and the process is public. Directives are
obeyed because o f the power currently possessed by their initiator. Directives may not be
adhered to because o f the discretionary power o f agencies and the independence of staff.
The mission in the military has traditionally been clear - to protect and defend the
nation and its interests. The goals of specific operations are generally related to this
overarching mission. This clarity has diminished in recent years with the undertaking o f
more humanitarian missions and limited engagements such as Somalia and Bosnia. Yet.
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the missions and goals o f the military are more specific that those of governmental
agencies, where missions are quite broad and often change with the election o f new
legislators and the shifting of power among interest groups. Public sector goals are not
clear to staff when the enabling legislation is vague, when the goals change with political
fortunes or when conflicting values further muddy the true goals o f a program and even
communicate to staff that there are no true goals to a program. While military officers
have generally experienced the completion o f missions and perhaps some level of
victory, public programs are ongoing and results are difficult to measure. The public
arena prevents the effective implementation o f controversial programs, and public
administrators must settle for "satisficing” (Simon. 1947).
Military personnel can recite the values of duty, honor and country. These values
are instilled in basic training and reinforced throughout a military career. Other public
agencies must juggle the shifting values of efficiency, effectiveness, the public good,
ethical government, social equity and responsiveness. Traditionally, the public sector
uses a legalistic, compliance approach to ensuring its employees adhere to policies,
directives and ethical practices rather than infusing values in its staff.
Many military personnel were attracted to join and remain in the service because
o f a sense o f patriotic duty and because of the culture and values o f the organization.
There is a strong organizational identification, loyalty and sense o f camaraderie within
one's unit and with other members of the service branch. There are varied attractions to
public sector employment: a sense of public service, job security and stability and good
benefits. There is generally a stronger identification with one's profession rather than the
organization. Military discipline is far stricter than the civil service system.
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Ferdinand Tonnies identified two types of organizations: gemeinschafr where
tradition and strong organizational identity build a strong, cohesive organization and
gesellschafi. where the organization exists to cany out a specific function. While the
modem military is transitioning to more o f a gesellschafi organization, it remains largely
true to its traditions. Despite some changes in the military, there remain key differences
between the organizational cultures o f government agencies and the military.
While government shares bureaucratic structures and the notion o f public service
with the military, the informal cultures o f the two sectors are quite distinct. Government
operates in an open, visible arena with extensive citizen and legislative involvement. Its
informal culture is that o f a more rational, occupational bureaucracy {gesellschafi).
These differences may affect the transition of military officers into the public sector.

Transition to the Public Sector
Career changes represent a significant adult transition, especially when there is a
"role shift," which sociologist Naomi Golan (1981) defined as "relinquishing one set o f
social rules and taking on another" (p. 19). When individuals are challenged by a
transition, they may experience difficulty in separating from the past, in making and
carrying out decisions and in weathering adjustments.
The issue o f “fit" —integrating the individual and the organization - is a key issue
in organizational effectiveness (Argyris. 1964). The concept o f "fit" addresses whether
or not the job can supply sufficient motivators to satisfy the employee's needs and
whether the employee has the abilities to adapt to the job requirements (French. Caplan &
Van Harrison, 1982). A lack o f fit between the person and the work environment is an
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important predictor of strain in the individual (French. 1973: French. Rogers & Cobb.
1974; French. Caplan & Van Harrison. 1982).
Organizations are a system o f roles that are communicated and clarified via
approval, disapproval, rewards and sanctions (Katz & Kahn, 1978). The process of
socialization to a new organization is learning the “norms, values and role behaviors”
expected o f organization members in certain positions (Klauser & Groves. 1994. p. 191).
Role ambiguity occurs when the individual is uncertain as to what is expected in the
organization (Burke, 1982). In retiring from the military, retirees are leaving familiar roles
that they have accepted since entering the service. Many retired military officers settle into
jobs very similar technically to those in the military. However, entering the civilian
workforce may present significant role ambiguity as the retiree is unfamiliar with the new
organization's culture, or even its basic ground rules (Jacobsen. 1990). If the ambiguity is
unresolved, an individual can experience stress over his/her role in the organization and
become resistant to change, especially in periods o f uncertainty (Kahn, et al. 1964).
The success o f individuals in transitioning into a new organization depends on
their tolerance for ambiguity and their high need for affiliation, which causes them to
seek out those contacts that can teach them the informal culture of an organization
(Klauser & Groves. 1994). For a successful transition to occur, “the will to change has to
overcome an impulse to restore the past, to resist the change" (Golan. 1981, p. 16), but a
frequent consequence of role stress is an attempt to return to the past. Research has
shown that an individual in role stress during change and transition will more often revert
back to earlier behaviors and attempt to preserve the past (Kahn, et al. 1964; Marris,
1974). Further, Glass (1977) found that among Type A personalities - which describes

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

I
i

54

many military officers —there was a stronger need to control their environment as a
response to role ambiguity.
The transition from military to the public sector environment is potentially a
stressful one. Retirees are leaving behind a unique cultural environment they have
experienced for over twenty years and entering a significantly different culture. Those
having difficulty’ in making this transition might respond by trying to recreate military’
structures and practices in their new work environment- Leadership can alter the culture
in an organization through modeling, rewards or sanctions (Bass. 1985; Kouzes and
Posner, 1987; Schein, 1992).
A gap between the individual's expectations and the realities of the organization
can also affect job satisfaction (Kahn, et al, 1964). Many retiring officers experience an
initial loss o f salary and level of responsibility in their civilian career transition. The
transition preparation they receive from the military and their orientation upon entering
the public sector may play a crucial role in their successful adaptation and career
satisfaction. Unfortunately, the curriculum o f military's Transition Assistance Program
(U. S. Departmcr.; o f Lab c 1998: Veterans' Employment and Training Service. 1995)
focuses primarily on career development areas such as skill assessment, resume writing,
interviewing and job search skills. The program does not adequately address the issues
of assessing and adapting to new organizational cultures. In a study of 122 retired naval
officers done by Webb (1990). retirees criticized the military's transition program for
failing to address the differences in organizational expectations of the military versus and
civilian sectors.
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No study was found addressing the differences between military and public sector
organizational cultures. The majority o f the books and articles written about retired
military entering civilian employment address the strengths such individuals bring to the
workforce, but fail to address the very real issue of transition and adaptation (Bowers.
1996; Carrison & Walsh. 1999; Jacobsen. 1990; Savino & Krannich. 1995; TROA. 1996:
Whelan. 1981). This research project did not discover any transition assistance or
executive coaching provided by public sector entities in the San Diego area to new
employees transitioning from the military. One may conclude that retired officers have
had to rely on their own wits or the support o f associates and mentors to analyze and
adjust to a new leadership role in a new organizational culture.
Significantly, this major career transition is occurring at mid-life. There are some
researchers who maintain that personality dynamics are fairly constant through adulthood
(Costa & McCrae. 1989). Others (Erickson, 1982; Gould. 1980; Levinson. Darrow.
Klein. Levinson. & McKee. 1978; Peck. 1968) have found mid-life to be a potential time
for personal reassessment and sometimes crisis. If a mid-life transition is already
occurring, a career transition can produce additional stress and complications (Levinson,
et al. 1978). As the public sector is currently in a state o f flux and disruption, this could
increase the strain on transitioning officers.

Reforming, Reinventing and Reducing the Public Sector
Government has never been under greater pressure to innovate. Call it
reinventing, reengineering, paradigm shifting, or plain old change, the bottom

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p ro d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

line remains the same: government must produce more with less and satisfy the
customer while doing it. (Light. 1994. p. 63)
The public sector has recently been under intense criticism to reform. There are systemwide efforts to make government more business-like by focusing on customer service,
empowering employees, reengineering processes, introducing market factors such as
incentive pay. bonuses and competition, and dismantling public bureaucratic systems
such as civil service, competitive procurement and program budgeting (Goldsmith. 1997
Kettl. 1993: 1994; Osbourne & Plastrik. 1997).
The tax reform movement, e.g.. Proposition 13 in California, and the election of
"outsiders’*such as Presidents Carter and Reagan were the early signals o f a broadening
dissatisfaction with government (Ban, 1995; Eggers & O ’Leary. 1995). According to
Kettl (1994). the perceived failure of the social programs o f the 1960s and the wellpublicized scientific failures (e.g., Three Mile Island, the Challenger disaster) contributed
to a decline in faith in experts and technology to solve problems:
The problem was not just a failure of government, although problems in some
areas were manifest. Rather, the public was less confident that any strong power,
public or private, could understand or cope with the huge uncertainties
surrounding public problems, (pp. 28-29)
Growing public dissatisfaction with government’s ability to solve problems became a
mandate for change. Osbourne and Gabler's Reinventing Government (1991) became a
best seller and spawned a movement. Osbourne and Plastrik (1997) defined reinventing
government as:
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the fundamental transformation of public systems and organizations to create
dramatic increases in their effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability and capacity to
innovate. This transformation is accomplished by changing their purpose,
incentives, accountability, power structure and culture" (pp. 13-14).
Osbourne and Plastrik outlined five key strategies for government reinvention which
have been embraced at the federal level by Vice President Gore's National Performance
Review (1993) as well as by state and local reform efforts.
The "core strategy” is similar to Peters and Waterman's (1982) formula to "stick
to the knitting” by focusing on core competencies. In a throwback to Woodrow Wilson,
it argues for a separation of legislative policymaking from bureaucratic policy
implementation. The "consequences strategy” embraces managed competition for
agencies to force efficiencies and performance incentives for employees such as bonuses,
merit pay and gainsharing. The "customer strategy” introduces accountability by
allowing public customers a choice, and implements customer quality-assurance practices
from the private sector. The "control strategy" focuses on lifting internal systemic
barriers particularly in recruitment, appointments, retention, discipline, promotions,
procurement and budget. The "culture strategy" is an organizational development
approach to changing government culture from a hierarchical monopoly into flexible,
responsive, efficient organizations.
The key changes proposed focus on instituting business practices, forms of
privatization, a customer service orientation, broader citizen involvement and input, and a
new public personnel system.
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Running Government More Like a Business
Part o f the drive to run government more like a business is frustration over the
ineffectiveness o f some social programs. Part o f it is a classical capitalism belief in
competition as the key to efficient organizations:
The absence o f competition has a devastating effect on efficiency. With some
heroic exceptions, government has performed as one would expect a monopoly to
perform: with little innovation, little regard for customer welfare, and escalating
costs . . . . We know the productive power o f competitive markets. The challenge
is to extend markets throughout government. (Eggers & O'Leary. 1995. p. 97)
There are some benefits to introducing the private sector model into government.
Managed competition has created rewards for innovation and risk taking and some
competitive efforts have profoundly streamlined public operations and saved substantial
tax dollars (Goldsmith, 1997: Osbourne & Plastrik. 1997). As risk taking is not generally
rewarded in the public arena (Golembiewski. 1985). competition can force dramatic
reengineering.
While it is difficult to measure the outcomes o f social programs, government can
often benefit by adapting private sector evaluation systems. Traditionally, government
has measured what is easy to measure (Wholey. 1983). Government budgets also focus
on inputs and expenditures rather than results. Identifying and using true efficiency
measurements would improve management and performance in government
organizations (Brudney and Morgan. 1988).
What Eggers and O'Leary fail to take into account are the differences in the roles
of government and business. According to Riddle (1988 ) and Dilulio and associates
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(1993). government is not subject to market pressure but political pressure. Supply and
demand do not work in an environment where demand for sendees far exceeds what
citizens are willing to pay in taxes.
Business practices, moreover, do not provide all the necessary solutions. One
practice that has improved some government programs is taking a multi-agency, multi
discipline approach to the complex problems o f society (Kettl, 1994). The success of
such an approach often depends on non-competitive, collaborative practices across
agencies and merging funding streams. A prime example of such initiatives are familyfocused programs involving social service, schools, police, mental health, probation,
employment and public health agencies.
Privatization and Public/Private Partnerships
Privatization in government can take many forms. It may involve: transferring
assets to the private sector (e.g., airports and landfills): ending a government monopoly in
providing a service (e.g.. private jails and fire departments): complete outsourcing: and
introducing a public and private competitive bidding process (or "managed competition")
where government employees bid against private companies to win a contract and retain
their jobs (Wise. 1994).
The argument for privatization is that private competition creates pressure to seek
efficiencies. Competition between government and private providers (e.g.. school
vouchers) can create incentives for quality service and shrink costs (Goldsmith. 1997:
Osbourne. & Plastrik, 1997). Those arguing for outright privatization do not see the issue
as reinventing government, but as cutting government (Eggers & O'Leary, 1995:
President's Commission on Privatization. 1988).
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The real problem is really threefold. First, government is too big. Second,
government is too centralized. Third, government management is embedded in
politics, and is therefore inherently limited in efficiency. (Eggers & O 'L ean-.
1995, p. 150)
The small government movement is mired in both sincere efforts to improve government
and political trends with their roots in Mill. Locke and Jefferson. Public sector leadership
is caught in the middle.
In truth, the United States has contracted for services since the Revolutionary
War. The Progressive reformers challenged favoritism in the granting o f contracts in the
1880s that led to the system of competitive procurement, precise contract specifications
and sealed bids. Proponents see advantages to private contracting for public services:
freedom from regulations imposed on public organizations, the ability to specify and
control services, freedom to implement performance incentives and ability to dismiss
low-performing contract employees (Goldsmith. 1997).

The call to increase the

contracting out o f public services is being criticized by those also examining the
problems in government contracting (Dilulio. et al. 1993: Kettl. 1993).
There are some challenges in government contracting due to the differences
between the public and private sectors. As previously noted, government does not
operate in a market situation. Supply and demand are not effective as public “market"
forces. There is a limitless demand on government services. Secondly, government often
requires unique services. On the local level, there is often a lack of qualified bidders.
Thus, once a relationship is established, government agencies seek to retain a specific
vendor even at the expense o f the "arms length" relationship historically established to
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guard against favoritism. Third, the requirements of competitive bidding means there is
no guarantee that performance will lead to a renewed contract. This creates incentives
for government contractors to maximize profits in the short term by cutting comers and
by under-performing (Kettl. 1993). Finally, government also provides services that are
often difficult to measure (Wilson. 1989). It therefore often focuses on measuring the
input side o f its contracts, such as number o f staff hours provided or clients seen, rather
than quality o f the outputs and results achieved (Kettl, 1993).
Aside from market imperfections, there are strategic concerns in contracting that
public sector leaders must consider. There is a danger that contracting can result in a loss
o f expertise within government. Government agencies can lose their capacity to manage,
oversee and evaluate their contractors (Kettl, 1994). Secondly, widespread contracting
can result in what Kettl called, "government by proxy." where the contractor is - without
true accountability - responsible for representing the public interest and for responding to
stakeholders. Government becomes distanced from those it is to serve (Dilulio. et al.
1993; Kettl, 1993).
Changing to a Customer Service Orientation
Citizens are dissatisfied with a "monopoly" attitude by public agencies. As the
sole provider of some services, government agencies have historically focused on the
inputs o f their programs - the amount of resources expended - rather than the satisfaction
of their customers. In fact, the word "customer" was seldom utilized in government just
ten years ago. Now government agencies are re-defining their service in terms of
satisfaction, examining not just what is delivered, but how. Agencies are seeking
feedback, utilizing surveys and other new measurements (Osbourne and Plastrik. 1997).
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The customer service paradigm has produced some landmark changes in agencies such as
courthouses and motor vehicle departments that formerly designed operations for their
internal convenience, but the customer focus is not an easy fit for all o f government.
Part o f the challenge in transforming to a customer-driven operation is that
government has multiple customers with conflicting agenda. The direct service recipients
seek responsiveness: partners in service provision (other agencies, private social service
agencies) seek effectiveness: those doing program oversight (legislative staff and elected
officials) seek accountability and taxpayers seek efficiency (the best use o f their money)
and responsiveness. It is unclear how public agencies are to balance the different
measurements as well as the different customer goals (Dilulio. et al. 1993). In a
"saticficing’" environment, no customer is truly satisfied.
Additionally, some government agencies have a difficult time translating their
roles in enforcement or technical areas into the new language o f public service providers.
For example, is the prisoner the ''customer” o f a jail guard? Some in the public sector
have criticized the customer orientation for promoting individual benefit (what is good
for the individual) rather than partnership and public/private collective effort (what is in
the interest o f society) (Barrett & Greene. 1998).
Broadening Citizen Involvement
In the public sector, according to Golembiewski (1985). success is measured in
political terms. A goal in citizen involvement is the "doctrine o f equality" (Yates. 1982)
which is expanding the number and breadth of the stakeholders at the table. Citizen
access to public agencies has been broadened through citizen oversight committees,
public hearings and regulations that expand access to information such as open meeting
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laws (Anderson. Newland & Stillman. 1983). Broader public input can improve the
identification o f problems and options and improve decision-making (Bryson & Crosby.
1992; Chrislip & Larson. 1994; Elmore. 1982). Unfortunately, the professional “guild”
mentality o f some technical experts can lead to discounting citizen and legislative input
(Golembiewski. 1985; Yates. 1982).
The result o f expanded citizen access is that more stakeholders bring more issues
to the table. Input from the external environment expands the organization's boundaries.
The agency response is to broaden its mission, and expand its programs, rules and
processes (Yates. 1982). The organization may also be compelled by political decisions
to take on non-core tasks which dilute talent and resources (Wilson. 1989). These
broadened organizational boundaries add complexity to leadership tasks such as decision
making.
The Changing Relationship o f Government and its Employees
To be a successful, modem bureaucracy, government organizations must shift
from being compliance organizations that rely on rules and policies to direct and control
its employees, to becoming organizations that promote independent decision-making
based on shared values and ethics (Wilson. 1989). Key to this is the human resources
system.
The tradition o f government employment is stability and job security. Since the
reforms o f the Progressive Era. there has been a "covenant" relationship o f sorts between
government and its employees. In exchange for long service and compliance with rules,
government employees worked within a system where: the classification system defined
their job and promotion ladder; the step advancement system rewarded their longevity of
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service: the hierarchy defined their responsibility: and the civil service system protected
them from capricious employment actions by political leaders and appointees. The
public personnel system is cited by many as a key problem in transforming government
organizations:
The civil service system is the crux o f government's most enduring performance
problems. There is a need to reduce or. where possible, eliminate personnel rules
and work regulations that sap public employees' productivity, making careers in
public service unattractive to talented, energetic potential candidates. (Dilulio. et
al, 1993, p. 64)
The scientific management belief in specialization of jobs and the progressive belief in
standardization o f personnel procedures to remove discretion and favoritism may have
worked a century ago when the goals of government were simpler. Public personnel
management has been broken for decades.
Now there is a movement to rebuild the human resources system with a mix of
proposals: broadbanding, which collapses multiple job classifications into a single broad
job description with a wide band o f pay; performance-based pay systems: incentive
systems such as merit pay and gainsharing: decentralization of human resources systems:
and flatter organizations with authority given to work teams. Some radical initiatives
have eliminated civil service rights entirely (Walters, 1997).
The potential o f managed competition, outsourcing and layoffs has broken the
covenant o f job security, affecting employee morale. The government is now the only
sector in the nation with rising unionization. So. while many government agencies are
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changing, there often remains a need to rebuild employee trust to create an atmosphere
that will support, not fight, organizational change (Ban. 1995).
Public personnel reforms also need to consider the broader goals o f governments.
Contractors often save money by paying less in wages and benefits and by relying on part
time contract or temporary workers (Goldsmith. 1997). As government has a larger
interest in the viability of the local economy and the creation and retention o f living wage
jobs, hiring low-wage contractors can conflict with the larger interests o f government
entities (Marcelli & Joassart. 1998).
The proposals to change government carry both promise and problems. Some of
the complaints about the public sector are endemic to large organizations, others are
unique to democratic government:
All complex organizations display bureaucratic problems of confusion, red tape,
and the avoidance o f responsibility. Those problems are much greater in
government bureaucracies because government itself is the institutionalization of
confusion (arising out of the need to moderate competing demands): of red tape
(arising out of the need to satisfy demands that cannot be moderated): and of
avoided responsibility (arising out of the desire to retain power by minimizing
criticism). . . . Many, if not most, of the difficulties we experience in dealing with
government agencies arise from the agencies being part of a fragmented and open
political system. (Wilson. 1989. pp. 375-376)
Given the realities of public administration in a participatory democracy, organizational
change can be challenging.
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The Difficulty of Organizational Change in the Public Sector
According to Golembiewski (1985), there are factors about the structure and
habits o f the public sector that make organizational change difficult to facilitate.
Structurally, there are multiple authorities (the “Iron Triangle") and multiple avenues o f
influence. There is continual interplay and shifts in power among the legislature,
executive branch, agencies, courts, media and special interests. The chain o f command
also has competing identities and interests —labor/management, career service/political
appointees, technician/manager, etc. The election-term focus of many politicians steers
efforts toward quick results, creates rewards for risk-averse behavior, and alters program
goals with electoral change (Golembiewski, 1985). These factors diminish the chances
of agreeing upon a decisive plan for change.
The practices o f government also limit the success o f change efforts. The
multiple layers o f review and approval inhibit delegation and the development o f
innovative practices. The need for standardization and legal compliance steers public
organizations to cling to past practices. The need for security and secrecy restricts open
communication within the organization. Finally, public leaders have fewer resources,
less control over management o f their staff and less rewards for innovation
(Golembiewski. 1985). These factors make it easier to maintain existing structures and
practices than to perform the difficult work of transformational change.
Leadership
Public sector organizations are clearly in a time o f transition, uncertainty and
organizational change. The very nature o f government and what it ought to do (its
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mission and core functions) is under public debate. With increased privatization,
growing citizen involvement and the changing employment relationship within the civil
service system, government is fundamentally changing. It is necessary for government to
go from a culture o f compliance to a culture of performance. There are disagreements as
to whether leadership can change organizational culture. Perhaps leadership alone cannot
do it. but I would argue that leadership has a central role in the success of such an effort.
The risk of turning to leadership is that there is no universally accepted definition
o f leadership (Bums. 1979; Rost. 1993). Rost outlined the historical trends of the
twentieth century views o f leadership. The great man theory espouses that leaders are
great men who shape history through their actions and intentions - espoused as early as
Plato’s notion o f the philosopher-king (1956). Leadership involves knowing the proper
path, and obtaining the control and authority needed to ensure followers do the wishes of
the leader (Bennis and Nanus. 1985). Charismatic views o f leadership (Conger and
Kanungo. 1989) and servant leadership (Greenleaf. 1977) are offshoots of the great man
theory. These are leader-centered views, wherein the leaders shape the vision, values,
goals and direction o f the change. In a similar vein, trait theory (Bass. 1985; Stogill.
1974) focused on identifying the common traits that good leaders shared. This was
prominent in the 1950s and 1960s. and reemerged in the 1980s.
Group theory focuses on leadership as a facilitative process particularly involving
divergent views. It promotes broad input within groups in contrast to the control aspects
o f the great man theory . In the 1940s, it addressed small groups; contemporary group
theory encompasses the importance o f forging consensus among stakeholders (Bryson &
Crosby, 1992; Chrislip & Larson, 1994).
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Behavioral leadership examines what behaviors in combination constitute
leadership. Many o f these theorists shared a normative approach that established a "one
right way’*that constituted good leadership such as McGregor's Theory X and Y (1960)
and Blake and Mouton's managerial grid (1964). But this normative approach did not
retain its dominance in leadership theory. The experience o f the sixties demonstrated that
there was a wider variety o f human and group behavior. The contingency/ situational
theory o f leadership held that the leader had to change styles, depending on the
circumstances (Fiedler. 1967: Hershey and Blanchard. 1988).
The 1980s was a confusing period as many basic societal assumptions were
challenged including national superiority. Having failed to win a war and been held
hostage literally and economically in the Middle East, the county sought new directions
for leadership. A profusion of literature on leadership was produced, much of it having
little to do with actual leadership. Leadership was organizational "excellence" (Peters
and Waterman. 1982); it was - drawing from the work o f Weber (1947) —charismatic
(Conger. 1991: Conger & Kanungo. 1989): it was doing management well (Bennis.
1989). The field returned to trait theories (Kouzes and Posner. 1987) and tried to
identify the great man or woman who could lead.
This begs the question, if there is no single vision o f leadership, what vision most
closely fits with the needs of the public sector? James McGregor Bums (1979) produced
one o f the seminal scholarly works on leadership and set the stage for others to follow.
He took a multidisciplinary approach utilizing psychology, history and political science
to examine leadership. Bums defined leadership as "the reciprocal process o f mobilizing,
by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other
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resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently
or mutually held by both leaders and followers" (p. 423). Bums distinguished between
two types o f leadership: transactional and transformational. Transactional leadership is a
reciprocal process that includes bargaining or exchanging one thing for another. Leaders
and followers are involved in a limited relationship centered on exchanging support,
goods, money, etc. The relationship ends when the transaction is over. This definition
recognizes that there are situations in an organization when members must work toward a
goal assigned by another layer o f an organization and there may be varying levels o f
personal commitment to that goal. Bums saw this as the typical leadership in
bureaucracies. Transformational leadership involves influencing change by addressing
the wants, needs and motivations o f the followers and well as the leader in an effort to
achieve a common purpose. Such leadership occurs within a condition of conflict and
change. What makes transformational leadership unique, however, is that it elevates both
the leaders and followers. The public sector is in the midst o f profound change and
requires transformational leadership.
As Heifetz (1994) wrote, the most difficult challenge to leadership is posed by
situations requiring “adaptive change" when there is no clear “technical fix" (p. 75). In
such situations the “authority must look beyond authoritative solutions" and inform and
mobilize others toward a solution rather than directing change (p. 87). According to
Heifetz, one o f the key tasks of leadership is to pace the change to keep the stakeholders
from being overwhelmed and disheartened as well as to provide a “holding environment"
when necessary to provide a buffer.
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Examples where this has not occurred are within the County of San Diego and the
San Diego Unified School District where short-term, outside executives entered the
organization, unilaterally mandated change and triggered incredible staff resistance. In
the case o f the County, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) formed “tiger teams" that
excluded affected departments and stakeholders, sidestepped citizen input and ignored
state legal requirements for union involvement. While the CAO improved the County's
bond rating, he also triggered lawsuits, and instituted a flurry o f simultaneous
reengineeerings. process automations, downsizings, outsourcings and managed
competitions. The CAO found a more lucrative position in the private sector within twoand-a-half years, leaving behind an organization tom with labor unrest and low morale.
The San Diego Unified School District hired a superintendent with no experience
in education. He excluded District staff from the improvement process, hiring outside
consultants to draft a reform program. His failure to involve teachers and administrative
staff led to a wave o f resistance by the very staff tasked with implementation his changes.
The public sector faces change that is directedfrom the political realm and
special interest groups and requires leadership that will honestly inform employees o f
what is coming, involve them in the process and expend influence to guide and pace
change at a survivable rale.
Bass (1985). Rost (1993) and Yukl (1989) saw leadership as an influence
relationship among leaders and followers. Change in the public sector cannot be
successfully imposed from the outside or from the “top down." Successful leadership in
the public sector must involve influence rather than coercion.
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To change the organizational culture requires leadership to cultivate a shared
vision (Selznick. 1957; Senge, 1990) and to clarify and articulate the organization's
values. Values are the guideposts for large-scale change as well as daily decision
making. Leadership can affect organizational culture by what it articulates, pays
attention to. rewards, punishes and models (Bass. 1985: Kouzes and Posner. 1987:
Schein. 1992: Tichy and Devanna. 1986). With a history o f competing values and a
political arena continually shifting directions, the public sector needs leadership that
defines, articidates and lives the mission and values o f the organization.
Affecting change in a shared-power arena requires collaboration (Bryson &
Crosby. 1992; Chrislip & Larson. 1994). Government agencies must seek and be
responsive to the views of elected officials, a host of interest groups and to its own staff.
Involving a broad, non-traditional. heterogeneous group of stakeholders can better define
problems, identify more options and improve the decision-making (Etzioni. 1986:
Kan ter. 1983: Morrison. 1992). Successful public sector change needs collaborative
leadership and a belief in the value o f diversity.
While there is no universally-accepted definition of public sector leadership or
leadership in general, the nature of what is needed to successfully steer public
organizations through the coming turbulent period is more evident. The public sector is a
unique entity, composed both o f its formal structure and its organizational culture. Some
structural and cultural aspects are shared with the military and some are unique. For
military officers currently transitioning into leadership positions in the public sector, the
key question is which of the military leadership practices and beliefs they carry with them
will be effective at this critical time o f systemic change as well as personal change.
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Summary
This review of the literature revealed that both the military and public
bureaucracies in this country have a shared history. Since its origins, the nation has
feared a military and a government that were too large or too powerful. The size,
authority and public perception o f the military and o f public agencies have risen and
fallen somewhat in tandem. In addition, both sectors shared parallel reform efforts in the
areas o f personnel, budgeting, purchasing and procurement. There are some differences
in their formal cultures: the military' has a strict chain o f command and hierarchy while
public agencies have overlapping jurisdictions and discretion in carrying out assignments.
The differences lie primarily in the informal culture o f these two organizations.
Informal military organizational culture encompasses strong traditions and the core
values o f loyalty, cohesion and camaraderie - a gemeinschaft culture - with some
differences between the Navy and Marine cultures. Public agencies generally operate as
rational bureaucracies - a gesellschaft culture. The key differences identified between
the organizations are in the areas of: clarity o f values, mission and goals: inter-agency
rivalry', fragmentation and competing missions: public service as a motivator: and the
predominance and influence of special interests, citizens and elected officials.
The differences between these two organizational cultures may cause difficulties
for military officers transitioning to leadership roles in the public sector. The challenge
o f this transition is compounded by the fact that it is occurring in midlife, that the
transition assistance provided by the military does not prepare officers for these issues
and that significant change is occurring in the public sector.
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The central reforms sought in public organizations are to adopt business practices,
to privatize some functions and services, to adopt a customer-service orientation, to
expand citizen involvement and reform the civil service system. The type o f leadership
needed in the public sector today is transformational leadership that involves and informs
staff, paces its rate of change, defines and is driven by values and seeks a collaborative
approach to organizational change involving diverse stakeholders.
The literature review revealed that there has been little examination o f the
differences between the cultures of military and government bureaucracies, and that there
is a lack o f knowledge about how the lessons o f military leadership (its strategies and
behaviors) translate to the public sector. The next chapter will address the methodology
used to study these issues and the actions taken to construct a theory' of this phenomenon.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Overview
The purpose of this research is to investigate the key military leadership strategies
and practices learned by retired officers and determine their transferability to leadership
situations in local government. The first chapter provided an overview o f the
dissertation, along with background information on the key terms, limitations and
assumptions of the study. The second chapter reviewed the core literature related to the
organizational cultures o f the military and public bureaucracies, the nature o f major life
transitions and a discussion of leadership and its role in guiding public organizations
through the current climate of significant organizational change. This chapter describes
the research methodology o f this study - the history of the project, the rationale for
selecting a grounded theory approach and the research process of interviews, data
analysis and triangulation.

Overview of Methodology
This research project utilized a grounded theory approach to investigate the
leadership strategies and practices learned in the military and how well these lessons
translated to the public sector. The data were collected by interviewing recently-retired
Navy and Marine Corps officers (at paygrade 0 -4 and above) who worked in mid
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management to executive positions in the public sector. Some o f the methodology o f the
study was selected as a result o f a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998. The goal o f the
study was to interview between ten and fifteen subjects. Subjects were located bycontacting the human resources sections of twelve cities, the county, seventeen water
districts and the Port Authority. At larger entities such as the County and the City of San
Diego, the human resources sections of the specific departments were contacted
separately. The researcher also ran a notice in the local publication o f the Retired
Officers Association (TROA). Participant interviews were centered on. but not limited
to. a standard list of questions. These core questions were based on the results o f a pilot
study done in 1998. Interviews generally lasted between ninety minutes and three hours.
Interview transcripts were coded and analyzed for patterns and trends. The data were
utilized to create a grounded theory that was triangulated with qualitative and quantitative
literature on military leadership and government organizations.
Pilot Study
In the spring o f 1998, the researcher did a pilot study that involved interviewing
four retired military officers who worked in local San Diego government: two who
retired from military service within the past two years and two who had retired and
subsequently worked in the public sector for more than five years. The primary goals of
the pilot study were to identify the leadership strategies and practices learned in the
military and to investigate whether the retired officers perceived that these lessons were
transferable to their positions as local government leaders. Secondarily, the pilot was a
test of methodology: to determine whether a qualitative approach would yield adequate
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data, to determine what populations were appropriate sources of data and to uncover
appropriate core interview questions.
The participant interviews revealed some beginning elements o f a grounded
theory on military leadership and its applicability to local government organizations. In
particular, the data uncovered some areas o f difference between the cultures o f the
military and government sectors that required adjustment on the part of retiring military
officers entering the public sector. The participants identified differences between the
context o f the sectors and the conditions in which the two sectors operate -- what Straus
and Corbin (1990) called intervening conditions (pp. 101-104). These contexts and
conditions require different strategies on the part o f those in leadership positions in the
military and the public sector.
Specifically, key differences between military and public sector cultures were
identified in the areas of: clarity of mission, amount of control and decision-making
authority o f positional leaders, the amount o f camaraderie and independence among staff,
the nature o f staff and organizational loyalty, the nature o f authority within the
organization, and the dominant communication style. This study explores the importance
o f these issues while remaining open to discovering additional factors.
The process of the pilot study itself affected the methodology of this project. The
pilot study identified potential areas of difference that form the basis for this research.
The spring 1998 interviews suggested that recent retirees had a richer perspective on the
applicability of military leadership concepts and behaviors to the public sector than did
those who had been retired longer. Thus, the pilot has shaped the criteria for the selection
o f participants for this study. Finally, it also served to suggest questions that successfully
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probed for the deep meanings in the experiences of military officers in leadership roles
both in the service and in the public sector. (See Appendix B.)
Reviewers o f the pilot study commented that there are key differences in the
experiences of officers in the different service branches. At their recommendation, the
scope o f this study has been limited to the Navy and the Marine Corps as they are the
most prominent service branches in the San Diego area. As the Marine Corps is a part of
the Department o f the Navy, this researcher expected to find some similarity between the
experiences of Marine and Naval officers.
This project was organized in several phases to adequately address the research
questions. The first phase involved locating retired military officers in middle
management and executive positions in local San Diego government. The second phase
involved interviews with these retired military officers to identify their perceptions o f key
military leadership strategies and practices and how well these apply to leadership
situations in local government. The third phase involved comparing these factors with
other research done with military officers (e.g., Ulmer. 1997; Yukl & Van Fleet. 1982)
for possible triangulation.

Research Methodology
Research Design. Phase 1 —Locating Participants
Locating retired military officers fitting the participant profile working in San
Diego local government presented a challenge. The human resources (HR) directors of
eleven cities, seventeen water districts and the Port Authority were contacted directly.
They were sent a participant profile and asked if their entities had hired any midmanagers or executives within the last six years who were retired military. As these
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entities generally had less than 250 employees and less than 20 managers and executives,
it was relatively simple for the HR directors to determine if anyone fit the profile. The
directors then either provided the necessary contact information or contacted the potential
participants themselves to gauge their interest in the project before supplying their names
and work phone numbers.
At some of the larger entities (the City of San Diego and the County o f San
Diego), the HR directors o f departments where the skills and background required were a
strong match for military background (e.g.. engineering, information technology,
facilities management, human resources, security, financial management, planning,
budgeting and purchasing) were contacted directly to determine if their staff contained
potential participants.
The researcher placed a notice in the newsletter of the local chapter o f The
Retired Officers Association (TROA) soliciting participants for the study. In addition.
County Office of Veterans Services and the Veterans Center were also contacted to
identify potential participants.
Research Design. Phase 2 - Participant Interviews
While much of early leadership research involved quantitative methodology
(summarized in Clark and Clark. 1990). the very nature of leadership may best be
addressed by a qualitative approach (Conger. 1998: Parry. 1998). In this study, the
research questions concerning the leadership strategies and practices learned in the
military were researched using the grounded theory method first developed by Glaser and
Strauss (1967). Data were gathered through interviews with individuals who fit the
participant profile. Participants were asked some o f the core questions (see Appendix B),

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p rohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

79

though the format was not limited to these questions. The researcher probed for deeper
meaning and explored tangential themes that arose during the interview process.
Interviews generally lasted between ninety minutes and three hours. Interviews were
tape recorded and transcribed in total. The data were analyzed through a multi-level
coding process involving: open coding to initially labeled themes within an interview
transcript: axial coding to uncover and define themes and categories: and then theoretical
or selective coding to uncover the relationships and connections among the categories
and to construct a theory grounded in the data. Military leadership strategies and
practices and their applicability to the public sector emerged from the relationships
revealed during data gathering and analysis.
There are numerous definitions of leadership. However, there are common
themes that appear in much of leadership literature. Leadership scholars often describe
leadership in terms o f influence rather than coercion (Bass. 1985; Rost. 1993; Yukl.
1989). Leadership is often seen as a transformational process (Bass. 1985; Bums. 1979;
Rost. 1993) that occurs in an environment of change (Bass. 1985; Bennis and Nanus.
1985: Rost. 1993). Thus, while there is no universal definition of leadership, it can be
argued that leadership is seen as a social process that involves influence within a social
system (Yukl. 1989).
A qualitative approach better addresses social phenomena than quantitative
methodology (Geertz. 1983). and may be particularly suited to examine a phenomenon
such as leadership (Conger. 1998; Parry. 1998). Grounded theory was explicitly
designed to examine basic social processes (Glaser. 1978) such as the instilling of a
culture. Much o f qualitative research is based on the in-depth interview, or what Kahn
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and Cannell (1957) called “a conversation with a purpose" (p. 149). In the interview
process, the researcher opens herself to the texts o f the participants which constitute a
“thick description" (Geertz. 1983. p. 42) o f their life experiences.
A solid qualitative study requires that a methodology guides the data collection
and analysis, and that the variables identified in the study and their interactions be deeply
embedded in the data (Marshall & Rossman. 1989). The grounded theory approach,
pioneered by Glaser and Strauss (1967). attempts to integrate the various categories and
their properties uncovered in the research into a theory. This method seeks the
connectedness o f ideas and thus lends itself to a systematic study of phenomena
(Charmatz. 1983). The grounded theory approach uses qualitative research as a basis for
generating theory.
In grounded theory, the data gathering and analysis occur simultaneously as an
interactive process, described by Glaser (1978) as theoretical sampling:
Theoretical sampling is the process o f data collection for generating theory
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what
data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it
emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by emerging theory,
whether substantive or formal .. . Through comparing the data as it (sic) is
collected, the researcher creates more abstract levels o f theoretical connections.
In short, theory is gradually built up inductively from the progressive stages o f
analysis of the data. (pp. 38-39)
The researcher concurrently interprets data, sharpens his/her analysis and improves the
data collection. Thus, the product and process of the research emerges from the data.
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rather than from theoretical frameworks. In this project, the pilot study sharpened the
data collection process, shaped some of the interview questions and generated some
initial categories for data analysis.
In grounded theory methodology, there is generally no preset number o f
participants or length to the study. Interviewing continues until saturation o f the data
categories is reached. Theoretical saturation, according to Glaser, occurs “when in
coding and analyzing, both new properties emerge, and the same properties continually
emerge as one goes through the full extent o f the data." (1978. p. 53). Saturation is
achieved when new subjects provide repetitive information and little new data are
revealed.
Data are verified through further observations and by reading beyond the confines
o f a single discipline, e.g., military sociology. Literature provides what Glaser and
Strauss (1967) termed a “theoretical sensitivity" which engenders more insight in a
researcher and develops a broader capacity to interpret the data. The goal o f the research
is a further interpretation of process rather than a final truth, because sociological
processes and culture are in motion (Charmatz. 1983).
The data are analyzed through a process called coding. Coding is creating
categories for the interpretation of the data. It is a multi-step process. In initial or open
coding, transcripts are read and reread to break down the data into discrete phenomena.
In this research project, line-by-line coding was used. The phenomena are given initial
labels then reviewed and placed into categories. Themes are revealed, though they may
not make sense as part of a system. The coding may also reveal new areas of inquiry not
originally in the researcher's conceptual frame. Axial coding is a second level analysis
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that groups data, builds categories and defines what they are and are not. This level often
identifies the central theme of the data, the context in which it occurs and the intervening
conditions that affect the strategies. Theoretical or selective coding conceptualizes how
the categories relate to each other and to the core category or central theme. This is the
process that generates theory (Charmatz. 1983: Glaser & Strauss. 1967: Strauss &
Corbin. 1990).
Strauss and Corbin (1990) developed the specific methodology for grounded
theory used in this project. There is a core category, the phenomenon to which all the
categories relate, and causal conditions that are the events and incidents that lead to the
phenomenon. The phenomenon occurs within a context (such as organizational culture),
may be affected by intervening conditions. These conditions are managed by action or
interaction strategies that lead to consequences which in turn may lead to new causal
conditions.
Research Design. Phase 3 - Triangulation
The transferability o f military leadership strategies and practices to the public
sector was investigated by participant interviews and by examining both quantitative and
qualitative literature on the organizational culture and recent developments in the public
sector. The emergent military leadership data were analyzed for a fit with the literature
on government organizations. Thus a mixed method or multimethod approach was
employed in this project.
A common rationale for a multimethod approach is the acknowledgement that
every research method has characteristic strengths and weaknesses. Combining methods
allows building on the strengths o f each method while compensating for the flaws and
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limitations o f individual methods (Brewer & Hunter. 1989). The qualitative data
gathered in this study have been analyzed against existing studies concerning leadership
behaviors o f military officers. A multimethod approach was used for triangulation and
complementarity purposes (Greene. Caracelli. & Graham. 1989).
Triangulation consists o f using different methods to address the issue o f "rival
causal factors" —whether another variable may be producing the result measured
(Denzin, 1970. p. 28). Webb. Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrist (1966) and Morse
(1991) stated that using multiple methods can give researchers more confidence in their
findings. Complementarity is examining different facets of the same phenomenon.
Bryman (1988) offered as an example that "quantitative research can establish
regularities in social life while qualitative evidence can allow the processes which link
the variables identified to be revealed" (p. 142). In this case, the comparison o f this
study's results with quantitative findings may broaden the understanding of the
categories.
Some qualitative researchers critique mixed method research (Guba & Lincoln.
1994). Yet. grounded theory has a strong connection with quantitative methods through
the background and influence o f its co-developer. Barney Glaser. In addition, grounded
theory researchers —because they aim to build theory with generality via qualitative
methodology (Strauss & Corbin. 1990. p. 23& 24) -- may have an obligation to seek solid
triangulation, which a multimethod approach can provide.
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Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability in Qualitative Research
Evaluation presents one of the ongoing unresolved issues in qualitative research.
Guba and Lincoln (1994) identified four key perspectives among qualitative researchers.
The positivist view is that the criteria for quantitative and qualitative research should be
the same. Both should consider internal validity, external validity, reliability and
objectivity with the aim o f verifying hypotheses. Postpositivists maintain that there
should be similar criteria for qualitative research while maintaining that hypotheses
cannot be proved, but only shown to be probable. Critical theorists —who emphasize
action or praxis, and transformation - focus on societal structures and historic context.
Constructivists focus on deep understanding o f texts and reconstruction o f the multiple
realities o f the participants and discuss the authenticity and the trustworthiness o f the
research. This group includes the feminist scholars who encompass empiricist, standpoint
and cultural/ethnic studies (Guba and Lincoln. 1994). Some researchers reject the notion
o f evaluation as antithetical to the nature o f qualitative research (Smith. 1987). Others
propose that an entirely new set o f criteria needs to be established for evaluation (Denzin
& Lincoln. 1994).
Many of the discussions concerning qualitative evaluation center on differences in
epistemologv and ontology. Unfortunately, the polemic over qualitative evaluation has
not brought consensus on approach and methods by either quantitative or qualitative
researchers (Shaddish. Cook & Leviton. 1991). It is this researcher's opinion that the
lack of generally recognized evaluation standards for qualitative research may have
contributed to what some see as reluctant acceptance of qualitative research by some
quantitative researchers and journals (Brewer & Hunter, 1989: Bryman, 1988).
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The approach taken in this project is to produce results that set a direction for
change. As such, an underlying concern is adopting solid research methods that are
acceptable to those interested in this research, notably retired military officers. It may be
more difficult to present persuasive qualitative findings to those with backgrounds in the
hard sciences, such as engineering and information technology. In order to both reach
this audience and follow good qualitative practices, I have chosen to utilize the approach
o f Hammerslev (1992. p. 64) who wrote that qualitative research should be evaluated on
whether: 1) it generates theory; 2) it is "empirically grounded and scientifically credible"
3) its findings can be generalized and reproduced; and 4) it accounts for the researcher's
effect and the research strategy. To these ends, this study uses grounded theory
methodology, examines validity, reliability and generalizability and addresses researcher
bias and effect.
It has been my intent to incorporate bridging words into this qualitative
assessment to better reach my target audience, as recommended by Michael Patton
(1997) who wrote:
To stay out o f arguments about objectivity. I talk with intended users about
balance, fairness, and being explicit about what perspectives, values and priorities have
shaped the evaluation, both the design and findings, (p. 282)
To address the potential concerns of its audience, the design o f the methodologyused in this research includes some features seen in quantitative research. The hope is
that such methodology will produce results that are more likely to be accepted and
utilized .
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Validity
Johnson (1997) is one theorist who advocated incorporating quantitative concepts
into qualitative research. Johnson used descriptive validity to address the factual
accuracy of the researcher: interpretive validity to describe how accurately the
participants’ views, experiences, intentions and thoughts are reported and understood by
the researcher: and theoretical validity to address the degree to which the research theory
or theoretical explanation elucidate the data. While some qualitative theorists would
certainly object to the use o f Johnson's quantitative terms. I align m yself with those who
agree that the concepts of validity and reliability are important to address, using the
procedures unique to qualitative research (Creswell. 1994: Merriam. 1988; Miles and
Huberman. 1984).
Johnson further suggested enhancing descriptive validity' through the use o f
reflexivity (ongoing self-review and critique), negative case sampling (seeking data that
do not fit the theory'), and multiple observers to reduce researcher bias. This research has
used field notes (Punch. 1994: Van Manen. 1990) both to document participant
observations and as a tool for reflective practices. In addition, interviews involved
probing for negative examples from participants to reduce the opportunities for "shaping"
the content of the interviews.
Johnson (1997) also recommended use of verbatim quotations and participant
feedback, or what Lincoln and Guba (1985) called "member checking" to enhance
interpretive validity. Verbatim quotations have been used liberally throughout this
dissertation. In addition, participants were afforded the opportunity to review interview
transcripts and request changes if they felt their beliefs and experiences were not
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accurately reflected. Johnson cautioned that participants alter transcripts to put
themselves in the best light. Transcript alterations were to be reviewed with committee
members when there was any question regarding the possible motivation for such
changes, though this did not occur.
Finally. Johnson recommended enhancing theoretical validity by any o f the
following methods: spending sufficient time with subjects, doing field observations,
using theory triangulation (Denzin. 1970). negative case sampling, and peer and
colleague discussions. In this study, the researcher was not afforded the opportunity to
do field observations with the participants. Research practices employed, however,
allowed interviews to extend without a prescribed time limit, incorporated theory
triangulation o f both qualitative and quantitative studies, and utilized dissertation
committee members and subject experts for peer review.
Reliability in Qualitative Research
Reliability in research addresses the accuracy o f the researcher's methods of
measurement, particularly aimed at whether or not results are replicable. Replication can
increase confidence in a study's findings (Cook & Campbell. 1979). Yet. this presents a
problem in qualitative research, which is based on varied lived experience and relies on
recollection and interpretation. Its reliability depends on the quality o f "the human
instrument” (Merriam. 1988, p. 171).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) stated that qualitative researchers should focus on the
internal validity of their methodology, which they linked to reliability. They further
stated that researchers should use terms like “dependability" and "consistency" (p. 288)
rather than "validity."
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To enhance the dependability o f their work. Goetz and LeCompte (1984)
recommended that researchers examine and discuss their assumptions about the research
topic, utilize triangulation, and create a written audit o f their data collection, category
development and decisions. Well-constructed field notes, they concluded, aid others
interested in replicating the study.
These three methods - a discussion o f researcher assumptions, triangulation and
field notes —were utilized in this research project.
Generalizabilitv
Generalizability is related to theoretical validity. The generalizabilitv o f
qualitative research is often considered suspect because it utilizes small samples and nonrandom sampling techniques. In addition, some qualitative researchers are opposed to
generalizability. Clifford Geertz (1983) wrote that qualitative theory generated must
"stay close to the ground’*(p. 56) addressing the culture one has studied. "The essential
task of theory building here is not to codify abstract regularities but to make thick
description possible, not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them"
(Geertz. 1983. p. 56).
A more expansive approach was taken by Wolcott (1995) who stated that: "Every
man is in certain respects a) like all other men. b) like some other men and c) like no
other man" (p. 173). He wrote that generalizability could be warranted in some
circumstances. Morse, on the other hand, saw theoretical results applying "to all similar
situations, questions, and problems, regardless o f the comparability o f the demographic
composition of the groups" (1999, p. 5).
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Merriam (1988) identified the following four historic approaches to
generalizability in qualitative research. Cronbach (1975) described all research as being
working hypotheses that are continually revised and changed by additional research
involving different communities and circumstances. Erickson (1986) found that
qualitative research produces some concrete universals —wherein the lessons of one
situation instruct us about others. In the naturalistic generalization approach (Stake.
1978). the researcher or evaluator assists the stakeholders in seeing howr other research
may apply to their own circumstances. This is similar to reader or user generalization
(Walker. 1980) u'here the writer provides enough information to allow readers to draw
their own conclusions about the applicability of research findings.
There is little agreement among grounded theorists concerning generalizability.
Charmatz (1983) argued that the theory generated fits the situation studied, while Glaser
(1978) stated that the researcher should seek a theory that transcends the situation studied
through the use and integration of disparate sources.
This research project does not seek to find a single truth but rather to offer
multiple representations o f the military leadership experience and transition to the public
sector and then examine how those experiences are linked to formulate a theory.

Participants
Selection of Participants
Proper selection of participants aids in any study's credibility. The participant
profile encompasses individuals who: retired from the military with 20 years or more
years o f service, commanded staff in both operational and non-operational activities, and
achieved the rank o f Lieutenant Commander or above in the Navy, or Major or above in

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

the Marines Corps. These selection criteria are intended to identify participants: who are
relatively well-steeped in the military organizational culture in terms o f experience,
education and training; who were shaped by both the field and the bureaucratic aspects of
the military: and who achieved some career success and. thus, may be positive about and
value their military experience. Participants must have retired from the military within
the past six years and have worked in local government in the San Diego area with the
expectation that this group may still have a recent perspective on both military and local
government experience. The initial intent was to obtain between ten and twenty subjects
who met the selection criteria.
The population has been specifically defined, and the methods used to locate
participants were designed to cast a wide net to identify' participants within the San Diego
area. The population interviewed represented the recently retired military community
working in local government. There is no evidence that the population interviewed is
unique to the San Diego area, thus it is possible research results may be general izable.
The Relation between Researcher and Participant
There is a debate among qualitative theorists regarding the appropriateness of an
outside researcher examining a community in which she is not a member. This is based
on the constructivist theories that see reality as constructed individually rather than
existing objectively (Heidegger. 1962). These constructions can be loosely held by
individuals or groups and are based on social phenomena and experience (Guba and
Lincoln, 1984). Some argue that the texts o f participants are deeply embedded in their
unique cultural context, and therefore only researchers who share the life experience of
the participants can both: 1) access the deeper layers o f this experience through a
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common bond and 2) adequately interpret these data. Thus, the role o f the researcher is
to interact with participants during the investigation based on their uniquely shared or
standpoint epistemology. Many women, non-white and immigrant researchers
(Anzaldua, 1987: Collins, 1991; Smith 1987) hold this position.
In part, this view springs from the reaction o f non-majoritv communities to being
"studied about" and is an effort to reassert their unique voice and perspective. As
African-American feminist bell hooks wrote:
Often this speech about the "Other" annihilates, erases: "no need to hear your
voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will
tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has
become mine, my own. Re-writing you, I write myself anew. I am still author,
authority..." (1990. pp. 151-152)
A critical element in standpoint epistemology is to restore the authentic voice o f non
dominant communities who have traditionally been studied through an outside cultural
lens resulting in an outsider's interpretation and judgment on the participants and their
communities (Denzin. 1997: Fine. 1994). The potential for "betraying" the participants
in a research project is always there. According to Miles & Huberman: "It is probably
true that, fundamentally, field research is an act of betrayal, no matter how well
intentioned or well integrated the researcher. One makes public the private and leaves
the locals to take the consequences" (1984. p. 233). Fundamentally, the researcher is
always an outsider, trying to entice participants to reveal more and more o f themselves.
The ethics o f entering a research situation as an outsider can begin to be addressed
by avoiding deceptive models wherein subjects are not informed of either the true nature
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of the research or the position of the researcher and by adapting a collaborative approach
to research (Punch. 1994). In a collaborative model, subjects are fully informed and are
partners or "stakeholders" in uncovering the processes being examined (Guba and
Lincoln. 1989).
In the case of this study, the retired officers were fully informed o f the nature of
the research and protected through the ethical review process performed by the Human
Subjects Committee o f the University o f San Diego. The Committee reviewed and
approved the proposed research methods prior to the data gathering portion o f the
dissertation process.
One o f the dissertation committee members is a retired Navy Captain with
organizational development experience in the private sector who assisted with reviewing
the content of the interviews and subsequent theory building for relevance with his own
knowledge o f the military. In addition, a retired senior officer, an active duty officer and
a civilian Navy retiree with almost 30 years of service served as subject matter experts in
reviewing the military aspects o f the research.
This study involved a phenomenological approach and. as the researcher has no
personal military background, she had to open herself to understanding the military
leadership experience through the words and on the terms o f the interviewees (Van
Manen. 1990). The participants' texts formed the basis for the analysis. The researcher's
non-military background necessitated requesting clarification and explanation o f military
terms and processes. This prompted participants to reflect more deeply and uncover
meaning as they sought to translate military culture into civilian terms.
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The essence o f the research is a dialogue into the nature o f leadership in the
military. In this area, the researcher is acknowledged to be an outsider, an "other." and
fulfilled the roles o f inquiring, recording and compiling the data, then integrating it into a
theory. In reviewing the applicability of the experiences and theories o f military
leadership to local government, the researcher straddled the border o f "outsider" as a
civilian, and what Fine (1994) calls "outsider within" as a researcher with fifteen years
experience w'orking in government organizations. In this area, the researcher could
access organizational experiences of how the actions of retired military officers have and
may appear to their civilian colleagues within the public sector.
Protection o f Subjects
Participants in the study are volunteers identified from the pool o f retired military
officers working in local government. They signed a consent form that informed them of
the process and o f their rights. (See Appendix C.) Three key precautions were taken to
protect the subjects of this study. First, the identity of the participants remains
confidential. Pseudonyms have been used and the participant descriptions are general
enough to conceal identities. Secondly, all participants were given the opportunity to
review the transcript of their interviews to ensure that their identities remained
confidential and to ensure the transcript reflects their intended meaning. Finally, all tapes
and transcripts have been kept in a home office and will be destroyed one year after the
research was completed. All o f these precautions were reviewed and approved by the
Committee on the Protection o f Human Subjects of the University o f San Diego.
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Limitations
The demographic profile o f the participants is largely white males. While the
racial and gender makeup o f the armed forces has become more diverse, the population
o f this study entered military service over twenty years ago. The profile o f the study's
participants is analogous to their cohort group.
The requirement that participants be retired six years or less narrowed the number
o f potential participants who fit the study's profile. During the search to locate
participants, many candidates for the study fit all o f the criteria except for retirement
time. This element o f the participant profile, however, was important to finding
participants with a fresh perspective on the transition from the military to the public
sector.
The research was limited to positional leaders and did not study the experiences
o f those performing informal leadership roles. It was also limited to the perspective o f
those interviewed. The data do not account for the views o f those working with retired
military officers regarding how well they have made the transition to the public sector
and their leadership effectiveness.
One of the limitations o f qualitative research is that any attempt to interpret and
explain the data is. by necessity, taking a reductivist approach (Geertz. 1983). Grounded
theory in particular requires the researcher to focus on the core category. Grounded
theory does not presume to create a comprehensive theory, only to explain a
phenomenon. Therefore, the researcher must set aside i: formation that does not relate to
the core category. Such data may be utilized for another study (Glaser, 1978).
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Finally, the researcher's lack o f personal military experience, albeit while
contributing a governmental organizational perspective, has no doubt placed some
limitations on the breadth o f interpretation and analysis. To this end. the researcher
invites those with military background and public sector experience to utilize this study
as a basis for further study and dialogue on this topic.
Summary
This chapter described both the methodological process and the rationale for
selecting the process. It reviewed main theoretical approaches to validity, reliability, and
generalizability in qualitative research and defended the approach taken in this study.
A qualitative approach was chosen because it is generally better suited to the
investigation and analysis o f a social process such as leadership influences. The intent of
selecting a grounded theory methodology was to generate a valid theory that is credible
and of use to other researchers as well as to retired officers. The data were triangulated
with qualitative and quantitative literature on military leadership and government
organizations for triangulation and complimentarity purposes.
The methodology of this study was examined for validity, reliability and
generalizability. Validity was addressed through the use o f reflective field notes,
interview techniques that probed participants for negative examples, verbatim quotations,
participant review o f transcripts and triangulation. Reliability was addressed byreviewing researcher assumptions, triangulation and field notes. The results of the
research may be generalizable because there appears no evidence that the retired military
population in San Diego has unique characteristics that would affect the results, and
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because the research explored a multi-faceted view o f military leadership and transition
experiences.
The goal of this research has been to produce results that are credible to the
potential audience, which includes retired officers. The credibility of grounded theory
research, according to Glaser (1978) is based on: whether the data fit the categories:
whether the evolving theory is relevant in that it explains, predicts and interprets what is
happening: and that the theory is modified to account for additional research and changes
in the social processes studied (pp. 4-5). The selection of methodology hopefully fulfills
the criteria for reliability.
The next chapter will present the data gathered, the categories revealed by the
data analysis and the resulting theory. In addition, the theory will be reviewed against the
existing research and literature on military leadership and public sector conditions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS
Overview
The first chapter provided an overview of the purpose o f this research —to study
the leadership strategies and practices learned by military career officers and their
perspectives and experiences regarding the applicability o f military leadership to their
subsequent careers in the public sector. The second chapter reviewed relevant literature
dealing with areas o f the organizational cultures of the military and the public sector, life
transitions, the nature o f organizational change and current change trends in public sector
organizations. The last chapter discussed the methodology used in this study: the pilot
study that was a precursor to this research, the rationale for selecting a qualitative
research approach and grounded theory methodology, and a description o f the research
steps and protocol.
This chapter will describe the actual research process, the data analysis process,
the key themes identified in the participant data, the relationship o f the data categories
and a description o f the emergent theory on the nature of military leadership.

Detail of the Research Events
The research design described in Chapter Three contained a theoretical
framework for good qualitative research. What follows is a description o f the research
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experiences: the process details and the researcher's practices. This section also includes
descriptions o f the participants —sufficient to present their standpoint, while protecting
their identity.
Theoretical Sampling
As noted in Chapter 1. the participants interviewed for this study were retired
military officers who served twenty or more years in either the Navy or Marine Corps,
achieved a rank o f Navy Lieutenant Commander or Marine Corps Major and above, had
been retired less than six years ago. and were working in local government at a mid
management or executive level in the San Diego area. One o f the main challenges o f this
research project was locating participants who fit such a narrow profile. The initial three
participants were located with the assistance of other retired officers. The County Office
o f Veterans Affairs supplied other leads. Initially, the intent was to locate additional
participants by giving presentations at the executive and mid-management meetings of
local government agencies. However, one of the human resources directors o f a local
city volunteered that she could easily review the records o f the mid-managers and
executives hired within the last six years and identify any who met the criteria. She
suggested using this method with other entities having smaller work forces to expedite
the research process and minimize the organizational impact.
This process worked well with every public entity contacted except for the
County of San Diego and the City of San Diego, which have 17.000 and 9000 employees
respectively. Neither maintains data on employed veterans by classification level. In
these cases, the personnel of specific departments within these two entities were
contacted directly. The departments were selected because their core tasks matched some
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of the technical proficiencies found in the military such as engineering, information
systems, environmental management, purchasing, contracting, finance and human
resources. Over 90% o f the public organizations contacted assisted the researcher.
In each case the human resources directors were sent an overview o f the studv.
(See Appendix D.) In some cases, they preferred to contact any potential participants
themselves to gauge interest, rather than supply the name and work phone numbers of
staff without obtaining their permission. It is not known, therefore, if any potential
participants refused to forward their names. Each person who spoke with the researcher
agreed to be interviewed. In all. eleven participants were found who met the criteria.
Description o f Participants
The material that follows is based on interviews with eleven white, male retired
military officers over forty years o f age. Each spent between 20 to 30 years in the
service. Six are graduates o f the Naval Academy. All but three o f the participants served
in combat or in forward areas. Two are retired marines and the rest are retired naval
officers. The sample includes three aviators, two ship commanders, six engineers, and
one submariner/aviator. All were retired less than six years at the time of their interviews
and worked in mid-management or executive positions in local government.
Pseudonyms are used throughout this paper. The participant descriptions are as follows.
"Bob" was drafted after three years o f college. He chose to join the Marine Corps
as a pilot. He flew almost 400 F-4 combat missions on his first tour in Vietnam and
helicopter missions on his second tour. Bob had a diverse military career lasting over 25
years. He served as a captain in aviation squadrons, directed aircraft maintenance and
flight training operations, was executive officer of two air bases, worked in advanced
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weapons research and development, was personnel officer for a large command and
worked on contingency planning for joint forces operations. One of the plans he worked
on was used in Operation Desert Shield. In his five years since retirement, he worked
briefly as a corporate and charter pilot, then became director of a regional airport.
■‘Dan” was in the Navy nearly 30 years and served in both Vietnam and Desert
Shield. He led construction battalions (known as CBs) and worked in public works,
facilities maintenance, contract management and construction. He had the opportunity to
be on the leading edge o f some of the military's major changes in recent years. He had
one of the first male/female CB battalions and also took the women in his unit into
combat regions in Desert Shield. He had worked for a local environmental agency for
less than two years.
“Frank" is an engineer who served in the Navy nearly 25 years. He had both
combat and field experience and commanded construction battalions. In his early
twenties, after completing ROTC. he was given command of over 250 men in Vietnam.
His largest command was over 2400 military and civilian personnel. He oversaw the
construction of buildings, bridges and other major projects, leading some projects in
forward areas including Central America and Africa. He had one assignment leading a
Marine rifle battalion. At the time of the interview, he was working in local government
as head of a design and engineering operation. He left government before the conclusion
of this research for a private engineering firm. He had worked less than two years for
local government.
“George" attended the Naval Academy and became a Marine Corps aviator in the
post-Vietnam era serving nearly 25 years. He was a helicopter pilot and also served as a
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flight school instructor, commanding officer of a squadron, aviation safety officer and
ground safety officer. He earned Master's Degrees in Management and Environmental
Management. He claims to have had a “quiet” career as an aviator. He was on combat
alert for less than six months but never flew in combat. As he stated. “No one ever shot
at me.” He had worked in management for a iocal environmental agency less than two
years.
“Les” was in the Navy for 30 years. The bulk of his first 23 years were spent in
shipboard assignments. He worked briefly in Washington in defense communications,
then finished his last six years in shore assignments. He closed his career as the
commander o f one o f the Navy’s largest bases. At one time his staff numbered 1100
personnel. He attended Annapolis and the Naval Postgraduate School, earning a Master's
Degree in Communication Management. After retirement, he became a shipping and
import operations manager in local government where he had been working less than a
year at the time his interview was conducted.
“Paul" attended the Naval Academy, receiving a degree in Civil Engineering.
During his career of over 20 years, he worked as an engineering officer onboard ship,
served as an admiral’s aide, directed facilities management operations, managed
construction contracting, led a construction battalion and directed a base closure project.
While administrating construction contracts, he supervised a mixed staff o f both military
and federal civil service. He had directed a project and contract management unit in the
public sector for about two years.
“Ralph” joined the Navy in anticipation of being drafted, and was trained as an
electronics technician. He served on a nuclear submarine as an enlisted man, where he
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attained the rank o f third class petty officer (E-4). His ship patrolled in the Atlantic
Ocean, staying submerged for as long as 72 days. He was selected for Officer Candidate
School and was commissioned an ensign. He is the only one o f the participants to have
been selected for officer training from enlisted ranks. He became an aviator and trained
in helicopters. He taught at helicopter flight school, managed helicopter maintenance
operations at sea during two assignments, directed anti-submarine warfare groups and
served on the staffs o f four admirals. He had worked in airport management for over
three years.
“Sam” attended the Naval Academy and served in the Civil Engineer Corps. He
led a CB battalion in Vietnam. He eventually led a total o f three battalions, directed a
nuclear defense research and development project, served as an admiral’s aide, ran public
works operations, directed a CB school, managed construction projects and coordinated
contract administration. He served nearly 30 years and received three engineering
degrees while in the Navy. He was a public works director in local government for
almost five years, but resigned and went to work for a private firm before the conclusion
of this study.
“Steve" served 20 years in the Navy in construction, contracting and public
works. He was a direct appointment, joining the Navy after attending college in the postVietnam era. He did not attend Officer Candidate School, but rather attended a six-week
officer training program. He spent 18 of his 20 years directing federal civil service
employees. He never served in a forward area or aboard ship. He joked, “I know very
little about ships, other than they tie up to piers and we have to [provide facilities] to
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them.” He is a public works director and had worked in local government for about two
years.
“Ted” had his first command as a junior officer, leading a minesweeping unit in
the Mekong River in Vietnam. He is unique among the participants in that he did not
have a veteran chief petty officer to assist him in his first leadership assignment.
Afterwards, he left the Navy briefly (for less than a year) and then returned because he
“missed the esprit de corps.” In his thirty-year career, he commanded a guided missile
destroyer and two amphibious squadrons. He had only two shore assignments. His
education is in Engineering and Systems Analysis. He also trained a number o f women
junior officers though none served under him aboard ship. He had worked in the public
sector for over three years at the time o f his interview.
“Will” led a construction battalion in Vietnam and continued to serve in the Civil
Engineer Corps in construction battalions, public works, facilities management and
contract management. He served on an admiral's staff and as executive officer o f a base.
His career spanned over 25 years. He had worked for just over five years in the public
sector at the time of the interview.
Limitations of the Participant Pool.
All the participants are white males, which is reflective of the majority o f the
officers in this cohort. Only one submariner was located. As previously noted, all the
participants interviewed were Navy Lieutenant Commanders and Marine Corps Majors or
above. No flag officers that met the criteria were located. Just two of the participants
were in the Marine Corps.
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Table 1:

Personal Profile o f the Retired Military Officers By Years o f Service.
Attendance at the Military Academy. Area Warfare or Staff Specialty and
Service in Combat or a Forward Area

Fictitious
Name

Years in
Service

Naval
Academy

Warfare or
S ta ff Specialty

Combat or
Forward Area

Years in Local
Government

Bob

24-27

No

Aviator

Vietnam

5-6

Dan

28-30

Yes

Civil
Engineer

Vietnam Sc
Desert Shield

1-2

Frank

24-27

Yes

Civil
Engineer

Vietnam &
other areas

1-2

George

24-27

Yes

Aviator

None
(on alert)

1-2

Les

28-30

Yes

Ship & base
command

Vietnam

>1

Paul

20-23

Yes

Civil
Engineer

None

1-2

Ralph

28-30

No

Submariner
Aviator

Yes. Extended
Patrols

3-4

Sam

28-30

Yes

Civil
Engineer

Vietnam

5-6

Steve

20-23

No

Civil
Engineer

None

1-2

Ted

28-30

No

Ship & base
command

Vietnam

3-4

Will

24-27

No

Civil
Engineer

Vietnam

5-6
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The Data Analysis Process
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) the theoretical sensitivity o f grounded
theory research is enhanced by ongoing contact with related literature to shed meaning on
the data being collected and by a rigorous analysis throughout the research process.
During this research project, field notes were taken on an ongoing basis that identified
commonalties across the interviews, new emergent patterns, questions concerning
apparent errant data, possible connections to research and literature and contrary
information across some participant interviews. At times, these field notes shaped
subsequent interviews, identifying additional concepts to pursue. One such concept
concerned stereotypes that retired military experienced in the public sector. This
subtheme was not an original field of inquiry but was raised in one o f the interviews and
proved to be a rich area for investigation with subsequent participants. The field notes
also assisted with coding and analysis.
Each interview was taped and transcribed verbatim. Over 400 pages o f transcripts
were analyzed line-by-line for themes and coded initially for substance and concept. A
second level o f coding - axial coding - was used to group data. Then theoretical coding
was performed to identify relationships. In each case, the words o f the participants were
sources o f coding labels. Concepts and key quotes were grouped by theme clusters, and
complex ideas were placed within multiple clusters.
Preliminary maps o f the concepts and theme clusters were created and colorcoded on large chart paper. Some o f the precepts o f “mindmapping” (Rose. 1985) were
utilized to draw connections, relationships and patterns between the data concepts.
Ultimately, a wall of chart paper began to reveal the enfolding theory.
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Analysis of the Data: The Organization of Key Themes
There are two separate grounded theory analyses contained in Chapters Four and
Five. The first addresses the phenomenon o f military leadership: the second is the
phenomenon o f the applicability o f military leadership principles to the public sector.
Both these analyses are based on the experiences of the retired military' officers
interviewed for this project and triangulated against other qualitative and quantitative
data.
Five key theme areas emerged on the core concept of military leadership: i )
leadership development, 2) leading people, 3) leading processes. 4) decision-making and
5) leading change. The key theme areas that emerged on the core concept o f applying
military leadership principles to the public sector are described in the following chapter.
Each of these themes related to conditions within the organizational context and involved
specific strategies and structures.

Description of the Key Themes of Military Leadership
The core category of military' leadership is a complex phenomenon. To describe
military leadership as a singular entity' is to simplify its nature at the expense of meaning.
The goal of qualitative research is to attempt a "thick description" o f the chosen category
(Geertz. 1983). To access its core requires acknowledging the breadth o f experience that
is military leadership. The research method used in this work is grounded theory, which
encompasses tracing relationships among data categories discovered during the research
process to build a theory. The basic relationships that build the structure o f a grounded
theory, as identified by Straus and Corbin (1990) are: the central phenomenon studied.
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the causal conditions, the context, any intervening condition, corresponding structures
and strategies, and the consequences. From here new causal conditions are likely to
emerge, affecting the phenomenon or creating new phenomenon. These are not linear
relationships but interwoven systems. The consequences in this case are the leadership
lessons learned by officers. This experience has not been the same for all the
participants, so. while the lessons described here may not be shared by all. they are
intended to represent a broad picture o f the phenomenon of military leadership.
Causal Condition: The Possibility o f Combat
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990). causal conditions are "the events or
incidents that lead to the occurrence or development of a phenomenon" (p. 100). In the
military, the causal condition is the possibility of combat. The traditions have evolved
and the structures and practices of the military have been created to prepare for this
prospect. According to Paul. "It's said that the military doesn't do anything except go to
war and train for war. You can argue that just about everything we do in the middle from peace time to war —is training."
Each participant agreed that, generally speaking, military leadership practices
vary, depending on whether the unit is involved in an operational or administrative
assignment. An operational assignment might involve combat, a training exercise, a
submarine patrol, a construction project in an unsecured area and a shipboard or foreign
deployment. An administrative assignment might involve facilities management,
civilian-military construction, research and development, or ship repair and refitting.
Regardless o f the immediate setting, an officer must always have the knowledge and
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confidence that his staff will obey orders despite the danger level. Les explained that in
an operations environment:
I don’t want them to hesitate . . . when [I’m] saying **I want you to take this ship
in here where they’re shooting at you and stay there for about twenty minutes
while firing some guns. Then I want you to bring it back out without hurting
anyone. I know how to do that. And I want you guys to trust me. to do the things
I say. when I say. and w e’ll all get out o f this together."
The reality, potential and training for combat are the shaping events o f military
leadership. This need for faith in the obedience of one’s troops and in their commitment
to carrying out the mission is at the foundation of military tradition, philosophy,
structures and practices.

Theme One: Military Leadership Development
As mentioned in the review o f the literature, there are three key strategies used to
develop officers in the military - schooling/training, mentoring and experiences. A key
condition that affects leadership development is the ever-present potential for combat.
The realities o f combat mean that the military must prepare its junior officers to take the
place o f a fallen commander quickly and with little notice. The military also establishes
structures and protocols so relatively inexperienced officers can take command when
necessary. Each o f its three development strategies plays a role in this preparation.
Education and Training
Initial military officer education programs, such as the Naval Academy or Officer
Candidate School, attempt to instill the strong values and beliefs o f the military culture
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and the norms of behavior expected o f officers (Peck. 1994). The Navy, some feel,
places less emphasis on formal leadership training because it has traditionally held that
leadership is learned on the job. For example, its Naval Leadership program at the Naval
Academy has been led by a Lieutenant Commander with a Bachelor's Degree. In
contrast, a Colonel with a Doctorate leads the program at West Point. Additionally,
unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy has no research center devoted to leadership
(Lt. Cdr. W. Hall. Annapolis, personal communication March 20. 1998). The primary
leadership preparation for N a\y and Marine C >rps officers is through their mentors and
through experience, the so-called "school of the ship."
Military Leadership Mentoring
The Navy and Marine Corps identify mentoring as a key leadership development
tool. This was confirmed both in the literature (Montor. et al. 1987) and by each o f the
participants. They were unanimous in their view o f mentorship as key to their leadership
development.
One o f the standard questions asked during this research was for participants to
describe one o f their role models and. if possible an incident that exemplified their
leadership. Their stories are described below and summarized in Table 2.
Ralph cited the first chief petty officer he served under as an enlisted man on a
nuclear submarine. This CPO had considerable technical knowledge, set high standards
and was well respected by his men. “Mv respect for him was so high the last thing I
would want to do would be to disappoint him." Ralph explained that this CPO expected
that all members of the team would work avidly to earn their dolphin insignia quickly,
designating him or her as qualified submariners. He described how the CPO's
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expectations became the submarine team's expectations. "The crew would stop a movie
if someone was in there who didn't have qualifications, throw him out and tell him to
study.. . . You wouldn’t be reading in the library for entertainment either." The CPO
created an infectious attitude that motivated achievement.
Dan told o f his first assignment in charge of a squad created from men "offered
up" from different companies. His squad was rife with discipline problems and drug
use. He turned to his chief petty officer (CPO): "He was a Korean War veteran. He had
a bulldog face, a pot gut. [He] smoked too much, drank too much and cussed too much."
During their nine-month deployment. Dan had what he identified as his best lesson in
leadership:
I had 120 men and the bulk o f them were misfits, cast-offs and rejects from all of
the other parts o f the battalion . . . the last of the Vietnam draftees . .. and I was as
green as grass. I learned more in nine months working with him than in four
years of ROTC or with any other officer I ever worked with .. . We started out as
the dregs. And for a lot of these guys, the reason they were so crappy is [that] no
one had ever taken the time to look after them, or talk to them, or take care of
them. . .. We gave these guys intensive TLC and at the end of the deployment
they were the b est. . . . It was nothing short of phenomenal.
Dan stated that the lessons he learned from his CPO were: to communicate expectations
and standards, to reward performance, but not mediocrity: to take care o f your people and
to demonstrate that care by learning about them as individuals and to be innovative and
individual in how you reward them. Frank also cited his first CPO as his leadership
model: "If you listen to these 25 and 30-year veterans, you’ll get things done.”
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Both ship commanders identified senior officers who kept their composure under
pressure as their models. Les told o f a commanding officer who handled danger while
remaining calm. He described two incidents: one in which a ship was in great danger of
running aground and another while under fire off Vietnam. "There was almost panic in
the voice of everybody on that bridge except for the commanding officer . . . the man
never lost control. . . He had the [total responsibility] if something went wrong, and yet
he was the calmest person in the operation. That left an impression."
Ted cited a captain who could "maintain his patience and his cool" in hightension. rapidly-changing situations.

His captain not only had self confidence, but

maintained trust in his junior officers: "He wasn't jumping in and grabbing control when
I made an order that might not have been the optimum one. He was coaching rather than
taking charge and I learned a lot through him.” His second example was a captain who
had an alcohol problem, but had a tremendous rapport with his crew. He was a former
enlisted Marine "who was able to go down and mingle with them, talk with them, make
them feel [that], even though he was .. . [senior to them] in terms o f rank he was not
superior as a human being. He was just another man." Ted said that not all senior and
flag officers could establish such rapport with staff.
Many of the civil engineers cited supervising officers as their models. Sam cited
an admiral he worked for who would constantly test his junior officers and push them to
think critically. He would ask their opinions and test them with questions, thus
encouraging their analytical skills. The admiral gave him challenging assignments and
allowed him to observe high-level meetings and at times asked him to speak. It appeared
to Sam that the admiral felt "I could contribute and add some value." which bolstered his

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

self-confidence. He also discussed a captain who "exuded personal confidence" and paid
attention to the small details, such as burned out light bulbs. Sam observed that when the
base executive officer (XO) paid attention to details, so did his staff.
Paul explained that his first commanding officer provided "a vision for the
command.” He stayed involved in the work but "did not micromanage or ask those kinds
o f detailed questions that were my responsibility.” In one particular instance he put the
success of a mission before his career and lobbied up the chain o f command against a
policy that was damaging to operations. Because of his commitment and ethics. Paul
stated. "I'd absolutely have followed him anywhere.”
Steve cited two models. One was a captain who stayed involved with his staff.
He counseled all levels of staff, created a recognition program and required his officers to
promote training and maintain individual development plans for each staff member. He
also took his officers off site for one day a month to build teamwork: "I didn't believe in
it. to be honest with y o u ,. . . but the team functioned together, worked together, got to
know one another in a very informal forum .. . . They became much more ready to work
with each other." Steve has since replicated the individual development plan strategy in
his own organization and is working on organizing team-building sessions. His second
example was a female captain who was perceived as "grinding everyone into hamburger
because o f her work ethic.” She urged her senior officers to take on more that they
thought they could. She pushed them toward improving their personal organization and
productivity. The lesson she left with Steve is "don’t be afraid to take on a lot.”
Some had difficulty in naming a specific role model. Bob could not recall a
particular mentor, but stated he was drawn to two types o f models —aviators who
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demonstrated superior technical ability and officers who “looked sharp handling people."
Will could also offer no specific examples, but admired leaders who could speak well in
public. The stories about leadership mentors are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2:

Personal Leadership Mentor Stories: Leadership Mentor(s) and Command
Context, Example of Leadership. Lesson in Leadership Identified

Name
Bob

Mentors
Aviator (combat)
Officer (ashore)

Leadership Example
Superb aviator
Could handle people.

Lesson in Leadership
Different leadership needed
for different tasks.

Dan

1st CPO*
(CB* unit in
Vietnam)

Took unit o f 120
"misfits” and turned
them into the best unit
in 9 months.

How to work with people.
Make them feel important.
Innovative, individual
rewards.

Frank

1st CPO
(Vietnam)
General

How to handle people.

Vague

Used authority wisely.
Communicated well.
Displayed values.

Care about people.
Lead by values.

George

Les

2 Captains
(shipboard)

Handling ship in danger
and in combat.

Command presence.
Staying calm, in control.

Paul

Captain
(Civil Engineer)

Lobbying for program
up chain o f command.
Made right decisions.

Command presence.
Articulate vision.

Ralph

l sl CPO
(submarine)

Set high expectations
for staff to pass
qualifying test.

Technical knowledge.
Set high expectations.
Build cohesion.

Sam

Captain
(CB unit)

Would point out burned
out light bulbs.

Notice the large and small
things and so will your staff.

Admiral

Tested verbally; gave
responsibility.

Develop self-confidence.

Female Captain
(Civil Engineer)

"Ground staff into
hamburger.”

Personal organization.
Push yourself.

Captain
(Civil Engineer)

Held teambuilding days.
Required training plans.

Build camaraderie.
Take care of staff.

Steve
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Ted

Captain
(shipboard)
Captain, (USMC
enlisted)

Tense situations.
Let junior officers learn.
Built rapport, mingled
crew.

Command presence.
Don't micro-manage.
Don't act superior,
Manage by walking around.

For many of those interviewed, their first chief petty officer or supervising officer was a
key mentor. The first CPO can help the new junior officer stay afloat in his or her first
command. Some of the warmest leadership mentor stories related were about the veteran
CPO taking the young junior officer under his wing, while allowing the new officer to
still look good in front of the enlisted staff. As officers gain more experience, they are
better able to coach petty officers, creating the potential for two-way mentorship
development.
Senior officers had the most influence in the areas of command presence and
decision-making. These senior officers provided both examples o f leadership and
developmental experiences for their subordinate officers.
Assignment rotation in the Navy is generally every two to three years. This
provides officers with the opportunity to serve under a number of senior officers and
observe a variety o f leadership practices. Steve mentioned that he had worked many
assignments with two captains overseeing the project. As a result, he had worked with 32
different captains, giving him a wide exposure to leadership practices. Most stated, like
Ted. that they had worked under some "truly great men" and valued the tremendous
models of leadership they were exposed to. About a quarter o f the participants
mentioned that they had also witnessed some negative models. Ralph offered that poor
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leadership also provides teachable moments: “You learn [not only] what works [but]
what doesn't."
Developmental Experiences
As Paul discussed, development of junior officers is a responsibility o f both the
chief petty officer and the senior officer. One o f the key leadership development
strategies for young officers consists of providing a structure for increasing levels of
responsibility. The initial assignment, however, is often a huge responsibility. For
example, right out o f college, with no prior supervisory experience. Frank and Dan each
were in command of construction battalions of over 220 men in forward areas. Ted was
overseeing treacherous mine sweeping operations in the Mekong River with no CPO or
other officer to assist him. As Frank saw it. these experiences discouraged those who
were not comfortable taking on the level of responsibility required by a military
organization:
The experience of coming right out of college, being thrown right into that
leadership role and having to develop that trust and confidence o f the subordinates
probably [had] the biggest impact on me. Most o f us [held jobs] going through
high school and college but never with that amount of responsibility . . . but the
military throws you in. A lot o f people end up getting out after four years because
they don't like it. or they want to try something else. But I kind o f survived and
was really excited about my responsibility.
The military experience may select those who crave and value responsibility. Almost
every participant described a similar process in which senior officers provided more
structured decision-making experiences, but quickly began to provide increasingly more
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general direction, leaving more decision-making responsibilities with the junior officer.
Steve found that the more tasks he took on. the more responsibility and independence
senior officers gave him. He credited this with developing his work ethic and his
leadership style. Sam and Paul felt such experiences developed self-confidence.
Conversely, every participant mentioned his dislike o f micro-management, and how
particularly painful it was to go from a captain who recognized and rewarded one's
capabilities with increasing authority and responsibility to one who micro-managed.
A

second development tactic that senior officers use is bringing their staff into

higher level decision-making processes, even if only at the observer level. Many
participants related stories o f commanding officers who brought issues to meetings for
the junior officers to discuss. Often the CO already had a decision in mind, but wanted to
provide junior officers with a forum for developing critical thinking. Participants
described superiors who would question them about the rationale for their decisions, to
further hone their analytical skills and ability to command.
Military leadership development focuses on preparing officers to take command
quickly and with little notice in a combat situation. These officers may be young and
inexperienced. The participant data revealed three structural conditions designed to
foster military leadership development: education and training, mentoring and
developmental experiences. Coupled with these conditions are the actions and strategies
summarized in Table 3. The intended result o f military leadership development process
is to instill the cultural values, beliefs and norms, develop the skills needed to lead staff
and develop decision-making capabilities. The possibility of combat necessitates a quick
initiation to leadership responsibilities. While some principles are taught in military
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education settings, the main portion o f leadership development takes place through
mentoring by senior officers and petty officers and by the accelerated developmental
experiences provided by senior officers. A summary of military leadership development
is in Table 3.

Table 3:

Description o f Subtheme o f Military Leadership Development

Context
Must prepare to
take over
command without
notice
Youthfulness of
many junior
officers (as young
as 22)

Conditions
Education and
Training

Strategies
Common initiation.
ongoing career
development.

Consequences
Instill values, beliefs.
behavior norms.
leadership principles.

Mentoring

CPO's and sr. officers
expected to develop
junior officers.

Guide, role models.
how to lead crew.
decision-making.

Developmental
Experiences

Immediate
responsibility.
Responsibility as a
reward.
Included in decision
making.

Develop critical
thinking, confidence &
decision-making.

The leadership development approach perhaps most unique to the military' is the practice
o f assigning immediate responsibility to very'junior officers. The participants were
unanimous in attesting to the significance of this experience in their development, and
several noted that early leadership responsibilities tended to "'weed out" those officer
candidates who were not comfortable with authority. Also noteworthy is that each
participant discussed his dislike of micro-management. It appears that the military
leadership development experience culls individuals who seek and thrive on
responsibility
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Theme Two: Leading People
The possibility of and preparation for combat has shaped the structures, practices
and principles o f leading people in the military. Despite their varied experiences, the
participants interviewed exhibited a strong, shared outlook on leading individuals,
suggesting there is a dominant approach within the military. The subthemes identified in
the interviews include: the contingency style o f leadership, the nature of staff, the
perception of the leader, motivating staff and building teamwork and camaraderie.
The Strategy of Military Contingency Leadership Stvles
The participants identified two objective circumstances that determine what type
o f leadership style is appropriate. They defined these circumstances as 1) an operational
environment, e.g.. combat, a training exercise, a submarine patrol, a construction project
in a forward area, shipboard operations, foreign deployment; or 2) an administrative
environment, e.g.. a shore-based assignment, a civilian-military construction project, a
research and development program, a ship repair and refitting assignment. Operational
and administrative environments place different demands on the crew. As Ralph viewed
it. an operational assignment requires "a lot of physical and mental performance [and] a
lot o f dedication to some immediate stressful challenges/' An administrative situation,
however, more closely mirrors a civilian setting.
Most o f the interviewees described a contingency view o f leadership in the
military, where the circumstances determined what style was appropriate. Paul, who had
no direct combat experience, saw just a small distinction between combat and managerial
environments: that combat simply requires an officer to make quick judgments with ease
and to keep "focused on the big mission.” Frank, on the other hand, drew the most
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distinct lines between the two ty pes o f leadership. He also had the most colorful
description of the operational leadership style, what he termed the "kick ass. take names"
style (hereafter called KATNleadership). This involved giving orders and using threats if
necessary to gain total compliance. The KATN leader was "the guy everyone hated.” yet
in combat or field situations, his men would have '‘the deep [fox] holes and the proper
camouflage . . . no questions asked."
Frank described a dualistic view of leadership —a leader could threaten or coach
staff. Those officers who could change styles were successful in any environment.
Those who were limited in their leadership tactics were not effective in all settings. In
his view, the KATN leaders were a disaster in construction settings. Their men had low
morale, worked poorly and "did nothing but grumble and get into trouble." Conversely,
those officers using solely a coaching style had high-performing teams in construction
settings but in an operational environment, according to Frank, their staff "would have
shallow' fox holes and skimpy camouflage and they'd be asleep on watch because the
coach w asn't threatening." The ideal officer could adapt styles to fit the setting. Frank
had spent a substantial amount of his career commanding blue-collar CB units, often
overseas. He mentioned experiences in Vietnam. Central America and Africa where his
units had to post guards around the clock while completing strategically important
projects. These experiences may have contributed to his sharp delineation between the
leadership needed in the two settings.
Ralph, perhaps due to his submarine and helicopter experience, emphasized
technical expertise and team coordination:
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At sea. high technical operations often in the middle o f the night require a
dedicated, concerted commitment to get the job done and to deal with people very
directly. You expect a lot of independence from them and coordination and you
expect it immediately. There are times when there's trouble on the ship. rain, low'
fuel . . . . Guys have to know what to do immediately and do it. That's w hat all
the training is about.
His view' o f the role o f leadership was to have and be able to inspire the kind o f technical
expertise and coordinated performance that preserves lives. He described submarine
drills called "scrams” where the crew would handle screaming sirens and alarming
readings, not knowing if they were involved in a drill or a real equipment failure that
could result in an irreversible flooding of the ship. Later, as an aviator, he led helicopter
squadrons in night anti-submarine maneuvers in the middle o f the ocean. Such
experiences led him to view operational leadership as producing high technical
performance, sharp physical and mental dedication and a "dedicated, concerted
commitment.” Will, in contrast relied primarily on administrative skills in the Civilian
Engineer Corps.
Les stated that in a shipboard environment, a leader expected orders to be obeyed
without hesitation. Shore command provided the experience o f working "more like a
business type environment.” He saw ship command as leadership and shore command as
management. The ability to command staff and get results was different on shore as well:
When I was at sea. and I would say "Right full rudder." I could watch the bow of
that ship turn to the right and know where I was going. When I [was] ashore and
ordering “Right full rudder" and I’d wait and wait for something to happen with
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this organization. [I] reach a point where . . . I don't care which direction it goes,
just turn somewhere! Show me the bow is moving!
Nearly every participant confirmed that the style o f leadership they used in the military'
was determined by the circumstances. This view is echoed in military literature: "The
leadership style required in combat or the field is different because there is an overriding
need to both protect the troops and to accomplish the mission" (Henderson. 1985. p.
164).
Interestingly, both Marines mentioned the stereotype of the authoritarian military
leaders - whom George referred to as “the screamers." They both agreed that officers
solely using that style were ineffective. Bob described several assignments where he had
been brought into a unit to do “damage control" in the wake o f an authoritarian CO. As
Les described, being flexible and in control o f one's leadership style was a command
asset, especially if the troops knew one was capable of using a tough, authoritarian style:
f m a sarcastic son-of-a-bitch sometimes. I can be intimidating when I want to be.
but I can control that and. quite frankly, sometimes it comes in handy and I use it
that way. But my personal style of leadership is walking around and asking
questions . . . [and using] some common sense.
George referred to this tactic as consciously “yelling for impact, but never out o f anger."
Ralph was the only participant to describe an incident involving a physical
confrontation. He had "chewed [an enlisted man] up one side and down the other" in his
quarters for making derogatory comments about other sailors' wives. The man had
reacted by refusing to guard him during a social basketball game. Ralph responded by
physically hitting the man open handed in the chest and swearing at him in front o f the
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whole crew. He felt that only “a very direct response [would] get him back on track
again." He felt that such a strong impact was required to get the sailor out o f the rut he
had fallen into.
Those who felt a KATN style was necessary agreed: 1) it can be used in the
military in a way it could not be used in the public or private sector and 2) the knowledge
that it can be used helps ensure orders are obeyed. It provides a balance to more common
coaching styles. (See Table 4.)

Table 4:
Context
Operational
environment

Administrative
environment

Description of Subtheme of Leading Staff, Contingency Leadership
Conditions
KATN style

Strategies
Demanding, possible
threats. Set &
expect high
standards. Demand
orders be followed.

Consequences
High mental & physical
performance, handle
stress. Obey orders
without questions.
Accomplish strategic
mission, protect troops.

Technical
expertise

Set and demand high
standards.
Model technical
proficiency.

Increase technical
expertise.
Accomplish mission.

Coaching style

Plan, coordinate,
involve, and inform.

Accomplish programmatic
mission.

The nature of leading staff in the military is not a strict choice between styles.
Operational and administrative environments place different demands on the staff in
terms o f performance expectations.
It is tempting to draw a parallel between the operational and administrative
environments and the leadership and management distinction outlined by many
leadership scholars (Rost, 1993; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Zaleznik, 1977). This is not
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valid, as it is certainly possible to practice and observe leadership in administrative
settings involving significant change and collaborative efforts.
Nature o f Their Military Staff
Frank. Paul, Dan and Ted all commented on how their military careers gave them
the experience o f managing widely diverse groups from every walk o f life. All o f the
participants described the youth and inexperience o f many o f those under their command
as a condition that they had to address. Steve remarked that most o f the enlisted he
commanded were under 25. had little life experience away home, often had high school
educations and "needed to be watched 24 hours a day." George described his experience
as the commanding officer o f a remote desert base as a time he "lived cringing over the
young Marine, 18 years old. who wanted to go out and do something stupid . . . I felt
totally responsible for these individuals." The age. naivete and immaturity o f many
subordinates places an "awesome responsibility" on military' officers who control aspects
o f both the personal and professional lives o f their crews
Complicating the situation is frequent personnel rotation. In general, military
members change assignments every two to three years. Many o f the military leadership
strategies and structures address the challenge of creating cohesive, technically-capable
units out o f many youthful, inexperienced, diverse and continually rotating personnel.
Some of these strategies are: selecting out. controlled environment, straightforward
communications, training and development, values and standard operating procedures.
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Selecting Out.
The military does some initial "weeding out" o f staff in boot camp. Bob. a retired
Marine, cited the importance o f the initiating rituals o f boot camp in identifying those
suited to military life:
That's the reason they start skimming your hair off and requiring you to have
shined boots, for requiring you to be able to bounce a quarter off the covers on
your rack [bunk]. It’s kind of a rude awakening to a lot of people, and a lot of
people rebel and never adjust to it. But that’s what they [the military] want to do.
They want to identify that person who’s not going to be adaptable so they can get
them out and focus on the people who can adapt and be effective.
Frank agreed that "those who don’t fit the system get sent home" during boot camp. A
second way people are selected out is through the re-enlistment process. Officers,
according to George, must “get tough, make the calls early and preclude re-enlistment"
by writing honest performance appraisals and administering discipline. He described the
leadership role in such circumstances as “balancing the real strong guy with the
compassionate side. The true leaders can do both." The goal, in Dan’s words, is to retain
those people with "the right stuff.”
Controlled Environment.
There are certain structures and practices that assist in building a cohesive unit.
Among those cited by the participants are combat, foreign deployment, the shipboard
experience and training/field maneuvers. Such assignments give those in command
control over the essential elements o f an individual’s life. As Dan stated, “you eat. sleep,
do everything with this same group.” In such circumstances, the troops are separated
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from their families, giving the leader a more powerful role. This is especially true on
ship. Les described the interdependency of the shipboard relationship:
I would be a lot more involved with my subordinates on a shipboard environment
where [we're] going to spend six to eight months at a time away from families
and where it's going to be just us. They're going to rely on me. I'm going to rely
on them.
On deployment, the leader has much more control over staff - what movies they watch,
when they work, when they sleep, when they cut their hair. Ralph described a submarine
crew as the ultimate "captive audience."
This controlled environment gives the officer a unique opportunity to build
camaraderie, unit pride and a common bond. Dan attributed the control of the operational
environment as critical to success in his first command. He and his CPO dramatically
reversed the poor performance and personal behavior of a unit in nine months in a
situation where he and his CB unit were together 24 hours a day. Thus, the control
military officers have over their units allows them to better build teamwork and to have
more effect in managing the work performance and personal behavior in their crews.
Straightforward Communication.
The youth and inexperience of many o f the enlisted staff may be a contributing
factor to the use o f straightforward, direct communication in the military. Orders are
followed —literally. Paul summarized the importance of clear, direct communication:
You have to make sure people hear what you're saying and you have to be careful
in your communication . . . you make a comment about how you would like to see
things done and that's exactly how they're going to do it.
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Vague or misleading directions can bring the wrong results. Dan related an episode that
shaped his communication style. He had taken over a command as a new junior officer
and had 90 performance evaluations to do. He asked the CPO to write up one evaluation
for him to review. He was pleased with the format and type o f information the CPO
included in the evaluation. He complimented the Chief and told him ”make them all like
this." For three weeks the CPO typed the evaluations on a manual typewriter with carbon
paper. The CPO then turned in 90 evaluations with exactly the same wording. The
military environment forced Dan to adapt his communication style to what was expected
within the organizational culture.
Another reason for straightforward communication is the importance o f being
honest with staff in order to develop the trust needed. There is a stereotype o f command
and control communications in the military, but Les distinguished between
communications in an operational setting versus everyday communications. As a
commander, he wanted to communicate decisions and his rationale to staff whenever
possible, so they were better informed, and would also develop trust in his decision
making. Finally, it is also an expectation that officers be careful and judicious in their
comments - often communicating on a "need-to-know" basis. As Paul stated: "In the
military you have to be careful, because a side com m ent. .. could easily kill someone."
Training and Development.
Every participant mentioned their personal belief and commitment to the
importance o f training and staff development. As Paul stated, training is the military's
"number one budget and operational priority." In the military, the rigorous training
prepares the younger members of the force to quickly take on specific technical
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responsibilities and allows for some members with mediocre educational backgrounds to
improve and take on responsible roles. The consistency o f the training also allows for
staff to be rotated frequently while retaining quality and consistent performance. Each
position has a required set of coursewcrk. Some have specific qualifications and
credentials that must be earned. Steve worked in commands where each individual had a
development plan in addition to the training requirements o f their current position.
The military training program appears to have shaped the leadership views o f the
officers interviewed. Notably, nearly half o f the participants mentioned their own
experience with continuous professional development as a key reason they remained in
the military.
Leading bv Values.
Participants were asked what caused individuals to go against human nature and
place themselves in harm’s way to make what Paul termed "the ultimate sacrifice."
There were two principle areas o f response. The first had to do with the core values o f
the military —duty, honor, self-sacrifice and country which are instilled during the
initiation process and reinforced throughout one's career (Janowitz. 1960; Nye. 1986;
Dunivan, 1994). Sam believed that an understanding and commitment to these values
comes from the military experience:
It’s the development of an understanding o f history, making people feel patriotism
and to have a love for what the country stands for.. . . I don’t think that most
people join the military because [these values] naturally exist within them already.
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While these values are introduced during basic training, it is the military officer who
models and reinforces them during throughout one's career. The leader himself is the
second factor cited as contributing to developing a willingness to risk one's life.
Perception o f the Leader
Crucial to the notion o f military leadership is the confidence and trust that the unit
must have in its leader. Obedience comes with rank. As Will described it. military rank
"carries the weight ... the respect.'' Officers "have got it to start with. It's sort of theirs
to lose." The potential for combat requires that the individual members must be willing
to put their lives in the hands o f the person in command. Military officers can readily
rely on the compliance of their subordinates. They have the opportunity to build upon the
respect and develop deeper loyalties through their actions. The participants described
command presence, trust in decision-making ability and loyalty as the factors critical to
the unit's perception of the leader.
Command Presence and Ability.
Les defined command presence as knowing "the person is a leader just by the way
the person carries himself, [by] the way they act." Ted saw it as "an aura .. . where
others feel comfortable you're in charge, wherever you are." An aspect o f command
presence is the physical bearing o f the officer —the uniform, personal neatness and
grooming, etc. But command presence is more often found in the individual's actual
manner. The phrases repeatedly used by participants were "in control" and "calm under
pressure." Ted told a story of how his mentor could handle any situation —and remain in
his captain's chair on the bridge:
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It amazes me the self-control he had and the confidence in his own abilities to be
able to do [anything while] just sitting there and I can't think o f when he ever
allowed the ship to be unduly risked. He was just able to do it in a manner that
[showed he] was very much in control and very calm, very capable.
Ted described another captain he met during a ship inspection: “When he got on die
ship's intercom to talk, the sailors stopped; they listened . . . . When he spoke. God
spoke.” Les and Paul also cited examples o f command presence when describing their
personal mentors.
The technical knowledge and physical ability o f the leader is one aspect o f
developing confidence in a leader and ties into the notion o f leading by example. On a
nuclear submarine, according to Ralph, the officers needed to display sufficient in-depth
technical knowledge to assure personnel o f their own safety. This positioned them to
demand a similar commitment to technical proficiency from their staff. The personal
flying abilities o f the leader determined the respect given by subordinates in an aviation
unit, according to Bob. In contrast, Will said that in a CB unit. “I've never though that
the technical knowledge was the important factor in our business. It was really the
administration or the management of organizations that was important."
Military leaders need to model that they can and are willing to do what their unit
does in both technical and physical tasks. When taking on a new ship command, Ted
would make it a point to go into the engine room and turn wrenches with the crew. Ralph
described the extremely competitive and physical athletic games he organized with his
units. George mentioned that Marine officers were expected to go on ten-mile runs with
their troops carrying fully-loaded packs - and to finish at the front:
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Participation from me was a big thing that increased their loyalty.. . . We would
run once a week as a unit and it was important that not only myself as the CO. but
every other Department Head was out th ere.. . . If you're making the run and
leading the run . . . it builds the esprit de corps . . . . They enjoy seeing you out
there. It just builds the excitement and everyone appreciates it.
He would also join his crew in the menial tasks involved in preparing for inspection. In
all, an "in control'' deportment, technical ability, physical ability and personal
involvement o f the officer all contributed to the officer's "public" image with the crew.
These lessons appear to have remained with nearly all the participants
interviewed. All but one participant had an extremely neat office. Ten o f the eleven
participants appeared to remain in very fit condition.
An officer joining a unit is granted inherent respect, based on rank. As Will put it
"it's yours to lose." The officer can also lose the respect o f the crew by such actions as
fraternization, allowing the crew to be disrespectful and excessive drinking. Officers can
and should socialize with subordinates as long as they maintained the decorum o f their
rank and position.
Trust in the Leader's Decision-Making.
The officer in command has the ultimate responsibility for decisions. The
military unit must believe that the leader has the capability to make quality decisions and
to provide for their well-being and safety. Sam. among others, used the process o f
briefing and educating his staff in non-critical times to build their confidence in his
decision-making abilities:
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I felt that I had this responsibility to share with them the "why" [of what] we were
doing, not just the "what." . . . My thought process was. if we ever do get attacked
or we get in a situation where [I] have to give orders. I believe that these people
will follow me a lot better if they have developed a confidence in my ju d g m en t..
. When the bullets start flying, if I say “Do this or that." I don't have time for
them to question me. I don’t have time for them to disobey me.
Demonstrating decision-making ability builds loyalty and confidence in the leader and
consequently improved combat readiness.
Lovaltv.
A military maxim repeated by each interviewee was “take care o f your troops."
The military leader needs to demonstrate a commitment to both looking out for the
interests and protecting the safety o f staff to earn their loyalty in return. Paul described
the symbiotic relationship o f loyalty between the officer and enlisted:
I mentioned that you had to get the confidence of the people you led. That
confidence came from them knowing that my biggest asset w asn't the machinery,
it wasn't the equipment, it was the people who run that ship. And you treat the
people accordingly [as] a much higher priority.
Frank found this relationship to be one of the most dynamic aspects o f his military
experience: “One of the biggest thrills o f being in charge is that they rely on you for that
[protection].” Taking care o f your crew can involve personal counseling, family support,
providing rewards and recognition, looking after their comfort, encouraging their
development, granting them additional authority and responsibility, getting resources and
support for the mission, and much more. Many o f the participants cited examples o f this
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concept of "taking care of your people" in their examples o f leadership mentors, and
described the personal satisfaction they had gotten from guiding a crew member through
a troubling moment in his or her life.
Coupled with the notion of ensuring the safety o f the unit is maintaining
discipline. An officer who ignores discipline problems puts everyone else in jeopardy.
As Frank stated: “There’s no room for those who don’t obey orders." The theme
repeated by all who discussed discipline was that it needed to be fair and consistentlyapplied to all. Each participant had been involved in serious discipline hearings in the
military. One had dismissed over 50 sailors and another had presided over more than 200
sessions of Commanding Officer’s Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP), known in the
military' as the Captain’s Mast. All agreed that an officer's willingness to take action
against those who violated rules was important to building loyalty' and unit cohesion.
Motivating Staff
Recognizing and motivating staff is regarded as a core responsibility o f military
officers. A repeated theme raised by participants was that recognition was tied to the role
o f the leader in setting high expectations, communicating them and promptly and
consistently rewarding top performance. Participants cited a host o f recognition tools
available to officers: letters of commendation, parties, time off, awards, pay. medals and
others. Dan felt that recognition strategies were one of the most important things he
learned in his thirty years as a military' officer:
People always want recognition. They want to feel that they're im portant.. . .
One thing I learned was that you’ve got to be innovative. You just always have to
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look at the buttons to push on people. You just can't use the same code [with
everyone].
The military also offers training and promotional opportunities as incentives. Paul
viewed it as "in the military, you're only limited by your own capacity to do good work."
Enlisted staff can rise to senior officer ranks, as in Ralph's case.
There were different views of the self-motivation o f enlisted staff. Paul discussed
the high self-motivation o f staff. Whereas Steve. Ralph. Dan and Sam felt officers had an
ongoing need and duty to ’'push" people to be their best. Ralph cited a case where a
sailor who was a poor test taker refused to take a promotional test that he had failed
several times before. Ralph ordered him to take the test and personally worked with him
on test preparation. The experience o f watching that sailor pass the test and go on to a
fine career with future promotions remains one the proudest accomplishments o f Ralph's
career.
Building Teams: Camaraderie and Unit Cohesion
In a close operational environment, individual and team motivation are
intertwined. The leader's standards and expectations can become transferred to the entire
team, and an impetus to please the leader can become peer pressure. Ralph described
how this happened on a submarine when some crewmembers pressured others to study
for their qualifying tests. In Ralph's experience, when the leader sets high expectations
and rewards achievement, "that kind o f attitude is infectious and improves the whole
organization overall."
Critical to managing military staff is building camaraderie among the troops.
Colonel William Darryl Henderson, a combat commander and instructor at the National
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Defense University, defined camaraderie as what exists “when the small group, the
organization and the leader come together" ensuring the group functions cohesively
(1985. p. 9). According to Henderson, the military builds camaraderie through its
informal culture (mission and values) and through structures that support the unit. The
goal is to have individuals identify with their unit, de-emphasize their individuality and
be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their crew . Experiences in boot camp and in
operational environments, e.g.. shipboard, field exercises and foreign deployment, are
structures previously discussed that help build unit cohesion.
Ted described building unit cohesion as “the challenge that I took on everyday o f
my military career/' In a shipboard environment, he would, like Bob. make certain he
spent time working alongside his men. “I always wanted to portray that I was not better
than them. I just had a different position. I was not afraid to get my hands dirty.” He
would also meet with new members o f the crew and promote to them that. “This is vour
hom e.. . . I want you to feel like this is yours."
It is more difficult to maintain that type of unit cohesion in an administrative
setting such as in a shore facility. There were several strategies offered by the
participants to maintaining cohesion in such an environment. Ralph and Frank discussed
using competitive events to generate ongoing unit pride and identity - Ralph employed
athletics and Frank used inter-unit competitions. Others structured social events and
gatherings. Les's strategy was to be as visible on shore as one would be on board ship:
Be visible, get around. Let people know you're still out there, you're still in
charge and you're still concerned - and what your concerns are. Often people
would be more than happy to do what you want, [but] they don't know what it is
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you want, because it's getting filtered. . . . People are more than willing to charge
down that line you want them to go as long as they know what it is you want, and
that you're not changing day to day.
This relates to the practice o f direct, straightforward communication valued within the
military. Clarity of mission ensures that direction is clear within so large an organization.
The officer needs to communicate each individual’s role within that mission. Without a
clear understanding o f the mission and priorities the staff go in a host of directions and
there can be no unit cohesion.
An additional aspect o f building camaraderie is for the unit to know they have the
support o f their officers. For example, when bureaucratic mandates and directives
coming from down the chain of command have a potentially negative impact, the leader
may have the opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to “take care of the crew." Les
described some occasions in administrative settings when had argued against
implementing a bureaucratic procedure that was detrimental: “Sometimes the role o f a
good leader is to . . . say, ‘Look, this is stupid. . . . You’re tearing my people up. I can't
keep doing it this way.’ and stand up and say ‘No.’" He added that one did not advertise
“taking on’*the chain o f command but that the unit "senses" when it has happened and
that enhances loyalty.
Despite differences in their service areas, there was remarkable consistency in the
strategies and practices described concerning leading people in the military. The main
themes identified centered on the operational/administrative environments, the nature of
staff, the perception of the leader, motivation, and building teamwork and camaraderie.
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The key conditions that affect these conditions, the strategies used to address them and
the leadership lessons learned are listed in Table 5.
Table 5:

Description of Subtheme o f Leading Staff

Context
Conditions
Strategies
Consequences:
____________________________________________________ Leadership Lessons
KATN style
Operational
Demanding, possible
High mental & physical
environment
threats.
performance, handle
Set & expect high
stress. Obey orders
standards.
without questions-.
Demand orders are
Accomplish strategic
followed.
mission.
Technical
expertise

Set and demand high
standards.
Model technical
proficiency.

Increase technical
expertise. Accomplish
mission.

Administrative
environment

Coaching style

Plan, coordinate.
involve, and inform.

Accomplish
programmatic mission.

Staff: some
young, lack
experience,
poor education.
Continual staff
changes.

Select out those
who can't
adapt.

Boot camp.
Honest performance
appraisals.
May not let re-enlist.
Discipline.

Be honest in appraisals.
"Make the tough calls" deal with discipline
problems.

Controlled
environment

Paternalistic system.
Do everything together.

Build camaraderie.
Turn around behavior.

Communication
straightforward
state reason.
judicious.

Orders followed
literally.
Trust leader.
People can be hurt.

Communicate clearly;
speak directly.
Demonstrate your
decision-making.
Need to know

Training and
development

Quickly productive.
Make up for poor
education. Consistency
despite rotation.

Make training as #1
priority: provide
continuous career
training.
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Table 5. Leading Staff, continued
Context

Conditions

Strategies

Consequences:
Leadership Lessons
Lead bv values.

Willingness to
go into harm's
wav.

Shared values.

Instill at orientation.
Leader models &
reinforces.

Willingness to
go into harm’s
way: to follow
leader.

Command
presence, calm,
High technical
ability.
Physical ability.
Maintain
demeanor.

Perception: leader is in
control, knows job and
will keep staff safe.

Appear calm.
Maintain demeanor.
Display abilities: work
along side staff; stay fit.
Respect is yours to lose.

Put life in
leader’s hands:
Decision
making

Display quick
& decisive
ability; rational
process.

Build crew’s
confidence in leader.
Perception: we are in
good hands.

If people trust your
judgment they will obey

Put life in
leader's hands:
2-way loyalty

Build loyalty.

Counsel all; be
involved with family.
Reward &
recognize top
performance.
Be fair & apply to all.
Take action to protect
crew.
Set high expectations:
communicate &
reward; Promote for
merit;

Take care o f your people.

Discipline
Motivation

Willing to
place self in
harm's way for
the unit

Camaraderie
and unit
cohesion

Values of unit identity.
Structures: deployment,
social events, sports,
and competition.
Be visible: demonstrate
support for staff.

Discipline builds loyalty
and obedience.
People need to be pushed.
Recognize individually.
Reward & promote on
merit.
Use events and structures.
Demonstrate support.
Work along side staff.
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The participants identified common core lessons in leadership, which they gained from
their military experience. These lessons were shaped by the existing conditions facing
the military and by the structures and strategies developed within the organization.

Theme Three: Leading Processes
Standard operating procedures (SOP's) are one o f the strategies that facilitate
organizational consistency within a context o f regular change in positional leaders and
personnel. Paul summarized the philosophy o f standard procedures as: “The guy who is
implementing that procedure today could be dead tomorrow. Somebody has to take it up
from where they did.*’
SOP’s are written procedures that exist for every common process from
maintaining a boiler to ordering supplies. One participant related how he had taken over
an assignment the day his new ship got underway - a very complicated process. He
“went by the manual" and left port with no complications. Military SOP’s are an aspect
of the military bureaucracy that one had to learn to adjust to according to Frank:
Every piece o f paper had to be blessed all the way up so that there are forms for
everything and everything had a form . . . . We were given a certain amount of
authority and you learned to live with it. .. . It's those people who really got
frustrated with that who got o u t.. . . 1 found I could adapt.
While all participants agreed that SOP's were absolutely essential in a combat situation,
there were differing perspectives on their role in daily administrative functions. The civil
engineers interv iewed displayed a “softer" commitment to sticking to SOP’s than did the
ship commanders, the submariner and the aviators. Paul and Steve - neither o f whom
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have combat experience - both talked at length about how success in the Civil
Engineering Corps relied on going around the procedures. Steve described how he had at
times circumvented procedures, yet still worked within the system:
I was constantly having to go around processes . . . [that] didn't provide speedyenough. quality enough or cheap enough results. I learned early on [about] the
big difference between law and rules —arbitrary procedural rules, you know.
Stepping over the line of the laws or statutes was one thing —you couldn't break
those . . . but if [a procedure] was in the way. find a way around it.
Paul also discussed the distinction between procedures and law. He saw SOP?s as largely
assisting enlisted staff by clearly laying out what needed to be done and helping them
perform the tasks necessary to contribute to the mission regardless of whether they
understand the "big picture."
A Leadership Decision: When to Break the Rules.
Each participant was asked to remember a time that he had made a decision to go
against the rules or procedures, to describe the incident and explain his rationale. Not
every' participant could recollect or was willing to discuss such an occasion. Below is a
summary o f the incidents related.
Bob discussed a low' point in his career when there had been major cuts in the
aircraft maintenance budget. He w'as overseeing a program where his crew was stripping
down planes for spare parts, working seven days a week and was still behind in repairs.
He became so frustrated that he turned in his resignation. A general met with him to
negotiate what it would take for him to stay. Bob w'as concerned that the record o f his
attempted resignation "would be like having VD in your file." The general assured him
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that any such information would disappear. Bob did not make the decision to remove the
information but supported it.
Dan brought up a case where one of his petty officers, an E-7. was convicted o f
Driving Under the Influence (a DUI). The standard procedure was to put the conviction
in the person's evaluation. Dan decided not to because the individual was a
“tremendous" petty officer, had (in Dan's view) learned his lesson and would never again
be promoted with a DUI in his record. As a result he eventually became a senior chief
petty officer and “was considered one o f the best senior enlisted in the Navv.”
Frank related how he was ordered to take 250 men to Somalia for a construction
project - prior to the outbreak of the recent civil war. The ambassador had told the State
Department that the men could not carry weapons. Frank sent three men to do some
assessment prior to the mission. His men were ambushed several times and had to bribe
their way out of the situations. He re-contacted the State Department and told them his
unit would need to be armed. The ambassador replied that this would be “too
confrontational.'' Frank stood up to the State Department and the ambassador and
refused to send his unit under those conditions. He was willing to end his career over the
issue. He ultimately won the support of his superior officer and his unit did not go.
George provided an example o f when he was involved in a joint Navy and Marine
Corps exercise. Each had given him conflicting directives on the number and type of
aircraft to include. He concurred with the Navy because the decision involved a safety
issue concerning the amount o f space available on deck. As a result. “I was chewed
probably the worst I’ve ever been . . . [I made] the right decision, but it still didn’t help."
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In this case. George was willing to face the wTath o f his Marine commanding officer to
protect his flight crew.
Les gave examples o f being in a field command and receiving mandates to begin
new administrative programs after talcing a cut in staff. To focus his limited crew on the
critical tasks, he began to challenge some of the blanket administrative policy
requirements such as launching a smoking cessation program:
You would either pick up the phone or write a letter. . . and say “NO!” I used to
love to do that, because I found after awhile that nobody wants to take on the guy.
the leader in the field. Because no matter how big the bureaucracy is. when you
get right down to it. they really do think in the Navy that the guy who is the
commander on the ground somewhere is the first line, is the guy who knows
what's going on. . . . I found th a t. . . when you say “no” often times nobody
realizes there's nobody in a position to say “Wait a minute, you can't say 'no*'*
because nobody back there knows who's in charge.
Les found it necessary to focus on the mission, and not to dilute and exhaust his resources
on non-essential programs. Ted. also a ship captain, made comments very similar to
Les's: “There just weren't enough man-hours in a day. wasn't the level o f skill available
to meet them all. . . . You're left doing selective compliance."
Paul described a case where higher command had told his unit to construct some
paint floats with weathered, inferior materials. They completed the project and the
customer rejected it. High command told them to require the customer to use it. Paul, as
a junior officer with message release authority, sent a message directly to the admiral's
office without first informing his commanding officer who was “more concerned with his
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ability to make captain than with his battalion." When word o f his action had gotten out.
the CPO told him that ‘’right now you have 400 people out here who. if you left the Navy
right now to start your own construction company, would line up and sign up right now."
The admiral intervened and made the needed changes as a result of Paul’s message
Steve mentioned two incidents. One was when he spent money improving some
1000 housing Navy units even though the base was scheduled to close in three years and
the directive from Washington was to not spend money on such bases. He and his
captain agreed that the state of the housing was deplorable and was affecting the home
life and personal security of the families. They improved the housing because "you’ve
got to take care o f your people." In the second incident, he needed to complete a
strategic construction project in 18 months at a cost o f $1 million. The standard
procedure was to create a request for a military construction project that would take about
five years. Instead, Steve divided the project into segments under $200,000 - which
could be authorized locally. He received approval for his small projects from local
controllers and field level officers. Three months later the contracting office in
Washington contacted him. He was told that he had broken contracting law and that
"people have been thrown out of the Navy for doing this.” Steve explained the
endorsements he'd gotten for these projects and left the contract officer with the
impression that "he was going to have a lot o f people to deal with" if he interfered with
its completion. Steve often had to be creative with project funding, but stated that, in this
case, it could have ended his career, *T came close, I came real close on that one.”
Ralph, Will and Sam did not recall specific incidents. Will stated that, in general,
he followed procedures, *Tm a pretty conservative person.”
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Table 6 summarizes the personal stories of the participants related to going
around standard procedures and their rationale for taking such action.

Table 6:

Fictitious
Name
Bob

Personal Stories of Going Around Procedure or Rule: Description of
Incident. Rationale
Description o f Incident

Rationale

Put in resignation over stripping
planes for parts and working staff
seven days a week.

Maintenance aualitv and safetv
beine compromised. Take care o f
vour people.

Dan

Did not record DUI conviction on
officer’s performance evaluation.

Individual had learned his lesson
faced end o f career. Take care of
vour people.

Frank

Refused to send unit unarmed to
Somalia despite directive from
ambassador and State Department.

Safetv of his unit. Take care of
vour people.

George

Conflicting service directives.
Followed Navy orders & scaled down
the aircraft involved in an exercise.

Safetv issue - not place too manv
aircraft on the ship.

Les
Ted

Refused to implement some
administrative directives.

When low on staff resources do
the requests critical to the
mission. Do not overtax staff on
non-essential tasks.

Paul

Sent letter to admiral over his
commanding officer informing him
of likely project failure.

High command staff making poor
decisions and his commander was
not looking out for the project.

Steve

Upgraded military' housing though
base was to be closed.
Violated contracting law by dividing
$1 million project into smaller ones.

Poor housing - affecting families.
Take care o f vour people.
Project was time sensitive and
strategically important. Support
the mission.

Ralph.
Sam. Will

Did not cite an instance.
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The three reasons repeatedly cited for circumventing SOP's were: taking care o f your
people, safety and supporting the mission. Paul's story was the only one that appears to
fall outside o f these reasons. The paint floats under construction were not strategic. His
story did not adequately portray his rationale for violating chain o f command, and his
report of the reactions o f the enlisted staff suggest his actions had a negative impact on
organizational loyalty.
Interestingly, those responding to this question from the Civil Engineer Corps
were more cavalier about procedures than the other participants. This could be because
their work is most commonly managing projects and contracts. Those who had been in
combat expressed a stronger commitment to the role of SOP’s. Dan emphasized that
ignoring or going around the rules was dangerous:
You know, it’s not like M*A*S*H and McHale's Navy . . . because the rules are
there for a reason and when you start bucking the system . . . someone will get
hurt, something will happen. Normally when there are disasters they can be traced
back to people who didn't follow the established procedures and rules, and in the
end someone gets hurt or killed and it's not a pretty sight. So you have to ask
yourself what's the risk for.
A military leader works in an organization steeped in tradition and structured by standard
operating procedures. Yet. the leader must be prepared and ensure the staff is prepared
for immediate deployment. As such, the military could be looked at as operating as an
organization o f stability working within a context of uncertainty. Standard operating
procedures contribute to both providing stability and enabling operations to continue
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under the most unpredictable and stressful circumstances. A good military leader adheres
to SOP's. but also makes judgment calls about when to go around them.

Theme Four: Decision-making
One o f the stereotypes of the military leader is that o f an autocratic individual
directing all aspects of the operation. To the contrary, the military is committed to
developing leadership capabilities vertically within the organization to create a system
where leaders are interchangeable and replaceable. This is critical to prepare for combat
situations where an officer may suddenly need to assume a command. As such, it seeks
to quickly build the decision-making capacity in its officers.
One o f the features of military leadership development stated previously is
granting officers responsibility early in their career. Frank reflected on his early
experience: “Most college graduates. I think, start out slowly and work their way up.
But the military throws you in . . . I kind o f survived and was really excited about my
responsibility.” A good senior officer teaches decision-making to junior officers by
granting increasingly more decision authority, giving feedback on those decisions and by
sharing the rationale for command decisions.
Those officers who remain in the military for a career have had the opportunity
for broad decision-making experience and to be a part of command decisions. Each
participant described instances where he relished the opportunity for challenging
command assignments and. conversely, also described chaffing under a senior officer
with a propensity to micro-manage. When Steve, for example, reflected on his most
challenging assignment in the military, he was especially pleased that his team
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accomplished its mission with virtually no direction from up the chain of command. The
military system o f increasing responsibility and feedback is designed to build the selfconfidence o f officers, the quality o f their critical thinking and the speed of their
decision-making. All three of these are required in a combat setting.
The style o f decision-making is not autocratic, nor is it consensus. The
participants described experiences where, as junior and senior officers, they were
exposed to the critical thinking process, they were given broad authority over their work
and they were often brought in and consulted on true command decisions. But. the
individual in command, as Sam described it. controlled the final decision:
Everybody knows in the military organization that the buck stops with the
commanding officer - he is to set the tone and direction for the whole command.
Now’ he does that with . . . other senior officers, discussing and most o f the time
mutually deciding what this direction is going to be. And he relies upon his
individual experts like his civil engineer or his doctor and chaplain or whatever, to
provide him with advice and guidance in the particular field. But overall, if
something goes wrong, it’s the CO 's fault. And he knows that and so does
everybody else. So they know - and this is where power comes from —that
power is distributed to all of the rest of us so long as we use it to follow the same
direction, but we have some influence in setting that direction.
Authority and discretion are granted to those who demonstrate their abilities through their
accomplishments and who follow the direction set by the commanding officer. Relying
on the obedience o f subordinates is just as critical in the officer ranks as it is with the
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enlisted. The officer in charge must know that when a critical situation arises,
subordinate officers will obey orders without question.
As previously discussed, it is also essential that crew have the confidence in the
officer's judgment and decision-making ability to follow orders unquestioningly. This
involves several factors related to the perception o f a leader: command presence, quick
decision-making and quality decision-making. In administrative settings, an officer can
structure situations so that the crew can witness the decision-making process and thus
gain confidence in the officer’s leadership abilities. A summary of the data on
developing decision-making within military officers is contained in Table 7.

Table 7:

Context
Leader may
need to be
replaced
quickly.

Description of Subtheme o f Decision-making. Condition: The Possibility
of War
Conditions
Develop
decision
making.

Strategies
Early responsibility.
gradually increasing.
Responsibility is a
reward

Consequences:
Leadership Lessons
Final decision is CO's. Input.
not consensus.
Relish independence.
Dislike micro-management.

The goal is to build the confidence and loyalty required ensuring that orders will be
followed. Paul used a bit of humor to characterize military authority: “There's really no
room for consensus. There are in a military system really only about five answers to any
question. And that's ‘Yes sir; No sir; No excuse sir; I’ll find out sir; Aye, aye sir.'
Nothing in there said ‘Why?’”
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Theme Five: Managing Change
All o f the participants were in the service during periods o f great organizational
change. The post-Vietnam War era has been a period o f reviewing, reflecting and re
examining the mission and direction o f the military. Some o f the major changes taking
place during this time include: focusing more on humanitarian and peace-keeping
missions, transitioning to an all-volunteer force, becoming a more multi-cultural force,
broadening the role of women, struggling with the issue o f gays and lesbians in the
military, changing the makeup of the fleet and introducing increasingly sophisticated
weaponry. Being a part of facilitating that change was a shaping experience for the
participants.
One o f the unique aspects of change efforts in the military is that they often come
as top-down directives or from outside the organization. The Navy's response to the
ensuing scandal after women were assaulted by male officers during the 1991 Tailhook
convention is an example o f how the military often implements change. In this case, the
Navy declared a "zero tolerance" policy against sexual harassment, had the public affairs
office of an admiral's staff develop training and mandated that training for all staff
(Mason. 1995).
Ted gave another example of an organizational change he was a part of changing the attitude and practices regarding alcohol use. As a ship captain, he did not
have a role in setting the policies. He implemented directives that, for example, required
that half of the beverages at social functions be sodas. He also enforced discipline
policies regarding drinking and modeled moderation to his crew. The military had the
control mechanism and practice of complying with orders to assist in driving the policy
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directives. As with any organizational change, he stated, it took years to change the
actual attitudes. In both these cases, the role o f the commanding or executive officer is in
monitoring compliance rather than as a participant in developing the approach to change.
The military instituted a number of process improvement initiatives in the last two
decades, many related to total quality management (TQM). This effort assisted in
improving processes, broadening participation in decision-making and seeking
consensus. There were many improvement programs introduced within the military
within the last decade. Three o f the participants reflected a cynicism toward these change
efforts, referring to them as "the flavor o f the month.” The military’s approach to change
is summarized below' in Table 8.

Table 8:
Context
Managing
change.

Description of Subtheme o f Leading Change.
Conditions
Change
strategies
motivated bv
events.

Strategies
Top-down directives:
officer does
implementation.
Utilize controlled
environment.

Consequences:
Leadership Lessons
Follow & implement
organizational change.
Variety of programs can be
seen as "flavor of the
month.

What is significant about the nature of organizational change in the military is that it is
generally directed from Washington, with local commanding officers largely tasked with
carrying out the implementation. Some officers participated in process improvement
efforts modeled after such programs as TQM. Responses from participants indicated that
there was some degree of cynicism toward the variety o f improvement programs
instituted in recent years.
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This chapter first described the actual research and data analysis processes. It also
contained the key themes identified in the participant data, the relationship of the data
categories and a description o f an emergent theory on the nature o f military leadership.
The nature o f military leadership is driven by the necessity of preparing for potential
combat. The participant data revealed five key themes: leadership development, leading
people, leading processes, decision-making and leading change. Rapid leadership
development is a priority in the military where an officer may, on little notice, have to
take command. As such, responsibility is given early and skills in leading staff and
making decisions are developed through education, mentoring and command
experiences. Shared concepts on leading people include using a contingency leadership
style, firm but fair discipline, controlling the environment, straightforward
communications, focusing on training and development, leading by values building
camaraderie and developing command presence. SOP’s are valued as providing
consistency across the organization and in the face o f ongoing staff changes. Finally,
much of the organizational change is centrally mandated.
In the next chapter, the data will be examined to reveal the applicability of
military leadership strategies and practices to the public sector organizations. In addition,
this theory will be triangulated with existing literature and research on the military and
public sector in the final chapter.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

CHAPTER FIVE
DESCRIPTION OF THE KEY THEMES OF THE APPLICABILITY OF
MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Overview

The first chapter established that the purpose o f this research is to examine the
leadership beliefs and practices learned by career military officers and their applicability
to the public sector. The second chapter reviewed relevant literature on the
organizational cultures o f the military and public sector, career transitions, the nature of
organizational change, and current change trends in public sector organizations. The
third chapter discussed qualitative research, grounded theory methodology and the
specific research steps and protocol used in this study. The fourth chapter examined the
data gathered concerning the leadership perspectives and practices learned in the military
and proposed a construct o f military leadership based on grounded theory methodology.
The goal o f this chapter is to identify the similarities and differences in the
organizational context, conditions and structures between the military and the public
sector as experienced by this study's participants. Highlighting any differences does not
suggest that they are challenges that retired officers cannot adjust to. The intent is to
identify both these challenges and any strategies that retired officers utilized to adapt to
these differences or utilized to improve the public organizations they joined. The last
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chapter will compared the data to relevant literature and examine the implications o f the
findings for leadership and for the public sector.
Causal Condition: The Movement o f Military Officers to the Public Sector
The transition of retiring military officers to a civilian career represents a
significant life event. They leave an organization that has been a central part o f their
professional and social lives for 20 to 30 years. Transitioning officers enter a new
organization, perhaps with some similarities, but certainly with many differences from
the unique culture o f the military. This chapter explores the experiences of the eleven
participants taking on leadership roles in the public sector. It focuses on the applicability
of leadership strategies and practices learned during their military careers, and discusses
which o f these strategies and practices assisted them in facing the challenges encountered
in their new positions as mid-managers and executives in local government.
The interview data revealed four key subthemes - leading public sector staff,
organizational relationships, leading public sector processes, and encountering
stereotypes of retired military officers —which are discussed in the following sections.
These military leadership strategies and practices will be examined to determine how
they meet the current challenges of public sector leadership.

Transition to the Public Sector
The participants interviewed had a wide variety of experiences in leaving their
military' careers and entering public sector employment. There were different reasons
cited for entering the public sector. Three chose government employment because they
felt closer to public service values than to the values of the business world. As Dan
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stated: ‘^Public service, honesty, integrity are those traits valued here . . . In the private
world they always work toward bottom line and profit.” Ted also was drawn to the
mission o f continuing to serve the public. He knew he wanted to work in government
when he retired, and entered a Master's program in Public Administration to prepare
himself. Four specifically stated they refused to work for defense contractors, to avoid
what they saw' as conflicts of interest.
Others, particularly those from the Civil Engineer Corps, found government to be
a natural transition because the work of managing large scale construction contracts,
public works or facilities operations was so similar to their work in the military. Finally,
some entered the public sector because a personal associate in a government agency had
contacted them about applying for a job opening. Three o f the participants were steered
toward a job by former commanding officers.
Both of the two aviators now' working in airport management - Bob and Ralph had difficulties in finding employment. At the time of their military retirement, their
skills were not in demand in the private sector and defense contractors were downsizing.
Bob found the memory of the job search particularly painful, even five years later: ”So
here I was 'a trained killer' and those jobs with military contractors weren't there. It w'as
a rough transition until the airport opened up." George, a marine aviator, found work
quickly, but admitted that he devoted a great deal of energy during his last year o f
military service to job hunting and preparation: "I was probably not the best marine that
year because I just don't think you can do your military job [adequately] and
[simultaneously do] a job search.” Ted. a retired ship captain, had a difficult job search:
"I sent out 50, 60 resumes and did not get one bite!” He decided to work as a volunteer
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intern with a local government agency to try to make contacts. At a particularly low
point in his job search, he was turned down for a volunteer position because he had too
much experience. George. Paul. Will and Les on the other hand, had jobs before they left
the service. All but three participants found employment within six months. In general,
the civil engineers had an easier job search.
There were varied assessments on the ease o f the transition. Les had found just
dressing for work to be stressful: “I’ve got to pick out a shirt and tie that match that
aren't khaki or blue and white - and to this day I have trouble with that." He has also had
to break the code of corporate dress:
I got hired in August. I went out and bought a bunch o f clothes. One of the
things I have always worn is short sleeves. I start to notice in meetings that
everyone is wearing a long sleeve shirt. I’m thinking to myself. "You know,
there’s probably something here. There’s a reason for this." So finally I cornered
a retired admiral who sits on a board with me and he told me. "Short sleeve shirts
are shop foremen. Long sleeve shirts are CEO’s." Well I never heard that said
before, so I learn as I go along.
For Les. this was one of the experiences that brought home to him that he was in a new
culture, and that he had to look for signals and cues on appropriate behavior. Frank had a
similar revelation when he had to counsel a female secretary about wearing low cut
blouses to the office. During his over 25 years in the service, he had never had such a
discussion.
Not every participant could relate such a moment and some denied when asked
directly that there were significant differences between the public sector and the military.
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Dan. Paul. Sam. Steve and Will all mentioned that they had worked extensively
managing federal employees which gave them valuable experience in leading civilian
staff and with a government civil service system. Dan remarked that about half o f the
jobs he oversaw in the military were done by federal employees or by civilian
contractors, so he '‘didn’t have an identity crisis” when he entered local government. Dan
began by saying that he’d had "a very easy transition” but reversed himself after some
reflection and acknowledged that he had faced some adjustments, admitting. “No
transition is ever easy.” Paul was emphatic that there were no transition issues for him:
“People can’t believe I came from Annapolis.. . . I’m a little unique because of my Civil
Engineer Corps background. I’d say my hardest transition was that I didn’t have my hat
on my head.” George considered one particular aspect o f his military experience helpful
in making the transition: “In the military we change jobs every two to three years. The
mere fact that I left one job and was coming to a new one was not strange." Will
believed that changing jobs frequently in the military taught him how to enter an
organization and affect change.
Early in the interviews and during the initial phone contacts, many o f the retired
officers stated that they had not had transition issues. There appeared to be a certain
amount of denial at least initially about the difficulties experienced in working in the
public sector. For example. Sam remarked that he and other Civil Engineer Corps
officers probably had an easier time entering the public sector and that pilots probably
had the more difficult transitions. Yet Sam was one o f the two participants who left the
public sector because o f frustration. Paul repeatedly commented during the interview
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that he had experienced no transition issues, and yet he was by far the most critical of
public sector staff, processes and leadership.
Whether or not they were willing to directly acknowledge it. each participant
ultimately described differences between the two organizations and some strategies they
utilized to manage these differences. The interview data identified the key issues of the
transition to the public sector as leading staff, organizational relationships, leading
processes and encountering stereotypes. The next sections discuss these themes, the
organizational context (structures and processes) that affects them and the strategies the
participants used to manage them.

Theme One: Leading Staff in the Public Sector
Leading staff in a government agency presented some different challenges for the
participants. They faced rules and structures different from those in the military. There
are now set working hours, and salaries are a budgeted item. Public sector managers
must operate within the parameters o f the Federal Labor Standards Act and a civil service
system. All but one o f those interviewed now worked in a unionized agency. Re
enlistment options have been replaced by expectations of "lifetime employment" by
many public employees. Participants also noted that they had experienced differences in
the staff, workforce mobility, employee expectations, communication styles, training and
education levels and teamwork in the public sector.
The rules and the culture o f the public sector exclude some o f the practices used
in the military. For Frank, entering the public sector meant recognizing “the ‘kick ass,
take names’ part o f [leadership] can’t work here. So you have to drop it completely.’’ He
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moved to leading full-time with the coaching and teamwork skills he learned in the
military. Ralph too. discussed abandoning the more intimidating methods he sometimes
drew upon in the military. He had related a story about pushing and swearing at an
enlisted man whose behavior was egregious and drew the parallel to the public sector:
"Can you imagine [if I had done that] in the civilian sector with unions? Fd be fired."
(However. Ralph's use o f physical force would also not be condoned by the sendees.)
Many o f the participants made a connection between leading public sector staff
and leading in a military administrative environment. Among the leadership strengths
they cited from their military careers were their experiences in leading diverse groups and
building teamwork. Participants identified some differences in what Strauss and Corbin
(1990) called the "organizational contexts" o f the military and the public sector that
affect leading staff. These key differences included: the nature o f the staff, the
classification system, staff retention, commitment to training and development, teamwork
and camaraderie, managing performance, communication styles, executive leadership and
values and ethics.
View o f Public Sector Employees
None of the participants made any blanket statements about having a preference
for leading government versus military work units. According to Steve, there are "really
outstanding performers" and "troubled employees" in both sectors. But there were some
general differences noted between the two. Both Steve and George commented that the
government staff members were generally older, more independent from the organization
and more savvy in workplace issues than was the case in the military. George noted that
public sector employees want to know how policy changes are going to affect their
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retirement, their taxes and their deferred compensation. He rarely got those kinds o f
questions from his marines:
In the civilian community, I think people are wiser. You take an eighteen-vearold in the military. They're not thinking benefits. The military is taking care of
that individual. All they have to think about a lot o f times is are they doing their
job. staying out o f trouble and, hopefully to some degree, being successful.. . .
Whereas out here people are thinking benefits, thinking their paycheck. We just
do not have the same control over people out here. One thing I had to learn [was]
. . . to treat people differently than I would in the Marine Corps. I think they're
just a little smarter and sharper out here.
The Corps and the armed services in general have a paternalistic culture where members
felt more trust that they were being taken care of. George found that his government
employees wanted changes explained to them, particularly when policy changes affected
their paychecks and benefits. After a recent contract negotiation, he was deluged with
questions about its impact on employees' deferred compensation plans and their 401 (k)’s.
He ultimately scheduled a series o f staff meetings where he had to answer some complex
financial questions. "You had to address them at a different level than you would in the
military." He initially made the error of just issuing a written notification o f changes, but
had found that memos generated rumors. He now has more meetings to keep people
informed: "It may not build loyalty, [but] it just keeps them from getting the negative
attitude." He observed that there was less trust between government managers and line
staff than between officers and enlisted.
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As George noted, public sector leaders have significantly less control over their
staff than do military officers. Frank joked that: “There’s just getting used to the fact
that everyone has a choice where to eat and where they go home at night/' Some
participants volunteered that there was a moment that highlighted the difference between
the two organizations. For George it was as simple as realizing that, to get all the
employees to turn in a form, he couldn't just order them into a room and issue pencils.
For Frank, his counseling session with a female secretary about inappropriate office attire
demonstrated to him the limits of his influence as a public sector manager. He could no
longer order what people wore and when they got haircuts. The progressive discipline
system defined the multiple steps he needed to take to initiate formal action against an
employee. Coaching, counseling and influence skills were now his primary tools for
shaping the behavior o f staff when, in the case of proper dress, the threat o f action is
remote.
One o f the areas that demonstrated this lack o f control was in gaining compliance
- simply getting individuals to do what they were instructed to do. Paul, who leads a
professional group of engineers, architects and project managers was “shocked" that
some staff did not follow a directive he gave them three times. He found this a stark
contrast to the military where: “If I gave [a direct] order, it happened." He has learned to
follow-up on assignments he gives. This has been a source of frustration for him. as he
feels “if you direct that something be done, you should have 98% confidence that it's
going to happen." He added that he has confronted one staff member and suggested he
leave the organization if he can't follow directives.
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Paul was one of the most critical of civil service employees. He found many
public employees to be “cynical” and resistant to change. He commented that, rather
than support change efforts, they seemed to be waiting them out with a “this too shall
pass’" attitude. He was disturbed by individuals who seemed to lack commitment and to
be disconnected from the organization’s values. He watched for “the smaller indicators"
such as whether a person's desk was cleared by 4:01 p.m. each day and whether he or she
submitted mileage reimbursement requests for as few as three miles:
I try to take a view o f loyalty, commitment and public good - all those things. I
look at those indicators, and they’re small, but I roll those into some other job
performance issues, and I tend to doubt whether that person is committed to the
values 100% . . . . They’re the person (sic) who’s most likely not promotable. who
won’t advance very quickly in the organization.
There were different views expressed on the nature o f public sector employees, ranging
from “more sophisticated" to “lacking commitment." While acknowledging the bright
spots in their organizations, both Paul and Ralph expressed frustration with some of the
staff they had inherited.
Many o f the participants who served in the Civil Engineering Corps, had managed
large numbers o f federal civil service staff, particularly on public works and contract
management assignments. Steve, for example, remarked that he had spent 18 of his 20
military years managing federal, blue collar workers. Some participants who had
experience with the federal system expressed a somewhat cynical attitude toward
government workers and processes, and fatalism toward what could be accomplished
within government. Steve remarked that he faced some “low motivation,” stereotypical
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behavior from some of the federal government employees he managed and had
difficulties in getting results within the civil service system. Dan amusinglycharacterized the processes within the federal government as following the motto. “We'll
do no job before its time.” The concern over the effects of these experiences is whether
they will translate into an acceptance and expectation o f mediocrity in the government
agencies they now lead.
Lack o f Flexibility: The Civil Service Classification System
Participants also expressed frustration about the public sector human resources
systems that limited their ability' to address personnel and staffing issues. Some
addressed the lack of flexibility' and restrictions within the classification / personnel
structure o f civilian government organizations. As Ralph described it, in the military,
people did whatever needed to be done to accomplish the mission. As an airport
manager, he now has restrictions:
There are limitations [here] on your resources.. . . You don't encounter those
kinds o f things in the military', you know. If you have something that needs to be
done, if it's heavy, physical work and the guy's an Electronics Technician or an
Electrician, you can still assign him to do that. We do whatever we have to do to
support our detachments and our commitments.. . . Here, people come back and
say, "That's n o t . . . in my classification. I'm going to call the union."
Ralph has had to handle disagreements with the union over job assignments. He says his
manager has coached him on reviewing job descriptions with employees “step by step,
item by item and tell them what the expectations are.” The most important lesson he has
learned since coming to the public sector is to “document everything.”
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Paul faced a problem where the system had not kept pace with the actual work
done. He had staff working at jobs that have evolved, while the job description, title, and
pay have not:
There are some pay issues [in] civil service that the military didn't have to deal
with. We just took all the responsibility - as much as they could give to you.
What you got paid didn't matter. Now on the civilian side, that salary is a big
[issue] for folks. We have some pay discrepancies within the organization now
with some people having incredible accountability and responsibility and not
getting paid as much as people who have less. I'm not so sure I can fix that
myself, but I can be an advocate.
After two years o f his lobbying, the centralized human resources system only
implemented some o f the classifications and pay changes Paul saw as necessary. For
both Ralph and Paul, the inflexibility o f the system affected the work product. In Paul's
case, it also affected his ability to take care of his people. Despite their frustrations,
neither has attempted to affect change in the HR area. George and Dan have found that
they have adopted the strategies available within the context o f the public sector and
worked on reorganizations within their work units. Dan also has focused on selecting
quality staff, an option he did not have in the Navy where "you have to play the cards
you're dealt. At least [here] you get to pick your cards.”
Staff Retention: The Culture o f Lifetime Employment
An interesting insight o f some o f the participants is the view that the culture o f
lifetime employment within the context o f a small organization is unhealthy for both the
organization and the individual. Dan is working to change that in his organization:
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You need to be bringing in good people in at the bottom o f the organization,
working them up through the ranks, and then shooting them out to the side to go
either to another department or go out to the private sector. I mean, that is a
healthy organization. An organization where everyone stays put. and there's no
change or mobility, that's sick! It's just gonna die. What [I'm] trying to do is
change the thinking.
Dan wants upward mobility and development to become a value in his organization.
Both Steve, Will and Dan all viewed the military practice of moving staff every two to
three years as positive because it accustomed people to change.
Dan observed that the continual staffing changes also brought fresh perspective
into the unit, combating the ‘'we’ve always done it this way" syndrome. He is trying to
change the stagnation in his current organization by introducing a new paradigm that staff
turnover is positive. He is training his managers not to hire people who are seeking just
to "stay here until [they] get a gold watch." During a recent reengineering effort, he
created a team that designed alternative career paths —a plan he's very proud o f because
he feels it will make a difference for individual staff and for the long-term health o f the
organization.
The high turnover rate o f enlisted within the military also prepared officers to
cope with staffing changes where the loss o f a single employee was regarded as routine.
Will noticed that in his agency, "when somebody who is doing a good job wants to leave
here, everybody gets all excited and [feels] the whole world is falling apart and [wonders]
what can we do to make [them] stay." He took the position that the organization should
end the practice of trying to keep existing staff by reclassifying positions to raise salaries.
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but rather pay for the proficiency level needed. He regards moving around during a
career as "part o f how you get ahead in life.”
Some participants saw the government culture of lifetime employment as a
detriment to both public organizations and their individual staff. A few o f the retired
officers have acted to change some o f the selection and promotion practices as well as the
pay and career development structures within their organization to infuse new ideas into
their organizations and enhance employee morale.
Training and Development
Another difference noted between the military and the public sector is the
commitment to training and development. Frank observed that government employees
are often better educated tha:; military enlisted personnel, but that the military staff
receives more ongoing training. The military’s philosophy is to train a talented person
for a position; government's philosophy is to hire a person who already has the education
and skills for the job. Frank found it a "different challenge" trying to get an older, more
experienced workforce to apply school education received decades ago to a changing
work setting.
Other participants were more critical of the failure o f government organizations to
adequately train their staff. Paul estimated that comparable military members receive ten
times the ongoing training of public sector employees. He found many professionals
"inadequately trained for what they are doing and probably not even understanding the
job they are supposed to be doing because [it] had changed" since they were hired.
Nearly every participant mentioned skill and training deficiencies in their workforce, with
few budget resources allocated to keep staff up-to-date in their fields.
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Will was the exception: he found a good level o f technical proficiency in his
organization. He focused on expanding computer training, introducing customer service
training and creating a leadership academy within his organization. Now all individuals
receive training annually. In contrast. Dan and Ted work in organizations with no
significant funds for training. Both are trying to establish small-scale, in-house offerings.
Paul. Dan and Sam expressed disappointed over the absence o f a leadership
development strategy in their organizations. Sam pointedly stated that. "Somewhere
along the line, upper management and leadership lost the focus that it wras their
responsibility to develop the managers and leaders beneath them to someday take their
jobs.’" Paul related that he currently has no internal candidates to fill a high-level position
in his organization managing about 30 professional technical staff:
There's absolutely nobody qualified within the organization right now to fill the
position . . . . [It's] shocking actually.. . . That tells you that you have an awful
lot o f followers and nobody trained or equipped to be a leader. That's not good
for an organization.
The lack o f an upward mobility program for members can lead to organizational
stagnation as people remain in the same position for years, which can also affect morale.
Dan and Will initiated leadership development programs to begin to address this.
This also means that military officers transitioning to the public sector may
encounter a "shallow bench." The CO's team is simply not there for them to use as a
sounding board for ideas and decisions. Paul was attempting to create what he calls his
"inner circle" - a group composed of staff who display a good work ethic and "have the
goals and the objectives" o f the organization at heart:
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I tend to pull them in probably closer than other folks. I would probably talk to
them about issues where a lot o f managers would not. I use them as sounding
boards and reality checks. I may be describing things to this person that I
probably shouldn't. It may involve other people. It may involve opinions,
personal opinions . . . [to] have that level o f [candor] that you sometimes miss as
an executive working within a department.
Paul noted that the government did not have restrictions on fraternization. This left him
freer to expand his circle wider than he could in the military. His description o f his
"inner circle" suggests that he may face future issues concerning breaches of
confidentiality and disparate treatment —two serious issues in public sector personnel
practice.
Several senior participants who retired at the rank o f captain, left a command with
a team of commanders, lieutenant commanders and lieutenants, many with Master's
degrees, eager for decision-making authority and supported by veteran chief petty
officers seasoned in managing people. They entered organizations with a very slim
management or supervisory staff. Some retired officers, who entered small agencies or
small city governments, transitioned into organizations where the entire support staff was
a clerk and a few supervisors. They left a team o f executives; now they have to do it all.
Building Teamwork in the Public Sector
The military has institutions and practices that build teamwork, e.g.. boot camp,
overseas deployment, operational assignments and competitions, that are not available
within the public sector. Each participant was asked how one could build teamwork in a
public sector setting. Some common themes emerged from their responses. Primary
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among them was identifying goals, communicating them and creating systems that
rewarded and valued the goals. Frank acknowledged that it is difficult to build teamwork
in the current downsizing environment within his agency:
You have to be loyal to your people, or they w on't be loyal to you. Obviously, if
you want their trust and their confidence, want them to be a decent team, you
want them to be loyal. If they know you want to get rid o f their jobs, or you
won't protect them . . . If they know that, you’ll never get anything done.
Frank and Dan both voiced that the “bottom-line” business rhetoric currently popular
with some elected officials and public sector executives is counter to building teamwork.
Both Frank and Steve advocated a leader-centered view o f teamwork based on
strong communication. Frank believed the leader’s willingness to share information was
important to building a team in the public sector. For Steve, the role o f a leader is “to be
honest with your people at all times” and “share the reason for decisions.” This will
build trust and loyalty in the leader and. in turn, develop trust in the organization.
Ted strove to create a climate in his public works organization where individuals
see the organization as theirs - similar to the climate he created on his ships. He
delegated authority to his supervisors over their divisions and made it clear that his role
was to support them:
I emphasized this from day one when I became the director. “That's your
division. Whatever happens in it is yours. I want to be informed. If you need
decisions. I expect you to make them. Give me the right information and I will
[support you].”
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He was “blessed" with good supervisors who welcomed their added responsibility and
authority. He saw the supervisors in turn, take the same approach with line staff.
Consequently, he witnessed a change in the motivation and the performance within his
organization: “The level o f maintenance o f public properties and o f public goods has
improved substantially. I’m routinely astounded at how many o f these guys, even at the
entry level------ have taken their jobs with such pride." He firmly believed that “building
a sense o f ownership" is key to building teamwork in the public sector as it was aboard
ship. In addition, he introduced lunchtime quarterly social events for the entire
department to build more camaraderie.
Recognition of top team performance was also a key strategy discussed. Will, for
example, included teamwork on performance appraisals and created a quarterly team
recognition award to supplant the individual awards the organization traditionally gave.
While not having the same structures that the military provided to enhance teamwork,
many o f the same practices participants learned in the military - such as communicating
goals, sharing information and creating a sense of ownership - are also effective in the
public sector.
Communication
A direct communication style is often used in the military because 1) it is critical
in combat that orders are clear: 2) directives tend to be followed literally so it is important
to eliminate ambiguity in instructions; and 3) specific directions require less judgment
from young and inexperienced enlisted members. This very direct style of
communication can distance a retired officer from others and can cause conflicts. Bob
observed that “people in the civilian atmosphere . . . aren’t used to dealing with people as
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straightforwardly as we're used to dealing with people." He admitted that his blunt
communication style, especially in his initial days, caused problems with staff and
customers.
Several o f the retired officers have run into difficulty because o f their direct
communication style. One participant related a story about a staff meeting where he had
discussed the substandard performance o f an individual, without naming his name, but
gave enough detail so people knew who the individual was. He defended this approach
as an effective way o f sending a message to the employee, however, he was subsequently
contacted by the employee’s attorney. Some o f the participants related incidents that
indicated the direct and blunt communication style learned in the military brought
complications with customers, the union and in one case, an employee’s attorney. Bob
acknowledged that he has adjusted his style. Dan also mentioned that he has received
some criticism about his pointed sense of humor and remarked that some staff search for
issues to criticize management. He now "thinks twice" before speaking. He also found it
frustrating that he had to speak carefully around discipline and counseling matters.
Sometimes, he said, he just wanted to say: '"G et a life. Get a grip on yourself. If you
don’t like it, get another employer.’ But instead, we have to pussyfoot around."
A second communication issue cited by participants was the need to "lose” their
military jargon. Almost half the participants commented on how they needed to
consciously guard against reverting back to military phrases and acronyms. Steve joked
about an incident when he was trying to lead a discussion with his some o f his executive
team: "I used the expression. ‘Can you get a strawman put together on this issue?’ Then
I came to realize that no one at the table knew what the hell what I was talking about.
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They all had a totally different guess o f what a “strawman" was." When Steve first joined
the organization as a deputy director, one o f his peers used to challenge him publicly
when he used military jargon by asking him. "What do you mean by that." It made Steve
sensitive to how jargon could confuse his staff, set him apart from others and give him
what he termed "the ex-Navy rap."
George acknowledged that he struggled to stop saying "yes sir" and "no sir."
George's manager, who is younger than he. reacted uncomfortably to such Marine Corps
formalities. The retired officer has consciously worked to become more informal so that
he would be more easily seen as part o f the team rather than as the only retired Marine on
staff. Sam found he had to get used to the informality o f co-workers and subordinates
who called him by his first name.
A majority o f the participants found that they had to change to a more "civilian"
communication style. This encompassed adopting a less direct and blunt style, avoiding
military jargon and speaking less formally to their superiors.
Managing Performance: Discipline and Recognition
A standard feature of the military discipline system is ensuring that the crew
knows the rules and that leaders apply them consistently and fairly. NJP rests a great
deal of authority on senior officers. This is in sharp contrast to the typical public sector
organization that operates within a civil service system.
Paul felt that, as a military officer he could work with "the whole person" when
there was a performance or discipline problem. Officers counseled staff on personal
issues, worked on family problems and really got involved to "put this person back on
course." Whenever a matter had to be elevated to Captain's Mast. Paul felt he had "failed
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in some wav." In his experience, individuals with problems sent "early signals." The
leader's job was to watch for and intervene early: "You want to inject yourself [right
away] to get this person back on course. And so you put effort into this person, as much
as you possibly can.” In the public sector by contrast, he can focus solely on work
performance. He saw few avenues for affecting some o f the personal issues that might be
at the core o f an employee's problem.
It is worth noting that many o f the participants shared stories about working
intimately with troubled staff and their families in the military. Making a difference in
the lives of individuals was repeatedly cited as one o f the most rewarding aspects o f a
military career. Within the public sector, managers cannot order members to utilize an
employee assistance program [EAP] and a manager will not be given any information
about the nature o f EAP-related issues without a signed legal waiver from the employee.
Thus, the manager is hampered from addressing the real issues and is left to operate
within the lengthy, cumbersome civil sendee process.
Dan bluntly stated that the civil service discipline system is an impediment to
building teamwork and loyalty in public sector organizations. He cited two extreme
examples in his organization. He raised questions about an employee who had
demonstrated bizarre behavior. The Personnel Officer informed him that he could not
take action because the person was not "technically mentally ill." He also objected to an
employee who made negative statements against the agency head at a televised public
hearing. Dan was shocked that the employee was allowed to testily against his superior
and then return to his desk the same day: "To me the disciplinary system and civil
service need to be totally reorganized. You're never going to get [cohesion and loyalty]
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unless you start dealing with these people who have legitimate problems." Both George
and Ralph felt that some employees used "open door" policies to go around the authority
o f their supervisors. They felt this undermined discipline and authority.
Participants agreed that the civil service system was an ineffective tool for
monitoring staff behavior. Dan expressed that civil service hearings were, "frankly,
unpredictable." Often, he observed, “it's a roll o f the dice." Paul criticized the discipline
process for simply taking so long and requiring so much effort by supervisors. He added
that it was easier to discharge an offender in the military than to terminate an employee in
his organization. As a result, he observed, many public sector managers take no action
with problem employees: “People find it easier to pass that problem off on somebody
else . . . promoting him up or reassigning him out o f the division." Sam witnessed public
sector managers who w'ere unwilling to take action and who made excuses and
exceptions for their employees: “I had been spending time with the people in my
department in individual discussions and counseling . .. but none o f the other
departments did. Instead, they were always finding reasons to justify why [each] was a
special case." In all. those retired officers having experience w'ith the public sector
discipline system found it frustrating and ineffective.
George, the only participant who works in a non-union agency, discussed how he
and the agency director used the reorganization process to "get rid o f people who were
not working as a team." He said that his military experience made it easier for him to do
the reorganization: "I have a little bit easier time calling a spade a spade if someone
[isn't] producing or we don't need the position." George's situation is unique, however.
In a unionized environment, seniority drives the layoff procedure.
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The second part of managing performance is recognition. The principles o f
recognition - giving prompt feedback that is meaningful to the individual, rewarding
behaviors significant to the organization and rewarding based on merit - are universal,
regardless o f the organization. What is different between the pubic and military sectors
are the recognition tools available. The military has a variety o f recognition options
including commendation letters, time off. awards, pay and medals. In the public sector,
intrinsic awards are available but pay increases are generally automatic based on time in a
classification. Some agencies are considering going to a "pay for performance" model,
but many o f those now in existence are blanket programs where all employees share
equally in any payouts regardless o f individual performance. None o f the participants
worked in an agency with a merit pay system.
Dan questioned some of the blanket recognition programs that give cash awards
to an entire department regardless o f individual effort. He viewed them as "encouraging
mediocrity instead o f rewarding those who bust their rear ends." Several stated that they
would like to have the authority to grant pay differentials to top performers instead of
relying on the "step increase" system that rewards time in a position.
Both Ralph and Paul commented that their organizations relied too much on
formal quarterly recognition events that they felt were too general and too distant from
the actual performance to be effective rewards. Ralph was more openly critical of the
recognition practices in his organization. He witnessed recognition given to employees
who were known to be mediocre performers because, it appeared to him. that everyone
gets some recognition within the group regardless o f their actual accomplishments. "The
whole charade makes me uncomfortable." he observed.
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Participants generally found the existing systems within the public sector to be
ineffective for managing performance. Some stated that they were more willing to work
with problem staff than were their counterparts.
Summary: Differences in Leading Staff Between the Military and the Public Sectors
Retired officers entering the public sector bring with them a depth of experience
in leading staff. They have often managed work units o f over 1000 people and at times
have been responsible for the very lives o f their crew. It is necessary for them, however,
to make adjustments when assuming leadership positions in the public sector. Some of
these adjustments are driven by the differences between the members, the expectations
and the organizational systems of the military and the public sector, outlined in Table 9.
The primary categories o f difference include the members o f the organization, the style of
communication expected, the classification system (particularly the role of job
descriptions), approach to staff retention, level of training and development, methods for
teambuilding and systems for managing performance.
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Table 9:
Subthemes
Nature of
Staff

Differences Between the Military and Public Sectors in Leading Staff
Military
Diverse, many young,
inexperienced.

Public Sector
Many older, more experienced,
concerned with pay. benefits &
retirement.
Labor/management relations.

Trust between officers &
enlisted.
Control over staff; follow
orders.

Independent; do not always comply
with directives.

Communica
tion

Direct, specific.
"Need to know" principle.

Negative reactions to straightforward
communication; jargon; formal style.

Classification
Svstem

Staff will “Do what needs to be
done."
Flexible job duties.

Established (sometimes out of date)
job titles, job descriptions, pay rates.
"Not my job" syndrome.
Unresponsive HR system.
No managerial latitude.

Staff
Retention

Use induction, performance
reports and re-enlistment
system to "weed out." Move
staff every 2-3 years;

Organizational stagnation; lack of
mobility.
Pay to keep individuals regardless of
job duties.

Training and
Development

Training a top priority;
continuous development; stay
current in field.

Mixed levels o f training - some very
poor. No leadership development.
"Shallow bench."

Teamwork/
Camaraderie

Built into system - overseas
deployment, dependency,
paternalistic system, cross
department shipboard teams

Lack of established structures that
promote teamwork.

Managing
Performance

Work with whole individual;
NJP; making the tough calls;
fair & consistent discipline
creates loyalty.
Wide variety o f recognition
options. Merit-based rewards.

Limited focus and effectiveness;
cumbersome civil service system;
inconsistent enforcement.
Some delayed, undeserving, and
blanket awards.
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These differences often require some adjustment or adaptation on the part o f retired
officers. As discussed, some of the strategies and practices adopted are successful and
others are less effective. These are outlined in Table 10.

Table 10:

Leading Staff in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies
and Practices Employed by Retired Officers

Subthemes

Context

Nature of
Staff

Many older.
more experience.
concern for pay.
benefits &
retirement.

Choices.

Labormanagement
relations.

Adversarial
labor
relations.

Independent: do
not always
comply with
directives.

Limits of
discipline
system.

Communica
tion Norms

Negative
reactions to
straightforward
communication:
jargon: formal
style.

Classification
System

Established
(sometimes out
o f date) job
titles, job
descriptions, pay
rates: “Not my
job” syndrome.

Conditions

Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Meetings; open
and frequent
communications.

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Information
bulletins:
problems with
spreading
rumors.

Open
communications.
Follow-up.

Assume
directives will
be followed.

Staff
unaccustomed
to direct style.
Stereotypes.

Communication
style adjusted.
Eliminate jargon
& formalin'.

Direct style
affects customer
& staff
relations.
Jargon.
formality create
barriers.

Civil sendee
system: some
unresponsive
HR systems;
no latitude for
manager.

Lobby & work
within HR
system; improve
selection;
re-organization.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.
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Subthemes
(continued)

Context

Conditions

Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Change attitudes;
turnover is good:
promote mobility:
pay what post is
worth.

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.

Retention

Lifetime
employment;
lack mobility;
pay to keep
individuals.

Organization
in stagnation;
turnover as
negative.

Training and
Development

Most poor
levels of
training. No
leadership
development.
"Shallow
bench."

Expectations
that staff
know the job.

Increase training.
Add leadership/
career
development
programs.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.

Teamwork/
Camaraderie

Lack of
established
structures that
promote it.

Downsizing
environment.

Communicate
goals, delegation,
instill sense of
ownership; team
recognition:
social gatherings.

Inner circles.

Managing
Performance

Limited focus;
not all
managers
enforce rules.

Limited
effectiveness
-civil service
system.

Work with own
staff regardless of
other managers.
Reorganization.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.

Unearned and
"blanket"
awards.

No merit
rewards.

Use rewards
available.

The broad experience retired officers gained in the military assisted them in leading
public sector employees. Officers seasoned by command positions are experienced in
building camaraderie and in employee motivation. They are also practiced in utilizing
discipline to shape performance. In particular, they bring a strong commitment to staff
development and an understanding o f the assets new members introduced into an
organization. Participant data revealed that retired officers needed to adjustment some
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military practices to effectively manage civilian staff. These adjustments were driven by
differences in the organizational cultures of the two sectors such as the makeup o f the
workforce, the limitations of the civil service system and the constraints of the pay and
classification system. Participants did not handle the challenge in the same way. They
identified some personnel management practices that were more successful than others.
Finally, some of the retired officers had to abandon some practices such as reliance on
KATN leadership, jargon and military formality in order to be more effective in the
public setting.

Theme Two: Organizational Relationships
The second subtheme identified from the data addresses relations with other
departments, agencies, the chief executive and the elected officials. Many participants
cited some of these areas as the most challenging faced in their civilian career. The
public sector environment is significantly different than the military chain of command
where roles and behavioral norms are defined. Government also must provide its
services in an arena o f politics, citizen input, interdependent agencies, and multiple
stakeholders. The participants identified differences between the two sectors, primarily
in the following areas: relations with staff members, peers, one's immediate manager,
and the executive leadership: the political process: amount of discretion: decision
making: and values and ethics.
Relations with Staff Members
In the military, status and respect tend to come with position. For example,
members of the service could reasonably make assumptions about the background.
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experience and competency of a commanding officer. As Will related:
The position is what carries the weight if you will, more so than the individual. If
the person is a commanding officer, from day one they get all the respect, all the
loyalty, and the allegiance . . . to start with. It's sort of theirs to lo se.. .. Whereas
in other organizations. I think you probably have to earn it first.
In the military, officers can reasonably expect to inherit the cooperation and respect of
their subordinates at the onset o f a new command. New leaders in the public sector
probably enter the organization with no reputation to assist them in taking charge and. in
the case of organizations in turmoil, may confront cynical or jaded members who expect
them to fail. Dan entered a public organization as the new deputy director. The director
had just been replaced and the agency was being downsized and reorganized. He found
some individuals that were skeptical and others that were openly confrontational:
"[These] other people just constantly look[ed] for chinks in the armor . . . for reasons to
find fault. . . . I am not used to having everything challenged."
Dan said that the verbal challenges to his authority were important moments in his
transition to government. These moments helped him realize that he would need to
adjust his behavior. He said he now picks his words more carefully around some staff
members. He cited an instance where he was joking with one of his support staff and
said that if he didn’t get an assignment done he would have to "clobber" him. Another
individual then accused him of workplace violence: "So I learned from that point on. I
had to just watch what I say." Public sector leaders work under the scrutiny o f staff
members and have to carefully earn their respect and loyalty.
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Several participants also mentioned that they had difficulty with their
organization's "open door policy" which they felt allowed staff to. in Ralph's words,
"circumvent the chain o f command." Ralph felt that allowing line staff to go directly to
high levels of management was intimidating to managers who had to make unpopular but
necessary decisions. He proposed that open door should be limited: "Managers should
be reasonably available through proper channels to talk about a concern. You can't
afford to have someone just walk in. knock on the door and circumvent lower
management."
Participants observed that managers and executives in the public sector are not
automatically accorded the same respect they are given in the military. Staff can also use
existing open door policies to circumvent the authority of their superiors. These both are
indicators o f a larger issue addressed in the previous section - public sector leaders do
not have the same control over subordinates as do leaders in the military. Many o f the
supportive relationships and structures retired officers worked under in the military do
not exist within local government or in the commercial sector.
Relations with Peers
The military tries to build executive teams focused on fulfilling their mission.
Individuals are trained from the onset of military experience that the unit takes priority
over individual concerns. Sam sought camaraderie with his peers —the executives from
other departments —expecting "them to be sincere about what was going on within their
respective departments and generally interested in providing mutual support.” He found
little genuine discussion of shared issues, a lack o f support with internal services such as
filling positions and ordering computers and a lack of trust among department heads.
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I spent a lot of effort in trying to develop within my department a sense of
direction and purpose and a sense of com m itm ent. . . but 1 felt we didn't get the
same thing back [from other departments.] . . . I would have vacancies and it
would take six to nine months before we could get a recruitment on the streets.
He found the executive teambuilding sessions "hollow*' because afterward participants
returned to passing the buck and finger pointing at each other: "After it was over, people
went back to exactly what they were doing before. No one ever learned anything." The
lack of teamwork and collegiality is one of the reasons Sam left the public sector.
While Sam's experience was not fully shared by all. most participants felt that
their public sector agencies did not have close camaraderie. Will identified the lack o f
camaraderie as the most difficult aspect o f his transition to the public sector:
[I miss] the camaraderie o f what we call the wardroom . . . I miss that, because in
civilian organizations it's almost as if it's not even desired. People, when they
leave work, want to get the hell away from it and get away from the people they
work with. Whereas in the military we were used to —especially when overseas —
[our] own little community.
Despite multiple attempts. Will was able to organize only one social gathering in nearly
four years. Ted has successfully created some camaraderie through leading by example.
He began sponsoring quarterly staff lunches, often a cookout. within his own
organization. Other departments have joined in organizing the cookouts. improving
interdepartmental relations and broadening teamwork across departments.
Sam found that there was a lack o f interdepartmental support from his colleagues,
other department heads. He found that functions he relied on like human resources and
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planning had a ”vour priority is not mv priority" approach. Each department head went
in separate directions, sometimes ignoring the direction o f the chief executive. At times,
according to Sam. “it seemed like you had six cities in one."
Although Ted met with some success in building teamwork by holding social
events with his own work unit and eventually other departments, other retired officers
noted the lack o f camaraderie and collaboration among peers as another difference
between the military and public sectors.
Relations with Immediate Manager
In the military, the commanding officer is responsible for the development of
subordinate junior and senior officers and is expected to be a mentor. The CO holds
ultimate responsibility for the safety o f the crew and for accomplishing the mission. The
role of a subordinate officer is to support his or her commander in that mission. Sam
expressed that this was still his job. whether in the public, private or military sector.
George spoke more extensively about what he termed the “senior-subordinate" nature of
his relationship with his boss, articulating views that were clearly shaped by his
experience as a Marine:
My military' background does not allow me to question too much. .. . [My
manager] is in the authority position. You don't really question that. You hope
he knows what he is doing. If he doesn't, you're eventually going to question it
or you're going to leave.
George's attitude that "the boss is the boss" originates in the concept of chain of
command, and the core value o f obedience. He saw his approach as more productive
than the reaction of many other managers who “don't understand and get upset if their
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recommendation isn't follow ed.. . . Because of the military I don't [get upset]. He's the
boss. He makes the decision. I accept that. Now let's go do it." What is interesting
about George's relationship with his manager, is that it is a complete contrast with the
actions Dan and Ralph described wherein some line staff members questioned, criticized
and went around their superiors. It is arguable whether unquestioned acceptance o f the
boss's direction fits with a civilian organizational culture and. more importantly, is the
best approach for producing quality decisions in a public environment where so many
stakeholders provide conflicting input.
Ralph felt his manager failed to take an active role in her staff s development: "I
don't feel like there's an attitude [here] of helping people who are interested and capable
of moving up." He cited an incident where he repeatedly asked his manager for
information on the process for getting a certain professional certificate. He finally got the
information from one o f his peers. Almost none of the participants have had any
significant professional development opportunities since entering the local government,
in stark contrast to their military experience.
Two of the participants - Ralph and Will - specifically expressed their
dissatisfaction with the assignments given them by their manager. Both felt they were
required to do too much mundane administrative work and were working below their
capabilities. Consequently. Will initiated his own special projects such as creating a
leadership development program and organizing a team to draft organizational values.
Relations with Executive Leadership
There are two other key components o f the chain of command in the public
sector. The first o f these is the chief executive of the public entity - the City Manager.
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Port Director. Chief Administrative Officer, etc. - whose role and authority
approximately equate to that o f the commanding officer. In the military, the
commanding officer sets the tone and direction for the organization and delegates the
authority to direct its implementation to the executive officer and others. Each
participant discussed some of the “truly great officers" he had worked under. Over half
expressed disappointment and criticism with the public sector executives and their staffs.
Steve worked under a chief executive who promised sweeping changes. Steve
anticipated that the executive would bring exciting, inspirational leadership to local
government. In practice, he abused staff in private and in public meetings. Steve was
disillusioned to see fear being used as a management technique and contrasted the
experience to Navy captains who “generally counseled you in private." Paul also
criticized his chief executive office for not supporting departments in public meetings:
I'm constantly amazed that somebody at [that] level would criticize this
department in an open arena in front o f other groups. That does absolutely no
good whatsoever! That comes from people who have no understanding of what
loyalty and commitment is.
While all the participants recognized that they now operated within a public political
arena, none o f those who raised the issue of public chastisement appeared to be able to
condone or forgive it. Some o f the harshest criticism of government organizations came
in this area. Like Paul, none o f the officers who witnessed it or experienced it saw any
benefit in it. As leaders who had for decades practiced summoning staff for a private
"chewing out." they could not excuse public and sometimes televised scoldings.
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Military commanding officers bear responsibility for the actions of all their
subordinates. Some participants expressed disappointment that public sector executives
would assign blame rather than assume responsibility, especially in a public forum.
The Political Process
The second key component of the public sector chain o f command is the
legislative body - the City Counsel. Board o f Supervisors. Water Authority Board, etc.
There is no direct equivalent in the military. Congress passes the legislation that affects
the budget and. in a broad sense, the programs within the military. The Department of
the Navy sets policy and defines the programs and aspects of program implementation.
In the military, however, there is a formidable administrative barrier between the officer
and members of congress. It is a severe breach of protocol for an officer to have direct
contact with a member o f congress. Few officers have direct contact with the
Department o f the Nav\' unless on assignment in Washington. There is. more frequently,
great physical distance between the legislature and the individual officer. By contrast,
nearly all o f the participants now have at least weekly contact with elected officials.
Many identified this as the greatest change they encountered upon entering the public
sector.
Will. Steve and Ted found understanding the political process - placating elected
officials and their staff, understanding the power structure, writing reports and letters “to
win the support of five very different people" and managing the public input process - to
be their biggest learning challenge. Steve explained that in the military, it was clear who
had the decision-making authority: “Here, there are a lot of political ramifications [with
every project]." Dan, in contrast, found it the most exciting aspect in his new career:
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Here, you're closer to the flagpole . . . We have an opportunity to interact and
respond directly to the [elected officials] who then, in turn, decide to make policy.
Whereas in DC. we were so far insulated from those who make the decisions . . .
[this is] a little more exciting.
George's adjustment involved getting accustomed to the reality that fully half his time
was now spent in preparation for legislative hearings. His legislative body went beyond
policymaking and became involved in the day-to-day operations o f his organization.
Steve found the process o f writing and docketing legislative proposals to be very
confusing: “You can adopt the attitude that it stinks and you don't want to deal with it.
and then you don't get anything done. Or you can try and master it." One of his earliest
assignments was to write a legislative proposal eliminating staff positions based on a new
reengineering procedure that required a written finding o f “economy and efficiency." He
sought help, only to find that no other department had done it before. Steve had to write
and publicly defend the findings and face stiff opposition testimony from employee
groups. Early in his public career, he was thrown into a high profile political project with
little support.
Sam observed that politics could have a divisive affect on the teamwork of the
department heads: "They were all concerned about making sure that they stood in a good
light with the city council members rather than really doing a good job o f . . . making this
a great city."
Public managers can actively work within the political structure to build
relationships and establish trust. Tw o of the participants stated that they had joined
committees outside their normal job duties to build relations with elected officials who
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influenced their programs. One. for example, served on a city childcare committee
chaired by an elected official on his board.
Part o f the public political process is also dealing with the interplay o f citizens
and constituents. Ted had been assigned to deal with a problematic citizen who had a
long history of encroaching on public parkland adjacent to his property. Drawing upon
the values of citizen involvement. Ted met with the individual repeatedly and ultimately
they signed an agreement on the appropriate use of the public land. Ted. proud o f his
success in negotiating a reasonable arrangement, was shocked when the legislature threw
out his agreement:
He'd been a problem enough in the past that they were not willing to be patient
with him or accept his w ord.. . . [They] said “We want you to put a fence around
him so he can't move onto the park." [The citizen] just went white and got angry
and won't speak to me to this day. You know. I had spent probably two months
in negotiations and was feeling pretty proud [about the agreement]. . . . It was a
learning experience on how [public] decisions get made. You don't have the
same latitude that you did when you were the commanding officer o f a ship. And
it takes a whole lot longer.
Ted felt he acted on public sector values, but the legislature acted on their own past
history with the individual. He received a lesson in politics and in the limitations of his
own role.
Participants had mixed reactions to working within the political process. Most
admitted they found it challenging and some enjoyed their expanded influence. It may be
that those who are more goal and outcome oriented derive less satisfaction from
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operating within the public sector arena. The variety of stakeholders and political
maneuverings complicates and delays the decision-making process.
Amount o f Discretion
Paul recalled that his military commanding officers generally had broad
experience in his technical field. As junior officers, they had once done his job. so they
understood the issues. As COs. they would check on the progress and direction of
projects but. overall, demonstrated faith in the capability of subordinate officers to do
their job. In the public sector. Paul finds his division being bombarded with requests to
justify his decisions and directives from administrators who do not understand his work:
You get hit with an excessive number o f questions or direction in many cases that
is counterproductive. I can't tell you how many hours I spend a week on things ..
. that are o f absolutely no value in accomplishing the mission of our organization .
. . because they don't understand and we're having to explain to them instead o f
them maybe operating on faith. . .. Let them focus more on keeping us equipped
- giving us the budget or the support we need in terms o f personnel.
Elected officials and public sector staff are usually generalists. They do not have subject
matter experts on their personal staffs in all technical areas. Department heads and
managers must build a relationship and establish trust to be effective in the policy
making arena. This is in contrast to the military where expertise and reputation came
with rank and were ”y °urs to lose." as Will put it. For Paul, who self-described himself
as "outcome oriented.” it was frustrating to be working under people who questioned his
judgment and seemed to assume his actions needed justification.
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Decision-making
Decision-making skills are essential in military operational settings. From the
onset o f their careers, officers are given broad authority. The combination o f mentoring
and experience is designed to develop increasingly higher orders o f analytical and
decision-making capabilities and confidence. As discussed earlier, the delegation of
expanded authority is a reward for officers. In addition, there is a premium placed on
quick decision-making under stress. There were two common complaints about decision
making in the public sector: the slow process and indecisiveness, and the micro
management by executive and legislative branches.
The public process expands the layers o f those involved in decision-making.
Citizens, lobbyists, public interest groups, unions, the press, other agencies, executives
and elected officials are all entangled in the public policy process. Les voiced his
frustration:
[Overcoming the] inertia in a large organization is harder ... for somebody who
spent a lot of time as a leader, making things happen in a small combat
organization. That can get frustrating real fast, and you have to kind of transition
it and start to understand how to make the organization move.
Paul found the layers of involvement led to a "paralysis in the system." The process
itself delayed decisions to the point, in his observation, that some public sector managers
had just stopped making critical decisions. He also sensed a hunger among the staff
members "for someone to make a decision. And it really doesn't matter what the
decision is. Just make one. Just tell me where to go." He was personally disappointed in
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the frequent second-guessing of his decisions, especially bv parties who did not have the
requisite technical knowledge.
Frank, who subsequently left the public sector, found a lack o f excitement in
government work: “The critical decisions seem to be taken from you here. Whereas
when I was in the military. I was always required to make those decisions, right now.'*
Sam. who also left government during the scope of this study, chaffed under a system
where the executive gave directives, rather than setting a general direction and allowing
his department heads implementation authority. Others recognized the uniqueness of
their military experience and adapted to new challenges. As Ted viewed it:
I think there was more satisfaction in the Navy because there was. most o f the
time, a real sense of purpose.. . . There were real lives on the line, real decisions
made. They were significant.. . . But I enjoy this job and I enjoy the tasks that
have been given me, putting them together and seeing them come out reasonably
w ell. . . and I enjoy working with the guys and seeing them take charge.
Ted has worked to adjust to getting satisfaction from both accomplishing tasks and
developing his employees. The political and public input process is a reality that public
sector leaders have to accept and utilize.
Values and Ethics
The military culture is one with shared values o f duty, honor, country and service,
which are instilled from the onset at the academies and in officer training programs. The
public sector values of efficiency, effectiveness, public good, responsiveness and social
equity are less clear and sometimes in conflict. Dan. Ted and Paul all stated that they had
entered the public sector because they wanted to continue their public service. Dan
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viewed local government as having "the same goals or ideals in terms of public service,
honesty and integrity/’ He did not feel that these values were absent from the business
world, but that in the private sector "they always work toward the bottom line, the profit
and I’m not sure they always adhere to ethics the way [government] employees do.”
Paul and Sam both expressed their disapproval of the ethics they witnessed in the
actions o f colleagues. Paul was disappointed in the values he found at all levels o f the
organization, but especially those displayed by management:
I’ve seen people [holding prominent] positions who were obviously self-centered,
who felt, "I’m here to make me look good. I’m here to build a power base.” . ..
[Navy personnel] seemed to have a very strong focus on the goals and objectives
o f the organization, not personal goals and objectives which I found to be the
general state [here].
He was particularly disturbed by the history of ethical violations within his agency. One
deputy director had served jail time for taking kickbacks from a multi-million dollar
contract. Such actions, he felt, create a cynicism within the staff concerning leadership’s
dedication to the values of public service.
Sam was disappointed in department heads who, it appeared to him, valued their
personal status with the local elected officials over the good o f their agency and the
public interest. He was also quite surprised at their non-compliance with directives from
the executive. He cited the example o f a policy on disciplining employees for excessive
vehicle accidents: "I was the only one o f all of the department directors who enforced the
policy . . . It’s part o f the structure o f the military [that] if you have these kinds of
policies, you enforce them.” He viewed such actions as contrary to the public good.
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Values and ethics were not mentioned by a majority o f the participants. Their
importance appears to vary with organizational circumstances. But shallow leadership
values constituted a disturbing issue to those who found the practices within their
respective organizations in direct conflict with their military experiences.
Summary: Differences in Organizational Relations between the Military and the Public
Sectors
The participants identified differences between the organizational relationships
within the two sectors. The military has formal relationships contained within the chain
o f command structure. The public sector less formal norms, and operates primarily
within power and influence relationships. These differences are summarized below in
Table 11.
Table 11:

Differences Between the Military and Public Sectors in Organizational
Relations

Subthemes
Staff
Relations

Military
Respect comes with position.
Confidence o f staff.
Respect is "yours to lose."

Public Sector
Must build own reputation.
Possible cynicism o f staff.

Peers
Relations

Mission is primary.
Camaraderie o f wardroom.

Lack o f camaraderie and internal
support.

Relations
CO has ultimate responsibility,
with manager Role is to support CO.
CO is in charge of officer
development.

Support boss. Lack o f training and
development opportunities.
Mundane assignments.

Relations
with
Executive
Leadership

Exec criticizes at meetings and public
hearings; assigns blame: probably
does not know your job.

Praise in public, chastise in
private. Knows your job.
Command presence.
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Table 11. continued
Subthemes

Military

Public Sector

Political
Relations

Insulated from congress and top
management.

"Close to the flagpole."
Competition among department
heads. Citizen involvement.

Amount of
Discretion

Broad discretion.
Trust in judgment.
Give general direction.

Micro-management. Others don't
know your job. Multiple questions
and requests for information.

Decision
making

Broad authority.
Make life and death decisions.
Quick decision-making.
Responsibility its own reward.

Limited authority. Involvement of
many stakeholders. Slow, indecisive
process. Micro-management.

Values and
Ethics

Clear, shared values.

Conflicting values. Some individual
orientation rather than public good.

There are more players in the public sector arena. All the retired officers now had regular
contact with elected officials and some also had regular contact with members of the
public. These retired military officers must now operate within an organization where
they are not automatically granted the respect o f their position - either by their staff,
peers or superiors. This can surface in such ways as a lack of compliance by staff,
minimal support from their immediate manager, lack o f camaraderie and teamwork with
regard to their peers, and micro-management by executive staff and elected officials.
This could be one of the more difficult adjustments for retired officers as camaraderie and
unit cohesion are infused in the military environment. More specific details are contained
in Table 12.
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Table 12:

Subthemes

Organizational Relations: Effective and Less Effective Strategies and
Practices Employed by Retired Officers
Context

Conditions

Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Consciously
build reputation.
Communicate
carefully.
Follow-up.

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Assume you
have a positive
reputation and
cooperation.

Staff
Relations

Need to establish
reputation.
People question
leader.
‘Open door*
avoids chain o f
command.

Less control over
staff.
Cynicism of
some staff.

Peer
Relations

Lack o f
camaraderie and
internal support.

Separate work
and personal
lives.
Focus on own
department.

Hold events.
Outreach.

No follow-up.
Accept status
quo.

Relations
with
manager

Support boss.
Lack o f training
and development
opportunities.
Mundane
assignments.

Multiple
stakeholders
complicate
decisions.
Historic lack of
training and
development.

Find own
development
opportunities.

Don't question
boss.
Wait for
development
opportunities.

Relations
with
Executive
Leadership

Criticize at
meetings and
public hearings.
Feelings o f being
disrespected.

CEO staff
probably does
not know your
job.

Build influence
relationships.
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Subthemes

Context

Conditions

Political
Relations

Insulated from
congress and top
management.

“Close to the
flagpole.”
Competition of
department
heads. Citizen
involvement.

Political
Process

Multiple approval
levels.
Competition
among department
heads.

Multiple
stakeholders.
Public
processes.
Takes longer.

Amount of
Discretion

CEO staff doesn't
know the job.
Many questions
and information
requests.

CEO and
elected
officials' staff
are generalists.

Decision
making

Limited authority.
Slow, indecisive
process.
Micro
management.

Multiple
stakeholders.
Others make
critical
decisions.

Values &
Ethics

Not always clear.
Some “me"
orientation.

Conflicting
public goals.

Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Enjoy
influence.
Build
relationships.
Join political
committees.

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Avoid, try to
insulate self
from the process.

Enjoy
influence.
Build
relationships.
Join political
committees.
Develop
relationships
and trust.
Build
reputation.

Avoid, try to
insulate self
from the process.

Accept
change.
Build
influence
relationships.
Satisfaction
from the work
itself.

Become
frustrated.

Become
frustrated.

Some of the more successful strategies cited by participants center around using influence
rather than positional power. This was effective in both developing successful relations
and gaining more discretion and decision-making authority - both traditionally important
to the job satisfaction o f military officers. The other important strategy was in
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consciously developing a personal reputation with staff and not relying on leading byposition.

Theme Three: Lack of Policies and Procedures
All but one of the interviewees mentioned the lack or poor quality- of policies and
procedures in their local government agencies. This is the area where many o f them felt
they had either made the greatest impact within their workplace or where they found
considerable frustration. Paul has found the lack of policies and procedures "incredible"
particularly in the area of planning and managing capital projects. In some cases
procedures did not exist, in others they were "on the shelf rather than being followed."
He is accustomed to the strict guidelines of federal contracts. In his public agency he has
discovered what he sees as a disturbing ignorance of contracting law and o f certain
standard procedures that establish a buffer between the contractor and contract
administrator.
When joining his agency. Bob found favoritism and inconsistency in the
application o f rules at the airport. He brought over some of the procedures he found to
work in military air facilities to the general aviation airport he now manages. He initially
found some resentment by both staff and customers to the structure he created:
I was pretty soundly disliked when I first got to the airport [for] imposing
structure. I didn’t try to rush it too fast in my mind, [but] to some people it was
too fast. . . . I may not be particularly liked by a lot o f people but I think I’m well
respected because of what I’ve accomplished.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

197

He believes he's built credibility and earned the grudging support o f some flight and
charter businesses because, despite a significant increase in air traffic, he is running a
safer airport with the same staffing level. Will introduced an integrated budget review
and streamlined the legislative agenda process within his organization. Ralph instituted
an improved system for fee collections and computerized certain functions.
Ted reported some success in improving processes where he works. He set up a
public works preventive maintenance schedule within his department. More broadly, he
has introduced project planning to many of his fellow department heads. In a example of
good change management, Ted began by modeling the use o f written plans within his
own department, then volunteered to do plans for projects that reached across agencies.
He needed to use persuasion, influence and example to convince his fellow department
heads of the importance of a project plan and of adhering to project schedules: “I have
no leverage to say ‘You have to do this at this time.' And so I have to be patient [and
ask] 'When are you going to be able to do it. I can't do my part until you finish yours.'
Or 'Do you need me to help?"' The department heads' attitudes shifted and they now’
look to Ted for project planning: 'Tt's now something people expect that I'm going to
do." He now has developed plans for most of the agencies' annual events. Ted regards
this as one of his more significant accomplishments in the public sector.
Steve related how he had used an improvement team to lead an initially skeptical
group o f surveyors and regional planning staff through a process o f reducing the total
cycle time of the plan checking procedure by two-thirds. He utilized the TQM processes
he had learned in the military. He believed that employee involvement was key to both
the successful strategy and successful implementation.
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Sam believed that he was brought into the agency to help develop processes. He
did so within his own department but. unlike Ted. did not influence the operation of the
agency as a whole. He worked directly with the chief executive officer, but felt nothing
was ever implemented:
He would spend a lot o f time talking to me about it. We met weekly, privately,
the two o f us. We talked through issues and he agreed with all of those issues but he never quite ever found time to take direct action on some of it. to make . . .
[the necessary] changes.
It is difficult to assess the reasons for success or failure in implementing organizational
change. Perhaps Ted’s approach of modeling and influencing better fit the nature o f a
public sector organization. He successfully won over colleagues he recognized he had no
control over. Sam described a military-like approach o f working through the chain of
command, expecting that the commander would take action and his officers would follow
the directives —similar to the military approach. His agency's executive may have been
reluctant to impose change when, as Sam witnessed, the department heads ignored
directives they did not want to implement. In contrast to military practice, there wore no
significant consequences for disobeying a directive.
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Table 13:

Policies and Procedures: Differences between the Military and Public
Sector; Effective Strategies and Practices for Public Sector Improvements

Military
Phenomena

Public Sector
Context

Conditions

Exist for
everything.
Standardized
across the
organization.
Generally
adhered to.

Lacking in
many areas.
Applied
inconsistently.
Less developed
than in federal
contracting.
Not always
consequences
for noncompliance.

Lesser priority.
Existing
policies and
procedures are
often out of
date or “on the
shelf.**

Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Bring in
practices from
the militarv.
Introduce
through
influence and
modeling.

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Discuss solelv
with the chief
executive and
relv on him/her
to implement.

Every participant cited the lack o f consistent policies and procedures as a difference
between the two sectors. This is perhaps the area where they experienced greatest
success in transitioning to the local government. Almost every participant could point to
tangible improvements they had made to their organizations by introducing some o f the
best practices they had learned in the military. Not all participants described how they
had successfully introduced new practices into their organization. Those who did. cited
examples of influence, involvement and modeling processes, rather than implementing
change from a position o f authority.

Theme Four: Encountering Stereotypes of Military Officers
One of the subthemes that emerged during the interviews described the
stereotypes o f military officers that participants encountered when they joined the public
sector. The stereotypes involved both the assumptions of co-workers about retired
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officers and the filter through which co-workers viewed their actions. Dan reflected that
increasingly fewer members of the public have had active military experience or
personally know someone who has served in the military. Thus, for many, the media
shapes their image o f military officers:
I think people tend to think military officers are rigid, possibly alcoholic, not very
sm art. .. Captain Binghamton o f McHale's Navy, the "Officer and a Gentleman”
type [from "Emerald Point” or “JAG”] . . . or the psychotic, pinhead.
Neanderthal. "kill-em-all-and-let-God-sort-‘em-out” mentality.
Dan cited an incident that took place while he was new to the job. An employee asked
him in apparent seriousness if he had been trained in psychological warfare and was he
going to use it on the staff. No one else related so extreme an incident, but everyone
questioned about the issue felt they had encountered stereotypes about retired officers.
Some have been more successful than others in contending with negative stereotypes.
George knew there were concerns about whether or not he could work with women and
with a director who was younger than he. He has worked deliberately to show he could
team with other organizational members.
Sam found retired officers were perceived as "haughty." "unchangeable" and only
knowing only how to give orders. When he tried to introduce some improved
procedures, other department heads saw as him and "bureaucratic and rigid.” Sam felt
they used his ex-military status as a rational for not implementing his ideas.
Steve believed the "ex-Navy rap” centered on having cliques and "a secret
handshake of some kind.” The most common misperception he encountered was that
former military all think alike and "don't know how to deal with civilians.” He had to
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make an effort to relay his experience in managing a civilian workforce. He mentioned,
as did others, that consciously trying to remove military jargon from his work
conversations was important to moving beyond the stereotypes. The jargon not only
interferes with communication, but sets retired officers apart from other staff. Several
officers using jargon in a meeting for example can reinforce the clique image.
Will felt he had been regarded as a “hatchet man.’’ “stiff." and "set in my wavs."
His preferred management style is to lead by example, but he felt that the stereotypes
“make that a little more difficult for me." His practice of thoroughly reviewing all
correspondence was perceived as a failure to delegate. His attempt to revise an existing
dress code to incorporate the organization's practice of “casual Fridays" backfired on
him, he believed, because o f his ex-military status: “I defined . . . some things that were
inappropriate [e.g., bare midriffs, shirts with improper language] and suddenly I'm
labeled as the guy who's trying to make everybody dress alike." Putting standard
practices in writing reinforced his ex-military image and interfered with his attempts at
organizational change.
Two of the aviators who had difficulties in establishing second careers expressed
dissatisfaction with their current level of pay and responsibilities. Both felt that the
public sector did not understand their military experience and what they were capable of.
Ralph related how his manager had taken him to a briefing she was giving to the assistant
executive officer o f their government entity. “I was supposed to have been impressed,"
he stated. But Ralph, who has been on the staff of four admirals, was not intimidated by
speaking before local government executives. He was not impressed by the performance
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o f his department head, nor did he feel he had been able to persuade his organization of
his experience and capabilities:
I spent 20 years as a manager in the service. Often that's not understood [nor is]
the level o f responsibility and expertise that you have . . . There's no appreciation
for military officers and what they've done, no understanding o f th a t. . . within
the civilian sector.
In an incident he found particularly humiliating. Ralph had to appeal after his application
for an executive position was rejected for lack of experience. He was accustomed to
having a military superior who supported his career development and did not find such
support in the public sector.
Each participant encountered some stereotypes o f retired military officers when
they transitioned to the public sector, summarized in Table 14.

Table 14:

Encountering Stereotypes o f Retired Military Officers: Effective and Less
Effective Strategies and Practices

Context

Conditions

Effective Strategies
and Practices

Stereotypes include:
rigid, bureaucratic.
not very bright.
clique-ish. trained in
psychological
warfare.
Experience of
retired military not
understood or
recognized.

Less public contact
and direct
experience with the
military.
Rely on media
image.
Not given
appropriate
assignments or
commensurate pay
Barrier to
implementing
change.

Avoiding military
jargon and
formality.
Conscious efforts to
counter stereotypes.
Take on higher level
assignments.
Educate co-workers
and demonstrate
abilities.

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices
Actions that
reinforce
stereotypes, e.g..
using jargon, issuing
too many written
policy directives.
Rely on superior to
give out
assignments.
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These stereotypes hampered their effectiveness as public sector leaders. The key to
handling the stereotypes is to be aware o f them and make concerted efforts not to
reinforce them. Retired officers with managers who do not understand or value their
background have the option of managing their own development opportunities,
demonstrating their abilities or seeking a new work environment.
Satisfaction and Disappointments in Public Sector Employment
There are positive and negative aspects to each workplace. The fact that two of
eleven participants left the public sector during the course o f this study and two others
hinted that they would be looking for other employment, however, suggests that
satisfaction and disappointment with public sector employment is an area worth
examining. Most of the areas o f satisfaction mentioned concerned personal
accomplishments. Nearly every participant in this study expressed disappointments.
Some were stated as personal disappointments in terms of career limitations. Others
addressed some o f the structures and practices found within the public sector.
Bob and Ralph, both aviators, had difficulty in finding steady employment
initially after retirement. Bob. who committed to keeping his family in the San Diego
area, was dissatisfied with his salary and knew he could improve his finances by leaving
the area. He w as compensated though, by the nature of his job: “I still get to smell jet
fuel every day." He was also proud of the improvements he implemented in the areas of
streamlining operations and improving safety. Ralph expressed more bitterness about his
position. He characterized the leadership style within his agency as ‘'micro
management,” “insincere" and “unsupportive." While he oversaw a much-needed
standardization o f helicopter flight procedures and improved parking and record keeping.
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he was dissatisfied with the amount o f review he faced and with the level o f assignments
he was given. He has witnessed the agency's failure to recognize employees and to
promote their advancement —including his own. “I don't feel that there's a prevailing
attitude of helping people that are interested and capable of moving up."
Frank, who left the public sector, enjoyed his staff but missed the excitement of
the military and the "critical ity o f decisions." He felt that within the political framework
o f government "the critical decisions seem to be taken from you." The slow pace of
decision-making also frustrated him.
Will was somewhat dissatisfied with the “mundane" nature of his administrative
functions. His director handled most of the political and legislative work, leaving Will to
oversee daily operations. He found improving processes and working on two projects developing organizational values and developing a leadership training academy - to be
the most satisfying aspects o f his job. He found the daily administrative assignments
somewhat tedious, and frankly stated, “I wouldn't expect to be doing this the rest of my
life." In addition, he regretted the lack o f camaraderie and socialization in his agency.
Unlike his experience in the military, the executives and managers separate their work
and personal life. He also found that stereotypes of military officers hindered staff from
getting to know him.
Sam also had issues with the lack of camaraderie in the public sector and he cited
this as one of his reasons for leaving. He did not witness an appreciation o f common
goals, mutual support and teamwork among his entity's department heads. He felt
stereotyped as rigid and bureaucratic by his colleagues and felt they used his ex-military
status as an excuse to oppose his ideas. He could not get the needed internal support
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services from other departments and felt it was unfair that they all received the same
compensation —from a department with five employees, to his public works department
which was the largest. He was disappointed that the executive did not follow through on
committed changes and gave specific directives rather than general policy direction. He
held little hope that the situation would change. He did not mention any areas o f public
sector employment that brought him satisfaction. He later took a job with a private firm.
Paul was pleased to be in an organization dedicated to public service and felt he
had a lot to offer. However, he also expressed a series o f disappointments with the public
sector. He was troubled by the lack o f policies and procedures, particularly in technical
areas such as contract and project management. He viewed the staff as under-trained and
some as lacking commitment to the goals o f public service. The inflexibility o f the
classification and civil service system hampered his ability to manage staff. He seemed
most frustrated by the thin support and even public criticism of public managers from the
executive layer, their level o f micro-management, their failure to make timely decisions
and their lack o f faith in the judgment o f division and department heads. When he
examined the entire picture, he felt he did not have the same ability to do his work as he
did in the Navy'. “I look back at the Navy and [realize] we were good. I mean we were
really good because [of] the policies, the procedures, the skill level o f the people.”
Les was very positive about working for his agency. He enjoyed his high level of
responsibility and felt that his agency was "on the cutting edge of local government.'’ He
was comfortable in his new career because the work was similar to his Navy experience.
He found some of the same procedural challenges in both sectors - "archaic” policies that
no one had looked at for ages and conflicting policies from different agencies. George
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had no significant disappointments. He believed that his agency could benefit by
incorporating some of the military practices in the areas o f standardizing policies and
procedures and developing clear communications practices. It is noteworthy that both
Les and George are working at agencies that are currently fairly stable.
Initially, Ted had a rough career transition, taking classes and doing volunteer
work in local government until he found a job managing an environmental program and
was subsequently selected as a department head. He expressed no disappointments with
the public sector and had sought to work in an area o f public service. He contrasted his
two careers and reflected that the military experience was striking because it involved life
and death decisions. But in his view. ‘"That career is over and f m satisfied it happened..
. . This is my new career and it has its own goals.” He stated that he enjoyed the
challenges o f running his department, and has worked to build good relationships with his
colleagues and staff. He was proud that the overall conditions o f public facilities had
improved under his direction. He has also successfully introduced project planning to his
peers.
Steve was also satisfied with his new career. He began as a program manager and
received a significant promotion to department head. Steve could point to his
accomplishments in improving the plan checking process (reducing cycle time by 75%).
a renewed agency focus on customer service and an expanded training program. His main
disappointment was with the chief executive officer and his staff. He was disturbed by
their willingness to chastise departmental staff in public and found some o f their practices
as counterproductive to building teamwork. Both Ted and Steve advanced rapidly once
entering government employment.
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Dan was pleased to be working in an agency that shared his commitment to public
service and found that he especially enjoyed operating within the political arena. His key
disappointment was in his entity’s failure to take care of its people by establishing career
paths and upward mobility programs which he tried to address in a recent reorganization.
He found the human resources practices frustrating, especially the classification and
discipline systems. When he joined the public sector, there existed what he viewed as an
"archaic" bonus system that "pitted worker against management." It has since been
replaced. Finally, he critiqued a new public agency diversity initiative as "20 years
behind the Navy’s."
A summary of the areas o f satisfaction and disappointment participants
encountered in public sector employment is summarized in Table 15.

Table 15:

Disappointment with Public Sector Employment: Description o f Areas of
Satisfaction and Disappointments with Public Sector Employment

Fictitious
Name
Bob

Satisfaction with the Public Sector
Accomplishments: improved airport
operations and safety.
Climate: Still gets to smell jet fuel.

Disappointments with the Public
Sector
Compensation: Poor salary
compared to other areas o f the
country7.

Dan

Political arena is exciting.
Accomplishments: reorganization,
creating career path.
Values o f public service.

Human resources, classification,
civil service systems: lack of career
mobility; worker vs. management:
shallow' diversity program.

Frank

Enjoys w'orking with staff.

Political structure: slow decision
making; critical decisions made by
others. Job lacks excitement.

Fictitious
Name
George

Satisfaction with the Public Sector
Accomplishments: improved
administrative procedures.

Disappointments with the Public
Sector
None
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Les

Organisation is “on the cutting
None
edge.” Similar nature of work to the
Navy; responsibilities are exciting,
important to local area.

Paul

Has skills needed by organization.
Values of public service.

Lack o f policies and procedures.
Some staff untrained or lack
commitment to goals and values.
Inflexibility of civil service system.
Executive level micro-manages. is
critical, non-supportive. indecisive,
lacks faith in staff.

Ralph

Accomplishments: standardized
helicopter flight procedures;
improved parking and records
procedures.

Low salary. Executive micro
management; low level
assignments. Lack o f support for
career development, recognition and
mobility.

Sam

None given.

Lack o f camaraderie, common
goals. & teamwork. Stereotypes of
ex-military blocked initiatives.
Compensation system. Executive is
directive, lacks follow-through.

Steve

Accomplishments: improved plan
checking procedures, customer
serv ice and employee development.
Promoted to position with
considerable authority.

Executive criticizes staff publicly.

Ted

Accomplishments: public facilities
are in better shape, improved plan
project planning. Values o f public
service. Promoted to position with
considerable authority.

None.

Will

Accomplishments: improved budget
and agenda procedures and
improved training.

Mundane assignments.
Lack of camaraderie.
Stereotypes o f ex-military affect
work and relationships.
Most of the areas of satisfaction expressed centered on accomplishments, which is
consistent with the goal and outcome orientation of the military culture. The fact that two

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209

o f the eleven participants have left public employment and two others said that they
intended to apply for other jobs suggests that the level o f dissatisfaction with public
employment ran high among this group. The areas o f dissatisfaction included inadequate
compensation, a cumbersome civil service structure, centralized decision-making, micro
management. lack o f leadership support for career development, lack o f peer
camaraderie, lack o f mobility and mundane, routine assignments. With the exception of
poor compensation, these are all areas that run contrary to military culture. Among those
who have left or stated they were considering seeking other employment, the following
areas were cited as the most disappointing in their current jobs: the task assignments, the
amount o f discretion, the public sector decision-making process, their relationship with
their manager, peer camaraderie and salary. It is also noteworthy that Frank and Sam.
who both left government employment, did not cite any concrete accomplishments in
their public careers.
Perhaps the ability to separate one career from the other is a significant
contributor to the success o f taking on a leadership role in a new organization. One
observation made during this research concerned the way participants decorated their
government offices. Most displayed vestiges of their military career. Some had most o f
their wall space dedicated to their military memorabilia. A fewr displayed tour books and
one even had an anchor in his office. Ted. Steve and Dan had nothing from their military
days in their offices. As Dan stated. "That is the past. This is where I work now."
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Data Analysis: Approaches to Change
Almost universally, the retired military officers interviewed identified a number
o f differences between the military and public sectors, summarized in Appendix F. In the
area o f leading staff, participants cited differences in: the nature o f the staff they led.
communication styles accepted, the flexibility o f the classification system, expectations
and practices related to staff retention, commitment to training and development,
organizational structures that promoted teamwork and camaraderie and the approach and
structures for managing performance. In the area of organizational relations, participants
noted differences in their relations with elected officials, executive leadership, their own
manager, their peers and their subordinates. There were also differences in the amount of
discretion allowed, the breadth o f decision-making and the extent shared values
permeated the organization. Finally, there was a difference in the extent and role of
standard operating procedures between the military services and the public sector.
During the course of the interviews, some participants volunteered strategies and
shared experiences, which demonstrated their success in adapting to and improving their
new organizations. These data are summarized in Appendix G. In the area o f leading
staff, successful strategies included: expanding organizational communications:
changing to a more indirect communication style: eliminating military jargon: followingup on directives; working within the restrictions o f the classification/civil service system;
promoting mobility and staffing changes; expanding training: developing teamwork by
clarifying goals, granting authority to staff, promoting social events and recognizing team
efforts; and committing to honestly evaluate and recognize staff. Strategies that were not
successful were: issuing information bulletins rather than direct contact, assuming staff
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would follow directives, using a direct communication style and military jargon,
accepting and criticizing the status quo and developing an inner circle.
In the area of organizational relations participants found that consciously building
their reputation, holding events, taking charge of their own development, building
influence and political relationships, and accepting the limitations of their authority and
decision-making were successful strategies. Less effective actions were failing to followup with staff, accepting the status quo, waiting for managers to initiate developmental
opportunities and becoming frustrated with the involvement of multiple parties in
decision-making and the limits o f personal authority in public organizations.
In the area of policies and procedures, participants who proactively introduced
relevant practices from the military, particularly by utilizing influence and modeling
programs were successful. Relying solely on the chief executive to take action was not
effective. Participants also found they had to be aware o f the stereotypes held about
military officers and had to consciously work to counter those stereotypes, to educate
their co-workers and to demonstrate their abilities.
Initially there were some participants who stated that they had not faced any
transition issues in leaving the military and entering public sector leadership positions.
Yet the participant data revealed that there were some areas where retired officers needed
to make adjustments from the practices they learned in the military' to respond to
organizational differences in the nature o f the staff, communication styles, the civil
service/classification system, employee retention, training and development, building
teamwork, managing performance within the civil service system, organizational
relations at all levels, the political process, the amount o f discretion, decision-making.
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values and ethics, and policies and procedures. In addition, each encountered stereotypes
of retired military officers that affected their image and capacity to influence their
organization.
The officers utilized various strategies and practices to adapt to the unique aspects
of the public sector. The variety o f answers recorded presented does not represent the
entire range of approaches, nor indicate the most effective approaches. They do indicate
a breadth of experiences. In the next chapter, this data will be triangulated against other
writings and studies concerning military and public sector leadership. The data will also
be examined for their implications for the military, for retiring officers entering public
sector careers, for public sector organizations and for the study o f leadership.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Overview
This study is organized into six sections. The first chapter provided a general
overview, outlined the background o f the problem, stated the purpose o f the study,
described military and public sector organizations, life transitions and contemporary
change issues in government agencies. The third chapter discussed approaches to
qualitative and grounded theory research and described the specific methodology used in
this study. The fourth chapter contained the research data pertaining to military
leadership and the fifth chapter contained the data related to applying military leadership
behaviors and strategies within local government organizations. This chapter contains an
overview o f the entire research project, describes the research findings, triangulates these
findings against other literature in the field, and describes the study's implications for
military organizations, for retiring officers entering public sector employment, for local
government agencies and for the field o f leadership studies. It also contains
recommendations for future research.
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Review of the Study: Its Purpose, Related Literature and Methodology
Purpose o f the Studv
During 15 years o f working in local government, this researcher has observed the
prevalence o f retired officers holding government leadership positions within the San
Diego area. As discussed in the first chapter, there are both personal and financial factors
that draw retired military personnel to local government employment (Gordon. 1997:
Jacobsen. 1990; Savino & Krannich. 1995; TROA, 1996). Data show that many retirees
settle in areas where they once served (Barnes. 1994). San Diego County has the third
largest retired military population in the country (Snyder. 1994). Areas with a large
military presence such as San Diego County, therefore, would expect to find larger
numbers o f retired military in government employment. Because o f their extensive
military experience in directing large-scale operations, many retired officers qualify to
move directly into high-level positions in local public sector organizations. In entering
local government, these individuals are leaving a unique organization, which has
generally dominated both their work and social life for twenty or more years, while
encountering a new organizational culture with many differences.
Some retired officers interviewed for this study moved to their new careers with
only a few days of transition. None received assistance or orientation that addressed
transition issues from either the military sendees or local government organizations
(U. S. Department o f Labor. 1998: Veterans’ Employment and Training Service. 1995).
It appears that retiring military officers largely rely on themselves or personal contacts to
assist in this transition. This researcher has observed both officers who do well and
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succeed in translating the knowledge and experience they garnered in the military to their
new organizations, as well as others who are less successful.
The purpose o f this research is to examine the key military leadership strategies
and behaviors learned by retired officers and determine their applicability to leadership
situations in local government. As stated in the introduction, the research focus o f this
dissertation (emerging from a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998) centers on
identifying: the key leadership strategies and behaviors learned and practiced by military
officers: the strategies and behaviors that are transferable and those not easily transferable
to leadership situations in local government; the adjustments that assist retired military
officers in transitioning to local government leadership positions; and the implications for
assisting newly-retired officers entering local government organizations and for future
research.
Summary of the Literature Review
The second chapter contained a review of the literature relevant to this study. The
literature showed parallel historical trends in the development of military and public
sector bureaucracies in this country. Both sectors have faced ongoing concerns over the
scope of their role and authority, and have had legislative bodies use funding limitations
and regulations to restrict their power. There were parallel developments in the growth
of their professionalism and o f the complexity of their missions. Finally, they continue to
share similarities in their formal, organizational cultures, particularly in their personnel,
budgeting and procurement systems.
The literature on military organizational cultures revealed differences in the
cultures and subcultures o f the service branches. The naval culture includes an element
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o f independence, flexibility and autonomy which springs from its seagoing mission
(Hadley, 1986; Halperin. 1974; Wilson. 1989). The Marine Corps is a self-described
unique, elite force which regards itself as the branch willing to take on the most
dangerous duty in battle (Krulak, 1987; Ricks. 1997).
The military services also have a shared culture. The military culture contains
deeply-rooted values and traditions, which are primarily camaraderie, unit cohesion,
loyalty, chain o f command, adherence to orders, strong organizational identity, defined
roles and moral responsibility (Henderson, 1985; Hubbard. 1899; Montor. et al. 1987).
The military is facing challenges as it transitions from a traditional, institutional culture to
a more occupational culture (Moskos. 1977. 1986, 1988). Changes within the military
are also being forced by advanced technology, more humanitarian and peacekeeping
missions, increasing diversity, all-volunteer forces, the issue o f gays in the military and
the broadening role o f women (Demchak. 1991; Dunivan. 1994; Stillman. 1996). The
traditional, informal organizational culture of the military services is evolving within a
climate o f some uncertainty.
Government organizations share centuries-old bureaucratic roots with the military
sendees (George. 1972; Rickover, 1971) as well as the organizational features of
centralized functions, standardized practices, defined roles, set boundaries, centralized
decision-making and unity of command (Weber, 1946). They differ largely in their
informal culture.
The public sector is characterized by multiple and conflicting values which
include efficiency, the public good, effectiveness, ethics, responsiveness and social
equity. The missions o f government agencies change with political trends and they
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strive to attain social goals which are difficult to define and measure. By contrast, the
military's mission has traditionally been to protect and defend the nation. Military
missions are often specific and achievable, while the government arena, with its
conflicting stakeholder interests, leave public leaders with merely a hope o f “saticficing"
these needs (Simon. 1947). By design, administrative government embraces multiple
agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, promoting interagency competitiveness (Dahl.
1956; Dilulio. et al, 1993; Yates. 1982). While there is some competition among the
service branches, military organizations share the common mission o f national defense.
Public employees also have more independence within the civil service system
than do members of the armed forces. Government administrative leaders operate in the
public arena, and deal regularly with elected officials, citizens groups and the media - all
of which constrict their authority, independence and ability to make decisions.
The literature on career change addressed the stress o f these transitions (Golan.
1981). which are further compounded when occurring at mid-life (Erickson. 1982;
Levinson et al. 1978). Role ambiguity is a key change faced when moving to a new
organization. One positive and effective reaction to career transition is to seek assistance
from those within the organization (Klauser & Groves. 1994). Individuals can also react
to transitions by attempting to recreate the past (Kahn, et al. 1964; Marris. 1974) or by
becoming dissatisfied with their new situation (Kahn, et al. 1964)
Finally, the literature on contemporary public sector organizations identified the
current change trends o f adopting more businesslike practices, introducing market forces
into government services, privatizing and/or developing more public partnerships with
businesses and nonprofits, changing to a customer service orientation, broadening citizen
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involvement and reforming the civil service system (Ban. 1995: Dilulio et al. 1993:
Eggers & CTLeary, 1995; Goldsmith. 1997: Gore. 1993: Kettl. 1993: 1994: Osbourne &
Gabler. 1991: Osbourne & Plastrik, 1997.)
Change in the public sector, though, is difficult because of multiple stakeholders,
a proliferation o f agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, power dynamics, short term
political concerns of some elected officials, risk-aversion to attempting change within the
public view, legal concerns and lack of rewards for innovation (Golembiewski. 1985).
In the view of this researcher, the public sector requires transformational leadership
which will inform and involve organizational members, use influence rather than
coercion, lead from a base o f strong missions and values, seek collaboration and value
diversity in order to face such profound change within the constrictions of the public
environment.
Summary o f the Methodology
As discussed in the third chapter, a qualitative approach was selected as best
suited to examining social processes such as military and public sector leadership
(Geertz. 1983). Grounded theory methodology is viewed by some scholars as a better
way to examine leadership (Conger. 1998: Parry. 1998) and can. at times, generate a
theory which is generalizable outside the group of participants (Glaser. 1978; Strauss &
Corbin. 1990). The validity, reliability and generalizibility of the theory generated was
enhanced through the use of field notes, verbatim transcripts, peer review and by seeking
triangulation of the data in other qualitative and quantitative studies. There is no
apparent rationale for concluding that the retired military population in the San Diego
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area has any unique characteristics, which would prevent the results from being
generalized outside of the group of participants.
The research questions and core interview questions used in this study evolved
from a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998. That pilot study involved only four
participants, and revealed that some differences could exist between the leadership
strategies and behaviors successful in the military and those that were successful in local
government organizations. In this study, all local cities, the Port District, the County and
all water districts within San Diego County area were contacted to ascertain if they had
any mid-managers or executives who were retired naval or marine officers who had
served 20 or more years, had achieved the pay grade o f 0 -4 or above and had been retired
less than six years. In all, 90% o f the agencies cooperated in the search for participants,
as did local veterans offices.
Eleven participants were found who met the criteria. All were interviewed and
tape-recorded. Their transcripts were coded verbatim and these data generated the theory
of military leadership and its applicability to the public sector.

Discussion and Triangulation of the Findings
This section summarizes the findings o f this study and examines those findings
against other related studies and writings. The purpose o f triangulation is to examine if
the findings are unique to the participants of the study or if they are sufficiently supported
to offer a theory generalizable to the larger population o f retired officers. Unfortunately,
there has been little research done on officer leadership outside o f the Army and the Air
Force. No definitive rationale could be uncovered for this, though it is thought by some
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to be related to the tradition that naval officers are developed at "the school o f the sea."
Some studies done in other service branches that may lend some insight are referenced.
Grounded Theory o f Military Leadership
The fourth chapter examined the data gathered concerning the leadership
perspectives and practices learned in the military and proposed a construct o f military
leadership based on grounded theory methodology. (See Appendix E.) The research
revealed that the phenomenon o f military leadership is shaped by the possibility of
combat. This continual preparation for combat has formed the organizational culture and
led to the development o f specific structures, practices and strategies within military
organizations. There were five specific subthemes identified by participants: military
leadership development, leading people, leading processes, decision-making, and leading
change.
Leadership Development.
Two key organizational factors affected leadership development - the possibility
that an officer might need to quickly assume command in a combat situation and the
youthfulness of many junior officers. Both created the need to rapidly develop leaders
which is done through education and training programs, mentorship and developmental
experiences. A review o f relevant literature revealed that the services utilize basic
training or other forms o f orientation to instill organizational identity and values into its
members (Janowitz, 1960; McCloy & Clover. 1988; Ricks, 1997). The training,
experiences and mentoring continually strengthen and reinforce the military way o f life
(Montor, McNicholas. Ciotti, Hutchinson & Wehmueller, 1987; Peck. 1994). The Navy.
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in particular, has traditionally held that the true development o f officers happens on
assignment, via mentorship and experience.
All participants were mentored by senior officers. In the experiences of some particularly those who had their first command in Vietnam - a veteran chief petty officer
also played a critical role in their development. These role models assisted the young
officers in learning how to lead a crew, developing critical thinking and decision-making
skills, building their self-confidence and developing a command presence. The regular
assignment rotation gave the participants the opportunity to serve under many different
CO's and XO’s, allowing them to witness a wide variety o f leadership styles and their
effectiveness. Two recent studies confirm the importance of mentorship. In a survey of
junior officers in surface warfare, respondents cited mentors as one o f the most important
factors in their development and in their decision to continue in the service. Another
survey o f nearly 700 retired flag officers found that 67% reported having significant
mentors, with a fifth o f those relationships lasting over 20 years (Johnson. Huwe.
Fallow. Lall. Holmes & Hall, 1999).
Typically in the military, officers are immediately given broad responsibility- far
more than they would generally receive in the private sector - then are coached and
guided into handling increasing levels of responsibility (Ulmer. 1998). The participants
observed that those who are not comfortable with broad responsibility do not remain in
the service. Each interviewee mentioned his own dislike o f micro-management. This
dislike o f micro-management was confirmed by the Navy's recent attitudinal survey of
surface warfare officers in 1999 (Crawley, 2000). Accordingly, those interviewed
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experienced the importance of leadership development and o f mentorship for
communicating and continuing military leadership strategies and behaviors.
Leading Staff.
The subtheme “leading staff’ was the most detailed of the study. The context or
conditions which affected leading people included: whether the officer was leading in an
administrative or operational environment, the youthfulness o f most enlisted members,
the variance in education backgrounds, the continual staff rotation, and the need to know
that members o f the unit would put themselves in harm’s way.
Most participants stated that they had adopted a contingency style of leading staff.
In an operational environment, they expected that orders would be obeyed, they were
more demanding, they expected high technical performance, and they felt they could
adopt a more direct, severe tone with the crew if required. In an administrative setting,
there was more opportunity to use a coaching style, to spend more time explaining and
informing members and giving the rationale for decisions. No study was found
addressing this issue with naval or marine officers, though this contingency approach was
confirmed by the Center for Creative Leadership's work with Army generals (Ulmer,
1998). In his writings. Ulmer, a retired lieutenant general, also critiqued the Army’s
performance reporting system for placing too much focus on operational leadership at the
expense of developing administrative leaders.
The youthfulness and variance in education levels of the staff led to both the
practice of weeding out those who did not fit in with military life while working intensely
to develop those who remained in the service. According to participants, those who do
not fit the military are culled through boot camp, or through the appraisal, discipline or
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re-enlistment processes. The paternalistic structures within the military also give officers
more control over their members. Participant data identified a military communication
style characterized as very direct to ensure orders are clear and easily understood. SmithJentsch. Johnston, and Payne (1998) in their research on tactical communications for the
Navy's identified the following elements of appropriate operational communication:
proper phraseology, clear meaning and elimination of excess "chatter." confirming the
teaching of a direct style of military communication.
There is also a strong emphasis on training and development and standard
operating procedures to accommodate staff rotation, compensate for uneven educational
backgrounds and ensure consistency. The lessons learned are that discipline and honest
evaluations are important, that communication should be clear and direct, that continuous
training is critical and that training can help the individual fit the position.
The potential for combat necessitates that crews must be willing to place
themselves in harm 's way. The data revealed that this hinges on shared values, trust in
and loyalty to the leadership and camaraderie within the unit. As previously noted,
military organizations instill shared organizational values in boot camp that are
reinforced continually by the structures, traditions and their commanding officers.
According to former Secretary o f Defense James Webb, "A leader who does not have the
respect o f his people, whose peopie do not believe he is operating from a system of
values, will find that his words are considered meaningless by the people he is leading"
(quoted in Montor. et al, 1987. p. 10).
The phenomenon o f command presence - which participants defined as
presenting an image o f control, self-confidence, proper demeanor and technical ability -
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contributes to the trust members have in their leader to protect them. This concept is
echoed in the writings o f Carrison and Walsh (1999) who addressed the “moral
authority" o f Marine Corps leadership:
While all officers have the legal authority to command, the moral authority to lead
is not granted by a diploma from Officers Candidate School. Moral authority is
developed in private, with one's conscience, and on display in public, in the dayto-day dealing with the men under one's com m and.. . . The officer with moral
authority may find that his men will go far beyond the call o f duty, perhaps to
their deaths, upon his order, (p. 122)
Thus, an officer cannot depend on rank alone, but must be conscious o f developing a trust
and reputation with the crew. Being involved on a personal level, disciplining in a firm
but fair manner and rewarding people for their performance were cited as behaviors that
also build loyalty. Unit camaraderie - a principal well recognized in military tradition
and discussed in multiple works on military sociology (Henderson, 1985; Ricks. 1997) was raised as another critical component o f leading staff. Officers interviewed felt that
camaraderie was enhanced by many o f the military organizational structures such as
foreign deployment, unit competitions and social events.
In summary, military officers learn the importance o f leading by values and by
example which includes developing a command presence. They learned the importance
o f taking care o f the staff as a group and as individuals and o f developing unit
camaraderie and teamwork.
Leading Processes.
As previously mentioned, standard operating procedures (SOP's) are the strategy
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used by the services to provide consistency in the work product and to accommodate the
inexperience and youth of many of the new recruits as well as the continual rotation o f
personnel. SOP’s are strictly adhered to in an operational setting. It is a leadership
decision as to when or if to go around or against SOP’s. Almost every participant could
cite an instance where he had knowingly violated a procedure or directive. Participants
related that such actions were justified when it was necessary to take care of your people
or for the sake o f the mission.
No corroborating hard data could be found on this subject, though Colonel Phillip
A. Johnson, a military judge advocate, wrote in an essay on the topic:
There is not one among us who has served any appreciable time in the armed
forces without personally witnessing numerous violations of published orders and
regulations. I daresay we have not always reported such violations. I would even
venture to say that in our day most of us have committed a few. (Johnson. 1987.
p. 126)
Thus, others shared the experiences of the participants with regard to SOP’s in the
service.
Decision-making.
Because the leader may need to be replaced quickly, it is important that officers
develop decision-making abilities early in their careers. Internal structures such as early
command assignments and mentoring both develop these skills and establish the need for
increased authority as a group norm. This desire for autonomy was confirmed in the
recent attitudinal survey of surface warfare officers where they named micro
management as their primary dislike (Crawley, 2000).

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

226

Participants described the chain-of-command. decision-making structure within
the armed forces, where input is often sought, but command decisions are final and
obedience expected. The need to display a command presence to the crew also
encouraged some of the participants to value quick, definitive decisions. In their works
on recent developments in tactical decision-making. Cohen. Freeman and Thompson
(1998) and Kozlowsi (1998) noted that the Navy previously taught a classical form of
decision-making stressing problem solving and statistical probability in finding the
optimal tactical decision. Newer naval technology requires officers to process large
amounts o f information at rapid rates. New decision-making models are focusing more
on emergent problems, continually changing situations and adaptive skills (CannonBowers & Salas, 1998).
Many of the military officers interviewed described a personal decision-making
style based on the classical form. Barber (1990) and Ulmer (1998) looked at separate
data from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Measure, but both found that over 70% of
military officers were in the thinking-judging (TJ) grouping, compared with 31.5%
among men nationally. The TJ group tends to favor rapid, analytical decisions
(McCaulley, 1990). Both groups were largely Army officers. Ulmer concluded that these
data and others gathered from the Center for Creative Leadership, suggest that
operational experiences create "expectations for prompt, discernible, measurable results"
(p. 19). Officers interviewed learned to display decision-making capabilities to their staff
and to value the authority to make decisions. Some may have learned a disposition
toward quick, decisive judgments.
Managing Change.
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The participants served during a time that included the post-Vietnam period.
They were part o f significant organizational change in terms o f redefining the mission,
structures and processes o f the service branches. Large-scale change in the military —
because o f its size - is generally directed from central policy-making bodies and then
passed down through the organization, as in the case o f addressing sexual harassment
after the tailhook scandal (Mason. 1995). The experience of most o f the participants
interviewed was in supporting and implementing top-down change. Their experience in
implementing change was further characterized by their ability to utilize the controlled
environment to mandate specific practices and activities. The continual series of
improvement efforts during their time o f service appear to have made some participants
jaded toward change programs. Others related positive experiences with TQM/TQL
teams. The lessons learned in the military about leading change include following topdown directives, using quality management techniques, using the controlled environment
and expecting constant changes.
Figure 1 shows a model of the grounded theory o f military leadership. The
behaviors and strategies learned and practiced by military officers, as identified by the
study's participants, are broken down into the subthemes o f military leadership
development, leading people. leading processes, decision-making, and leading change.
Several studies are relevant to these findings.
Insert Figure 1 about here

Whiteside (1985) interviewed 750 Navy ship captains, officers and crew about the
behaviors and practices o f junior officers on “well-run ships.” While the term
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Figure 1: Model of the Grounded Theory Military Leadership
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"leadership" is not specifically used, the study is tied to the business of commanding a
ship and offers both superior and subordinate viewpoints. The key factors reported in the
study were building cohesion, demonstrating loyalty and support o f the captain, raising
issues, asking questions, giving the captain positive and negative news, taking initiative
and accepting responsibility for team performance.
Gullickson and Chennette (1984) interviewed 21 senior officers about the
characteristics o f six excellent surface ships. Factors which related to the leadership
included: good communication up the chain o f command, good discipline with a focus
on reforming problem sailors and removing those that would not perform, a dedication to
at least three hours of training weekly, high standards, involvement without micro
management, common vision and values, intense command interest and continual
concern for each individual. While not identical in their findings, both these studies
conform to the data o f this study regarding a grounded theory o f military leadership.
While there is no definitive source on military leadership, the strategies and
behaviors identified by the participants are supported by military research and writings.
Reviewers of this study with military backgrounds - while not sharing all o f the
experiences noted in Chapter Four - confirmed that the data were a credible portrayal of
military leadership.

Grounded Theory of the Applicability of Military Leadership
in Public Sector Organizations
The research findings contained in Chapter Five addressed which o f the military
strategies and behaviors were transferable to leadership situations in local government
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and which were not. The intent also was to identify any methods that retired officers
utilized to adapt to the differences between military and local government organizations
or to improve the public organizations they joined. The data revealed four key
subthemes: leading public sector staff, organizational relationships, leading public sector
processes and encountering stereotypes o f retired military officers.
Leading Staff
The subtheme o f leading staff was the most complex. Participant interviews
identified the following context factors existing in the public sector which affected
leading staff: the nature o f the staff, communication norms, the classification system,
concepts about retention, training and development, teamwork and performance
management systems.
Nature of Staff.
Participants characterized the staff in their public sector organizations as generally
older, worldlier and more concerned with the details of their compensation and benefits.
They found the leader-follower relationship complicated by the independence and
discretion o f staff, in contrast to the more youthful enlisted members who generally
followed directives. Many witnessed a lack o f trust between labor and management in
government, which at times was compounded by an adversarial approach to labor
relations. Some found negative and cynical members which confirms the findings o f
Gabris and Simo (1995) in their study comparing public, private and non-profit
employees. The researchers found that the public sector had the lowest job satisfaction
rate (at 78%). The public employees in the survey overwhelmingly considered the
private business as the best employment sector.
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Retired officers interviewed found they needed to spend more time in personal
communications with their staff members, and recognized that they did not have the same
trust and reputation that came with their rank in the military. Public sector employees did
not necessarily follow their directives, and participants found they had to repeatedly
follow-up to be certain their instructions had been carried out.
Some officers felt there was less commitment to public service among
government employees than in the military. Service is a core value in the armed forces
confirmed by Barber's (1990) values study with 270 attendees at the Army War College.
Participants in the values rank ordering exercise identified “a sense o f service” as their
fourth most important instrumental value.
There is conflicting information on whether the public sector attracts individuals
with a commitment to service. Perry and Wise (1990) have hypothesized that individuals
who wish to affect public policy and give service to their community would be motivated
toward public employment. However, Ting (1997) analyzed data from the Survey of
Federal Employees (which surveyed 56.767 federal white-collar employees) and found
no correlation between job satisfaction and commitment to service. Gabris and Simo
(1990) found that the top reasons for choosing public employment were the challenge
(55%), the convenience (17%) and the money and job security (nearly 12%). There was
no evidence o f a service commitment among public employees: “Whatever kernel o f
public motivation exists initially as an independent variable effecting [sic] career choice,
seems to dissipate rather rapidly among the public employees in our sample” (p. 51).
These results may not readily be extrapolated to all public employees, however, as the
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sample size was small and taken from agencies in only two cities. In summary, there are
no hard data on the strength o f public employees7 commitment to government service.
Communications.
Communication norms were another area o f difference. Direct, straightforward
communication, necessary for clarity and decisiveness in the services, can appear too
harsh within the civilian world. Utilizing a blunt, direct style offended some employees
and, in the case of one participant, led to a grievance. Using military jargon clouded
understanding, reinforced stereotypes and risked separating retired officers from others in
the organization. Retired officers found that consciously changing to a less direct style
and abandoning jargon and military formalities - like saying “yes sir* - improved
communication in their new jobs. Retired naval and marine officers in a study by Webb
(1990) also responded that military communication hindered them in transitioning to
civilian organizations.
The issue of communication is o f critical importance to leadership. Schein (1992)
identified language as one o f the four key factors in defining and creating organizational
cultures. It helps to construct, interpret and disseminate the mental modes within an
organization. Language is key to communicating vision and managing meanings within
the organization (Bennis, 1989:Senge, 1990).
Classification. Retention and Staff Development Systems.
There were three systems discussed by participants that affected their ability to
lead staff. The first, the civil service classification system, restricted their ability to freely
assign tasks and to compensate individuals for duties actually performed. The retired
officers interviewed, accustomed to an organization where members did what needed to
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be done, found the system hampering and frustrating, particularly when challenged by
employees that an assignment given was not their job. Some participants met with
success by trying to improve selection, through reorganization efforts and by working
within the constraints of their human resources system.
The second system identified was the norm o f lifetime employment in
government. Some participants found their new organizations largely composed o f long
term employees with little career mobility - conditions they felt contributed to
organizational stagnation. Some also found existing attitudes that turnover was negative
and practices which paid individuals more simply for remaining with the organization.
They contrasted this to the military where continual staff rotation was normal and, they
felt, renewed the organization and brought in fresh ideas. Successful strategies in this
area were to change the organizational norm to see the benefits o f turnover, to promote
upward mobility and career ladders —regardless o f whether it led people to move outside
the organization - and to set pay rates based on the worth o f the position. The
participants' experiences with the civil service system and the culture o f lifetime
employment are consistent with scholarly and historic writings (Ban. 1995; White. 1935)
and are addressed in detail in Chapter Two.
Almost all the participants found inadequate training programs, few career ladders
and a lack ofleadership development and succession management programs. This was
one of the areas where their military background provided models that were easier to
transfer to the public sector.
In all three o f these areas, resigning oneself to accepting and criticizing the
existing situation was ineffective.
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Teamwork.
The military has established structures that support the development o f
camaraderie, morale and teamwork. Maintaining unit cohesion and camaraderie is a
daily priority for officers (Montor et al, 1987). None o f the participants found anyexisting structures within their government agencies for building teamwork, and those
operating in a downsizing environment found ever-greater challenges. Several
participants utilized their military experience to establish and communicate clear goals,
trying to assist their new organizations in working better as a unit. Defining tasks and
roles, then granting more authority at the supervisory and front line level helped some
work units develop a sense of ownership. Other retired officers used team recognition
strategies and social gatherings to develop teamwork. Creating an inner circle as an elite
team within the work unit was a practice that may have promoted more separation than
camaraderie.
Managing Performance.
Civilian managers have less control over staff than do military officers. Many
participants criticized the civil service system and the public sector rewards system as
ineffective for managing performance. They were now restricted to focusing solely on
the work performance issues, whereas within the paternalistic systems o f the military,
they had the authority to work with the whole person, including their families. They felt
the multiple steps and long processes of the discipline system allowed problems to grow
before they could be effectively dealt with. The rewards system limited the incentives
and merit awards they could offer employees. Participants commented that some
established public managers were reluctant to use the discipline system because o f its
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ineffectiveness and consequently tolerated poor performance, a point confirmed in Ban's
examination o f the federal service (1995). Some retired officers, however, stated that
they were establishing standards, documenting and disciplining those with poor
performance, regardless o f whether their managerial peers chose not to. One used
reorganization to eliminate poor workers. Retired officers expressed that they found it
important to use the rewards available to them creatively.
Organizational Relations
The second key subtheme identified by participants was organizational relations.
This encompassed relations with staff, peers, one’s manager, executives and within the
political arena. These relationships affected their level o f decision-making authority and
raised differences in approaches to values and ethics.
Relations with Staff. Peers. Managers. Executive Leadership and Elected Officials.
In the military, respect, to some degree, accompanies rank. The participants
transitioned from an organization where status and reputation were “yours to lose” to one
where reputation had to be earned. Most experienced having their decisions questioned
and their instructions disobeyed. Some subordinates used open door policies to
circumvent their authority or looked for reasons to find fault with them. A few retired
officers characterized their staff as cynical toward change efforts. Effective strategies for
working with staff were to consciously develop a positive reputation with individuals, to
communicate directives carefully and to follow-up with staff. It was problematic for
retired officers to assume they had a positive reputation and the automatic cooperation o f
their employees.
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Many o f the participants missed “the camaraderie o f the wardroom" - close peer
relations and internal support. Some experienced this as part o f the separation and
competition of agencies and programs in the public sector noted by Dahl (1956). Dilulio
and associates (1993) and Yates (1982). They also observed more o f a separation of
work and social life in the civilian world. Some successfully built peer relations and
hosted social events. Retired officers in Webb's study (1990) also reported that the
civilian sector was less collegial and trusting than the military. Some participants faced
situations where there was little support or cooperation from other managers. One retired
officer cited this as his reason for eventually leaving government service.
The military services place a high priority on continual development and the CO
takes an active role in providing developmental assignments and in broadening the
authority o f capable officers. Most of the participants found a dearth of training and
career development in the public sector. Those who were successful sought their own
opportunities. Some found their assignments were mundane compared to the military
and that critical decision were made elsewhere in the public environment.
In the military, the executive officer is familiar with the technical operations he or
she oversees. It is fairly common for the chief executive of a public organization to have
little technical knowledge concerning most o f the operations. Consequently, success for
high-level administrators relies on building strong relationships with the CEO.
Nonetheless, some retired officers experienced public criticism by the CEO. Accustomed
to the "praise in public, criticize in private" norm within the military, they were shocked
and disappointed at this feature o f public organizations.
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Some o f the study participants objected to the continual questions and requests for
information received from the offices of the CEO and elected officials that disrupted their
workflow. In addition, the “second guessing” and failure to support the agency's
recommendations were termed frustrating and often counterproductive. Retired officers,
accustomed to broad authority expressed their disappointment with micro-management
by those with positional authority, but without technical expertise.
Little individual decision-making authority existing within a public political
system characterized by multiple stakeholders, competing agencies, slow processes and
incremental rather than decisive action (Golembiewski. 1985; Yates. 1982). Critical
decisions are made by elected officials or by the chief executive. This reflects the
historic tension about the role of the public administrator, and whether this role should be
that o f a neutral administrator or a partner in policymaking (Lindbom & Woodhouse.
1993; Lowi. 1979; and others). CEOs and elected officials may use strict oversight to
curb administrative power (Rourke. 1984; Selden, Brewer. & Brudney, 1999).
Recent research confirms that elected bodies in some jurisdictions are becoming
increasingly involved in the detailed aspects of programs. Nalbandian (1999) studied a
group o f local city and county managers in 1988 and again in 1999. The public
administrators reported that elected officials were becoming more involved in the
programmatic and implementation details. Nalbandian's study also found that many
governing councils contained special interest and anti-govemment members.
Bressner (1999) surveyed city managers and mayors in over 300 communities in
the United States between 1994 and 1998. Respondents identified two trends o f
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particular concern: an increasing tendency by councils to micro-manage. and the
inexperience and poor caliber o f their some council members.
Schafer & Toy (1999), in their study of 225 city managers in California, identified
"the amount o f independent authority” as having the most significant correlation (reverse
correlation) with the ability o f managers to thrive in the stress-filled climate o f public
management. Council members who focused too much on the program details was the
fourth most important source o f stress. Twenty-eight per cent o f those interviewed were
negative about whether they w'ould again choose their public sector career. These studies
confirm the micro-management reported by many o f this study’s participants.
Having close dealings with elected officials was a new experience for all of the
participants as officers in most assignments are not to have direct contact with elected
officials. According to General Louis Wilson, USMC. “Our business is that we
understand conflict and we take an oath that we will protect our country and not make
policy” (Quoted in Montor et al, 1987). Some found it exciting to be a player in the
policy arena, while others were more frustrated by a process featuring multiple
stakeholders, shifting political winds, time-consuming public processes and interagency
competition. Those who were more successful became involved in building influence
relationships with elected officials and becoming involved in political committees. This
is an area where retired officers had to find satisfaction from being a part o f the process
rather than the decision-maker, or find satisfaction in another aspect o f public service.
Authority. Values and Ethics.
The final area in the subtheme o f organizational relations is that of values and
ethics. Some participants were disappointed in joining organizations where there was
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little sense of strong purpose. Those retired officers expressed strong commitment to the
role of ethics and values in leading organizations. Leaving a gemeinschaft military
organizational culture, they were disappointed in the occupational orientation of many of
the high-level public administrators in their organizations. They questioned how to lead
in an organization where others modeled behavior that was more designed to promote a
career than the public good.
Ban (1995) wrote that public sector organizations generally fostered a "culture of
control" whereby they gained employee compliance by focusing on rules and external
controls. There is little ethics and values development evident in public sector employee
development efforts and little agreement about which ethic should guide public agencies
(Skidmore, 1995).
Leading Processes
Some o f the areas where the retired officers interviewed expressed their greatest
success was in improving procedures, strengthening the planning component and
standardizing processes in their public agencies. Those who had the most success in
introducing such changes used influence and modeling. Those who proposed
improvements but relied on their executive or CEO to implement plans generally saw less
change actualized.
Stereotypes of Military Officers
All of the participants interviewed encountered some stereotypes o f military
officers. These varied by individual, many saw officers as rigid, bureaucratic, not very
bright, having little experience with civilians and clannish. Some of the people they now
supervised had little experience with the military; their impressions may have been
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shaped by the media. Some retired officers had managers who did not appear to
understand their background or what they were capable of. The experience o f facing
stereotypes was also shared by retired officers in a focus group study done by Webb
(1990) and in contemporary media pieces (Cohn, 1997). Hadley (1986) also discussed
the existence o f “The Great Divorce,’' a growing gulf between the military' and civilian
sectors o f the country which may be perpetrated by negative media images.
Participants who recognized and deliberately countered these stereotyped images
and avoided using military jargon and communication styles expressed less frustration
about the effects of these images. By educating others in their organizations regarding
their experiences and by demonstrating their abilities, they felt they had begun to change
perceptions and to gain the types o f assignments they knew they were capable of. Those
who retained their military communication style and relied on their managers to direct
their career voiced more disappointment and negativity over their situation.
A summary of the theory of the applicability of military leadership to public
sector organizations is found in Figure 2 and the grounded theory' is summarized in
Appendix F.

Insert Figure 2 about here
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Figure 2: Grounded Theory of the Applicability o f Military Leadership to the
Public Sector
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Implications

What do the findings sav about military leadership?
The portrait of military leadership revealed by the interviews contains elements of
a variety of leadership theories. The contingency view of leadership, expressed by
almost all participants, fits several different theories where the nature o f the subordinate
and the context determine what style o f leadership is used — Fiedler's notion o f
contingency leadership (1967). House's path-goal theory (1971) and Hershey and
Blanchard's notion o f situational leadership (1988). A few participants described a more
extreme, dualistic view (i.e., KATN versus coaching leadership) which approached
McGregor's authoritarian/participatory Theory X, Theory Y (1960). A contingency
approach to decision-making is supported in the work of Vroom and Yetton's (1973)
continuum o f autocratic, consultative and group decision-making.
Many writings on military leadership are drawn from the great man/woman
concept of leadership, with a particular focus on examples from the operational and
combat achievements. As Janowitz (1960) related, the organization depends upon
technical and administrative talents, but has a special reverence for it heroic leaders.
However, in Ulmer's view (1998). the focus on tactical decision-making skills and on the
personal style/presence o f those in command, can shift the focus away from the skills
needed in a non-combat or operational environment:
The ''operating" situation requir[es] standard procedures and crew "drills." with
expectations for prompt, discernible, measurable results. The linkage between
cause and effect is clear. Hard data are usually available for decision-making.
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Reflection or contemplation is out o f place. The typical general officer or CEO
personality fits well into this situation. Any [tendency] toward immediate action
is reinforced in the junior leadership years when prompt, aggressive control of the
tactical situation represents laudatory behavior. The other type of situation gives
the general officer or CEO personality more trouble. It requires contemplation
before action, patience with ambiguity, and an appreciation for broad participation
in the decision-making process. This is the '‘building” or “improving" situation,
(p p .19-20)
Ulmer, as a retired general and former head of the Center for Creative Leadership, has
been in a unique position to study military leadership. He wrote that military practices o f
short-term assignments have made it difficult for senior officers to contribute and lead in
situations requiring long-term change. “In effect, everything about the current system
moves leadership style relentlessly toward the ‘operating’ end o f the spectrum." (Ulmer.
1998, p. 20)
There are certain aspects of charismatic leadership contained in notions of
military leadership, particularly in the phenomenon of command presence. Conger and
Kanungo (1989) defined charismatic leadership as involving: a vision shared by
followers that is distinct from the status quo. innovative and unconventional means to
accomplish that vision, a realistic assessment o f the external supports and restraints and
the process o f inspiring followers to pursue the vision through communication and
influence. Bums (1979), however, said that charismatic leaders were not true leaders
because their followers’ actions were based more in a personal attraction to the leader:
“Idolized leaders are not, then, authentic leaders because no true relationship exists
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between them and the spectators - no relationship characterized by deeply held motives,
shared goals, rational conflict, and lasting influence in the form o f change." (p. 248).
Bums identified two types o f leadership: 1) transactional, wherein rewards and sanctions
are used in an exchange relationship to gain the cooperation of the followers, and 2)
transformational leadership, where “persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize,
in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological and other
resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives o f others'" (p. 18).
Bernard Bass and his associates have done quantitative research on
transformational leadership in naval officers for over a decade (Bass. 1990; Bass. 1996;
Waldman & Bass. 1990; Yammarino & Bass, 1990; Yammarino. Spangler & Bass. 1993.
and other works). Bass's (1985) original theoretical work on the subject described
transformational leadership as including an appeal to a vision, inspiring confidence,
empowering followers and creating inspirational activities. His later field research on
naval officers was based on data from subordinate ratings o f the leader using his
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) (Bass & Avolio. 1989). and. in some
studies, incorporated ratings from formal performance appraisals. Bass has sought to
identify and quantify transformational leadership within individuals by measuring their
subordinates' assessment o f their charismatic behavior and the personal attention they
show to followers, as well as the resulting motivation and intellectual stimulation
experienced by subordinates. A problem with Bass's work in this area is that the MLQ
may be measuring factors that contribute to a leader's effectiveness and improve
organizational performance, but it is not clear that it measures a key aspect o f
transformational leadership as defined by Bums and others —working toward significant
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change. The issue with Bass's research confirms Rost's (1993) view on the problems of
studying leadership without a definitive definition.
Transformational leadership —as defined by Bums (1979). Conger and Kanungo
(1989), Rost (1993) and others is uplifting to both the leader and follower - which goes
far beyond the factors Bass is measuring. The notion o f transformational leadership
incorporates the idea of challenging, complex change, and asking those involved to both
commit and change themselves in order to realize the vision. Bass measured the views of
subordinates and factors in the ratings o f superiors, but does not capture whether the
individuals are involved in adaptive rather than technical changes - a distinction central
to the work of Heifetz (1994). This is unfortunate, as Bass has published the majority o f
the publicly available research on leadership in naval and marine officers, and his MLQ
has been used in other military research studies (Clover. 1990: Dorfman. Howell. Cotton
& Tate, 1992; and other works).
There are multiple examples o f transformational leadership in the military'. The
armed forces have instituted numerous innovations, many o f which involved painful
organizational changes that included: creating a vision, involving internal stakeholders
with competing interests, creating commitment and synergy in a diverse, multi-function
team and making personal sacrifices to make the vision a reality. The military has been
at the forefront —sometimes painfully in the public view - o f many race and human
relations struggles. Many projects —from digging wells in Africa to peacekeeping and
nation building missions have involved culturally complex, politically sensitive issues.
The potential for military officers to exercise transformational leadership is evident.
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Some military officers may be drawn to see adaptive challenges as technical
problems (Heifetz, 1994), particularly because, as a group, they are strongly oriented
toward rational/logical approaches (Barber, 1990; Ulmer. 1998). Taking a strict technical
approach may limit views o f the problem, restrict potential solutions and obscure
outcomes. The technological focus o f military jobs, along with the hard-science
educations o f most officers may pre-dispose some toward technical analyses and
solutions. The officers who have the most to bring to the public sector have both the
competencies and the commitment for technical and adaptive change.
Military officers as change agents in the public sector
Retired officers have the potential to play positive, activist roles in facilitating the
kind o f change needed in the public sector. Selden and associates (1999) used a Q-sort
test with government administrators from Georgia to identify how they viewed their
roles. They found that respondents who took an activist, values-based approach
identified themselves as those most likely to look for a different job within five years.
Those who sought no activist role in policy, voiced no strong values about their jobs and
had no strong commitment to efficiency improvements, rated themselves as the most
likely to remain with the organization (Selden. et al. 1999). It is unfortunate that the
group which is the least change-oriented is the one most interested in staying in public
employment. Government needs leaders instead o f caretakers in its administrative ranks.
Public administration faces another challenge from the influx of outside
executives recruited to bring business practices to local government. Some o f these
executives focus solely on efficiencies and budgets at the expense o f policy. This influx,
coupled with the trend toward more anti-government sentiment on elected councils and
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boards, may shift the balance of policy-making toward the legislative branch. The danger
is that public policy —which has for centuries found balance in the struggle between
bureaucracy, the legislature, the courts and special interests - will move too far toward
short-term political responsiveness and away from the administrators' focus on long-term
implications. The public sector needs administrators who are willing to do the painful
political work o f regaining and retaining this critical balance. Retired officers who enter
the public sector need to be willing activists and not caretakers.
The retired military officers interviewed had different experiences with the job
transition process. Some found jobs before they left the military, while others had painful
searches with multiple rejections before successfully obtaining a job. Once stepping into
a leadership position in the public sector, they had to rely largely on themselves to
identify these military strategies and behaviors that would successfully adapt to their new
organizations and which were unique to the Navy or Marine Corps. The armed services
should improve transition assistance programs for retirees, who have given 20 or more
years in service. Such transition assistance should include sessions in organizational
theory and culture with emphasis on how civilian organizations differ from the military;
leadership assessments with individual coaching on how to capitalize on one's strengths
and compensate for areas of weakness; and assessment centers with such components as
leaderless groups to provide individual feedback on communications and leadership
issues.
Implications for Retired Officers Working in Public Organizations
It is hoped that this study will help retired officers enter careers in local
government with their eyes open. Realistic expectations of the rewards and drawbacks in
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the public sector will help retiring officers determine if local government is an
appropriate second career and allow them to better prepare for the transition. Two o f the
eleven participants left local government before the end o f this study and others
interviewed expressed some deep disappointments. Holland (1985) in his work on career
choices, identified six different organizational environments. He wrote that each
individual develops personal dispositions toward specific environments and that they
seek environments that are congruent with their preferences. It may be that retired
officers my find more satisfaction in what Holland described as a “realistic" environment.
Retired officers need to assess whether they can find individual satisfaction in an
environment where they exchange technical challenges for adaptive challenges with
uncertain goals, decision-making authority for facilitating multiple stakeholders,
independence for political input, and close, defined relationships for a loosely coupled
and independent workforce.
French and associates (1983) specifically focused on the transition o f 23 retired
Navy officers, surveying the group during three separate intervals during the first three
months of their career transition. They concluded that the primary transition stresses
were lack o f job complexity (not finding the work as exciting as their military
assignments), role ambiguity (not understanding the organizational expectations and
norms) and the under-utilization o f their abilities (French. Doehrman, Davis-Saks &
Vinokur. 1983). These were the same issues important to members o f this study.
Campbell has been gathering data since the 1970s contrasting Army generals with
their CEO counterparts in the business world. He found the generals were more
conventional in their problem solving and were more dominant, competitive and action-
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oriented than the business leaders. This action-orientation. if true across the serv ices,
may prove a challenge to those working in the public sector where true resolution o f
issues is rare and action typically slow (Cited in Ulmer, 1998).
A few of the participants displayed an approach o f resigning themselves to the
ineffectiveness o f public systems. In the military bureaucracy, core systems such as
human resources are far removed from the control o f the individual officer and their
administrative policies are generally accepted and worked with. There are far fewer
paths for challenging, lobbying and influencing these overarching systems as compared
to local government. Local agency leaders have more opportunity to change these
systems if they have the commitment and will to do so.
Some participants who addressed public sector inefficiencies related negative
experiences with federal processes and federal employees. Experience with or biases
about the federal sector should not shape a new leader’s view o f local administrative
government. To approach a new organization anticipating dysfunctional systems and
under-functioning staff will color the experience and limit what a manager or an
executive perceives as possible. Retiring officers can bring transformational change by
refusing to accept mediocrity and challenging counterproductive systems and attitudes.
It is possible that some of the military leadership behaviors and practices can be
interpreted differently in the public sector. Displaying decision-making abilities, a bias
toward quick, decisive action, and portraying control, self-confidence and decisiveness so important in military leadership —can appear to employees as if the leader is not
seeking participation and involvement. Many public employees may not be looking for

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

250

an individual who has the answers, but may be more comfortable with one who asks the
questions.
The balance of constructively disagreeing versus obeying directives o f superiors
shifts in the public sector. There is less of a need and less o f an expectation to "carry a
message to Garcia" without question (Hubbard. 1899). (See Chapter Tw'o.) There is a
greater need for implementation challenges and ethical issues to be brought forward and
even argued with superiors. A few participants in the study appeared to take the position,
in the words o f one. that “the boss is the boss." This is not a leadership perspective.
Military officers need to recognize that there is generally a greater expectation that they
disagree, even aggressively disagree with their manager, over important issues in a
responsible manner.
The public sector is not for everyone and it was clear that some o f the officers
interviewed were not enjoying their work. Given the difficulty some participants had in
finding their first job. it is important that they enter a field where they will find
enrichment and success.

Implications for Local Government
None of the public organizations involved in this study provided any orientation
for its mid-managers or executives (outside o f generic sessions that addressed such issues
as benefits). Government agencies should have a multi-session orientation for all its
leadership staff entering from external organizations. Such an orientation should include
components on the human resources, budgeting, fiscal and civil services systems. It
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should include practical aspects such as how to write and docket proposals going before
the elected body and the nuances o f the political system.
Anyone entering a new organization needs to learn new roles and discover new
organizational norms as well as unlearn behaviors that are not a fit with their new
organization. Klausner and Groves (1994) wrote on the importance o f mentors or
"buddies'’ in helping new members learn the organizational culture. Local government
would benefit by assigning mentors or team members to assist with orienting executives
and managers, particularly in the actual processes, shortcuts, political minefields to be
avoided, etc. An assigned resource colleague or mentor could teach them the
organizational norms, structures, language and meanings, facilitate connecting them with
resources and answers and model an activist orientation toward public leadership. This
would assist all new mid-managers and executives entering the agency from outside the
public entity, but would especially help retired officers who have worked in a unique
organizational culture for over 20 years.
What will help military officers succeed
Participants revealed some suggestions for assisting military officers in
transitioning into the public sector in a way that positions them to meet the current
challenges facing government: 1) recognize there are differences; 2) focus on adaptive
change; 3) be prepared to build your own learning organization; and 4) build influence
relationships at every level.
Recognize there are differences.
Nearly every participant initially denied having transitional issues. Yet. during
each interview, stories were told that revealed confusing, challenging and sometimes
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painful transitions. Why were these issues difficult to identify at first? There may have
been an initial unwillingness by some to discuss the topic with a stranger. It may also be
that the similarities between aspects o f the formal culture o f the public sectors and the
military masked many o f the informal cultural differences. It can be easy to focus on
similarities and minimize differences. Officers need to realistically expect that there will
be transition issues.
Focus on adaptive change.
In the midst o f the unknown, it is easy to fall back on what one knows best, and it
is more comforting and safer to focus on making technical changes. Many o f the changes
implemented by the retired officers in their new organizations were technical changes
focused on standardizing procedures and processes. What is truly needed in the public
sector though, is adaptive change that takes place within an environment o f uncertainty
and unclear goals. Public sector leadership involves both collaboration and consensus
building with multiple stakeholders and, at times, involves the building and use of power
relationships. Successes discussed by some o f the participants such as empowering line
staff and creating teams to identify organizational values demonstrate the broader
outcomes possible when leaders focus on significant change.
Be prepared to build vour own learning organization.
Public managers and executives face challenges from public sector systems (civil
service, discipline and rewards systems), existing group norms (rigidity o f assignments
and expectation o f lifetime employment) and some staffing issues (older, savvy, cynical
workforce) that hinder the potential for implementing real change. Learning
organizations must be built despite these challenges and, at times, in the midst of a larger
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organization in stasis. By developing and presenting a clear vision, continually
developing individual members, creating systems that reward and reinforce that vision
and by creating trust with members, leaders can begin to recreate the organization.
Build influence relationships at everv level.
Public sector managers and executives operate in an internal environment o f
interagency conflict, competition, conflicting long and short-term visions and values
conflict. To be successful, influence relationships must be built with staff members,
peers, managers, the CEO, elected officials, labor representatives and involved citizens.
Relationships in the public sector are strikingly different than in the military. The mutual
experiences, shared beliefs and common technical background that built camaraderie in
the service are rarely found in the diverse services environment o f government.
Relationships will be built on influence, mutual interest and sometimes on power. These
relationships may be less personally satisfying than the relationships o f the wardroom,
and retired officers may need to seek close relationships outside o f work.
Implications for the Study o f Leadership
The overwhelming majority of writings on military leadership focus on combat.
As an example, one literature search on the topic "military leadership" performed during
this study, revealed over 60% o f the references involved battle-related topics such as
tactics. Nearly all of the remaining references discussed military leadership from the
"great men" theoretical standpoint. The field o f leadership studies has not done an
adequate examination o f the strategies and practices o f military leadership, particularly in
view o f its lessons for military and civilian sectors regarding administrative settings.
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Most o f the studies on leadership in military organizations involve easily
accessible populations such as military academy candidates. This is a convenient
population, but not necessarily the group most likely engaged in transformational
leadership. A quantitative approach that utilizes data from officer candidates is not
necessarily measuring transformational leadership as it is not addressing the intent or
effort to affect real change. The military —and the Navy and Marine Corps in particular need to do more significant research within the senior and flag/general officer
populations and make this data available to civilian researchers.
A feature of this study is that the researcher is from outside the military. There
are theorists who hold that research performed from the perspective o f an outsider is. by
its nature, seen through a lens that obscures the true meaning of the data. This research
topic was pursued with full knowledge that the process relied on the input of readers and
reviewers from the military to ensure that the voices of the participants were heard in the
text. It was also endeavored with the belief that the distant standpoint of the “other" was
important in examining transition issues and differences in the organizational cultures.
The appropriate role of qualitative research from the standpoint of the “other" needs to be
further discussed and clarified, especially as the nature of leadership research involves
the multiple perspectives of both leaders and followers. Finally, there is a need for more
research on military officers which is available to civilian researchers and, in particular,
research that involves 360 degree feedback.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research began as a class project. The lack o f existing research on military
officers transitioning to second careers spurred the pursuit of this topic. Clearly much
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more research needs to be done. Some o f the areas needing further examination include:
the transition experiences o f retired military officers that will assist retirees in finding
satisfying and productive second careers; comparisons of the organizational cultures of
the military, public, private and non-profit sectors which would facilitate the crosspollination o f managers and executives already occurring; public sector leadership issues
such as leadership behaviors, administrative decision-making, leader-followership and
employee motivation that would give government the type o f information that has long
been available to the private sector.
This study involved eleven Caucasian males who were identified after an
extensive search o f local government organizations. These participants are reasonably
reflective o f their cohort. It is expected that a more diverse population will be accessible
for research in the coming years as the retiree population o f higher-ranking officers will
reflect more gender and racial diversity. It would be beneficial to investigate if any
addition perspectives are found among a more diverse group. Nine o f eleven participants
were naval officers. It is recommended that more research be done comparing transition
issues unique to naval officers and marine officers and any differences in the subcultures
o f aviation, surface and submarine warfare and staff core specialties such as engineering
and supply.
Closing Thoughts
At the end of Chapter Two contained some essential elements for public sector
leadership. It is fitting that this research close by examining those elements in view o f its
findings.
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1. The public sector is experiencing profound change requiring transformational
leadership.
Retired officers who can offer transformational leadership are those with: a
vision that may be outside the standard way o f doing business, a comfort level for
ambiguity, the presence to communicate through their actions and words that they believe
and live the vision, the ability to inspire and motivate others toward the vision, and the
passion to carry it out. Those focused on finding a technical solution to these public
problems cannot adequately lead organizations toward addressing complex challenges.
2. The public sector faces change directed bv the political structure and special
interest groups requiring leadership that will honestly inform employees o f
coming change.
The officers interviewed all displayed a concern about taking care of their people.
It is important that any desire to protect one's people and any vestiges of restricting
information on a “need to know" basis do not hinder the flow o f important facts. Public
employees have access to much more information within the organization and from the
media than do military personnel. Information which is not shared with staff may surface
in rumors or be released in public statements by elected officials, blind siding staff
members. The leader must achieve a delicate balance between the need to pace the
change and information employees receive, with the need to ensure they are not blind to
political events.
3. Successful leadership in the public sector must involve influence rather than
coercion.
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Retired officers who are proficient coaches and implemented change successfully
in administrative environments, know that complex change cannot be ordered to occur.
Influence is more than persuasion by logic; it involves modeling success, living the vision
(i.e., walking the walk) and presenting a concept worth committing to.
4. With a history o f competing values and shifting political directions, the public
sector needs leadership that defines, articulates and lives the mission and
values o f the organization.
One o f the strengths of military officers entering the public sector is that they
contribute a much-needed commitment to leading by values. In a public culture o f
competing values, retired officers bring a commitment to public service, which will
enhance any organizations they join.
5. Successful public sector change needs collaborative leadership and a belief in
the value of diversity.
Experiences with collaborative change and working in a diverse organization
were provided to military officers in the guise o f TQM efforts and in the training and
self-examination done by the military services in response to their increasing multiculturalism. In any organization, collective experience does not necessarily translate to
individual commitment. If an individual views leadership simply as providing the
answers and appearing in control of situations, she or he will discourage opportunities for
collaborative efforts. The commitment to broad involvement from diverse sectors is an
important and an individual one.
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The potential for retired officers to bring needed skills to the public sector is
substantial. The capabilities and commitment of individuals will determine whether or
not they are ultimately successful.
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APPENDIX A: THE INSTITUTIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL CONTINUUM
Military Social Organization: Institutional vs. Occuoational

Variable

Institutional

Legitimacy
Role commitments
Basis o f compensation
Mode of compensation

Normative values
Diffuse
Rank and seniority
much in non-cash form or
deferred
Decompressed; low recruit
pay
Adjacency of work and
residence locales
Integral part of military
community
Esteem based on notion o f
service
"vertical” - within
organization
Holistic and qualitative
military justice
Veteran’s benefits and
preference

Level o f compensation
Residence
Spouse
Societal regard
Reference groups
Evaluation o f performance
Legal system
Post-service status

-- Charles C. Moskos
Occupational
Marketplace economy
Specific
skill level and manpower
Salary and bonus
Compressed; high recruit pay
Separation o f work and
residence locales
Removed from military
community
Prestige based on level of
compensation
"horizontal” —external to
organization
Segmented and quantitative
Civilian jurisprudence
Same as civilian

First published in: Moskos. C.C. (Fall. 1977). Trends in military organization. Armed
Forces and Society. 4. 41-50.
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APPENDIX B: GUIDING RESEARCH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Overview/Grand tour
1.
Can you give me a b rie f summary o f your military career?
2.
What kind o f education and training did the Navy/M arines provide for you?
Leadership
3.
4.
5.
6.

Can you think o f som eone you watched in the military who was a role model, or a mentor
for you? Someone w ho w as a leadership model for you?
Can you think o f a tim e when you were working under som eone's command when they
displayed great leadership?
Do you see a leadership style difference between a com bat situation and a military'
bureaucratic organization?
Can you think o f a tim e you were tested a leader and were proud o f how you handled the
situation?

Processes
7.
8.

9.

10.

The military has to do everything on such a large scale. What are some o f the techniques
you relied upon to accom plish your mission?
The military is known for its bureaucratic processes. Tell me about a time when you
became really frustrated with an order or a process. [Did you ever have to challenge or
question a process because it conflicted with the mission or could potentially harm your
people?]
Looking back, what are som e o f the things you learned about organizations in the
military that helped you m ake the transition to government? What are some o f the things
you brought with you?
You came to the [public organization] after [number] o f years in the military. During
those early transition days, what were some o f the things that you w eren't accustomed to
in the civilian work sector; some o f the things you had to consciously think about to be
successful?

People
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

What were some o f the m ethods you would use to motivate people in the military?
How did you build unit cohesion in the military?
W hat was it that enabled you to build loyalty between you and your staff in a military
setting?
How- did the structures and practices o f the military compare to government in terms o f
how you work with people? In terms o f building loyalty and comraderie?
How can you build team w ork in a government setting?
When you joined the public sector, what were some o f the things you found d idn't work
in managing people? W hat did you find you had to do differently?

Summary
17.
18.

How would you com pare your military and government careers? [Probe for differences in
excitem ent and satisfaction.]
W hat are some o f the principal ways your military experience shaped you as a leader?
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APPENDIX C: CONSENT FORM

University o f San Diego, Doctoral Thesis Project - M ilitary Leadership Influences
I understand that the focus o f this project is to research the influence o f military
background on those in leadership positions in local government.
I understand that the procedure for this project will be as follows:
•

I will be interviewed about my working experiences inside and outside of the
military.

•

The questions asked will relate to my professional experiences.

•

I am free to decline to answer any question, without providing justification to the
interviewer.

•

No names o f my staff will be sought or used in any published materials relating to
this project, including transcriptions o f my interviews.

•

My participation is voluntary, and I understand that I am free to stop participation at
any time. At any time I can ask questions about the project and receive answers.

•

There will be no expense involved in participating in this project.

•

My identity as a participant will not be revealed. Details about me will be masked to
avoid identification.

The interviews will take place during 1999-2000. I will have the opportunity to review
the portion o f the transcript utilized in the research project for accuracy. No further
participation in this project is expected o f me.
I understand and give permission for the project data to be incorporated into published
writings and professional presentations.
I, the undersigned, understand these statements and I give consent to my voluntary
participation in this project.

Signature of the Participant

Date

Interviewer
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE COMMUNICATION WITH PUBLIC AGENCIES

[return address]
August 29. 1999
[Name]
Human Resources Manager
City of Escondido
201 N. Broadway
Escondido, CA 92025
Dear [Name],

I am a doctoral student in Leadership at the University o f San Diego. I am writing my
dissertation on the transition issues o f retired military officers moving into high level
positions in local government. I am trying to identify what aspects o f their military
experience translate well into public sector leadership positions.
I am trying to locate individuals who:
• are working in local government in mid-management or executive positions;
• served 20 or more years in the Marines or Navy as a senior officer; and
• have been retired less than six years.
I would like to contact you about how I might locate any such individuals working at the
City of Escondido to see if they would be willing to participate in an interv iew.
I will contact you later in the week and look forward to speaking with you.
Yours truly.

Lynn Eldred
Work: [phone number]
Home: [phone number]

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287

APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF GROUNDED THEORY OF THE
PHENOMENON OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP
Context

Conditions

Theme: Leadership Development
Must prepare to Education and
take over
Training
command
without notice
Mentoring
Youthfulness of
many junior
officers (as
young as 22)
Developmental
Experiences

Consequences:
Leadership Lessons

Common initiation,
ongoing career
development.

Instili values, beliefs,
behavior norms,
leadership principles.

CPO's and sr. officers
expected to develop
junior officers.

Guide, role models,
how to lead crew,
decision-making.

Responsibility:
immediate;
seen as a reward.
Included in decision
making.

Develop critical
thinking, confidence
& decision-making.

Set and demand high
standards. Model
technical proficiency.

Increase technical
expertise.
Accomplish mission.

Demanding, possible
threats.
Set & expect high
standards.
Demand orders are
followed.

High mental &
physical
performance, handle
stress. Obey orders
without questions.
Accomplish strategic
mission.

Technical
expertise

Set and demand high
standards.
Model technical
proficiency.

Increase technical
expertise.
Accomplish mission.

Coaching style

Plan, coordinate,
involve, and inform.

Accomplish
programmatic
mission.

Technical
expertise

Theme: Leading Staff
Operational
KATN style
environment

Administrative
environment

Strategies
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Summary o f Grounded Theory o f M ilitary Leadership
Theme: Leading Staff: continued
Conditions
Context
Strategies

Consequences:
Leadership Lessons
Be honest in appraisals.
"M ake the tough calls"
- deal with discipline
problems.

Select out those
who can't adapt.

Boot camp.
Honest performance
appraisals.
May not let re-enlist.
Discipline.

Controlled
environment

Paternalistic system.
Do everything together.

Build camaraderie.
Turn around behavior.

Communications
traightforward
state reason,
judicious.

Orders followed
literally.
Trust leader.
People can be hurt.

Communicate clearly:
speak directly.
Demonstrate your
decision-making.
Need to know

Training and
development

Quickly productive.
Make up for poor
education. Consistency
despite rotation.

Make training as #1
priority; provide
continuous career
training.

Willingness to
go into harm's
way.

Shared values.

Instill at orientation.
Leader models &
reinforces.

Lead by values.

Willingness to
go into harm's
way; to follow
leader.

Command
presence, calm.
High technical
ability. Physical
ability. Maintain
demeanor.

Perception: leader is in
control, knows job and
will keep staff safe.

Put life in
leader's hands:
Decision
making

Display quick Sc
decisive ability:
rational process.

Bui id c re w 's confidence
in leader.

Appear calm.
Maintain demeanor.
Display abilities: work
along side staff; stay
fit.
Respect is yours to
lose.
If people trust your
judgm ent they will
obey.

Put life in
leader's hands:
2-way loyalty

Build lovaltv.

Staff: some
young, lack
experience,
poor education.
Continual staff
changes.

Perception: we are in
good hands.
Counsel all; be involved
with family.
Reward &
recognize top
performance.

Take care o f your
people.
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Summary o f Grounded Theory o f M ilitary Leadership
Theme: Leading Staff, continued___________
Conditions
Context
Strategies

Discipline
Motivation

Willing to place
self in harm's
way for the unit

Camaraderie and
unit cohesion

Theme: Decision-Making
Develop
Leader may
decision-making.
need to be
replaced
quickly.

Theme: Leading Change
Managing
Change
strategies
change.
motivated by
events.

Be fair & apply to all.
Take action to protect
crew.
Set high expectations;
communicate & reward;
Promote for merit;

Consequences:
Leadership Lessons
Discipline builds
loyalty and obedience.
People need to be
pushed.
Recognize individually.
Reward & promote on
merit.

Values of unit identity.
Structures: deployment,
social events, sports, and
competition.
Be visible; demonstrate
support for staff.

Use events and
structures. Demonstrate
support.
Work along side staff.

Early responsibility,
gradually increasing.
Responsibility is a
reward

Final decision is CO's.
Input, not consensus.
Relish independence.
Dislike micro
management.

Top-down directives;
officer does
implementation.
Utilize controlled
environment.

Follow & implement
organizational change.
Variety of programs
can be seen as “flavor
o f the month.
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APPENDIX F: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND PUBLIC
SECTORS

Theme: Leading Staff
Military
Subthemes
Diverse, many young, inexperienced.
Nature of
Staff

4

Public Sector
Many older, more experienced,
concerned with pay. benefits &
retirement.

Trust between officers & enlisted.

Labor/management relations.

Control over staff; follow orders.

Independent; do not always comply
with directives.

Communica
tion

Direct, specific.
‘‘Need to know” principle.

Negative reactions to straightforward
communication; jargon; formal style.

Classification
System

Staff will “Do what needs to be done.” Established (sometimes out of date)
Flexible job duties.
job titles, job descriptions, pay rates.
“Not my job” syndrome.
Unresponsive HR system.
No managerial latitude.

Staff
Retention

Use induction, performance reports
and re-enlistment system to “weed
out.” Move staff every 2-3 years;

Organizational stagnation: lack of
mobility.
Pay to keep individuals regardless of
job duties.

Training and
Development

Training a top priority; continuous
development: stay current in field.

Mixed levels o f training - some very
poor. No leadership development.
"Shallow bench.”

Teamwork/
Camaraderie

Built into system - overseas
deployment, dependency, paternalistic
system, cross-department shipboard
teams

Lack of established structures that
promote teamwork.

Managing
Performance

Work with whole individual; NJP;
making the tough calls; fair &
consistent discipline creates loyalty.

Limited focus; performance problems.
Limited effectiveness: cumbersome
civil service system; not all managers
enforce rules.

Wide variety o f recognition options.
Rewards based on merit.

Some delayed, undeserving, and
blanket awards.
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Differences between the Military and Public Sectors
Theme: Organizational Relations, continued
Subthemes
Staff
Relations

Military
Respect comes with position.
Confidence o f staff.
Respect is “yours to lose.”

Public Sector
Must build own reputation.
Possible cynicism o f staff.

Peers
Relations

Mission is primary.
Camaraderie of wardroom.

Lack o f camaraderie and internal
support.

Relations
with manager

CO has ultimate responsibility'.
Role is to support CO.
CO is in charge of officer
development.
Praise in public, chastise in private.
Knows your job.
Command presence.

Support boss. Lack of training and
development opportunities.
Mundane assignments.

Political
Relations

Insulated from congress and top
management.

“Close to the flagpole.”
Competition among department heads.
Citizen involvement.

Amount o f
Discretion

Broad discretion.
Trust in judgment.
Give general direction.

Micro-management. Others don't
know your job. Multiple questions
and requests for information.

Decision
making

Broad authority.
Make life and death decisions.
Quick decision-making.
Responsibility its own reward.

Limited authority. Involvement o f
many stakeholders. Slow, indecisive
process. Micro-management.

Values and
Ethics

Clear, shared values.

Conflicting values. Some individual
orientation rather than public good.

Relations
with
Executive
Leadership

Exec criticizes at meetings and public
hearings; assigns blame; probably
does not know your job.

Theme: Policies and Procedures
Policies and
Procedures

Exist for everything.
Standardized across the organization.
Generally adhered to.

Lacking in many areas.
Applied inconsistently.
Less developed than in federal
contracting.
Not always consequences for noncompliance.
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APPENDIX G: LEADERSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: EFFECTIVE AND
LESS EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY RETIRED OFFICERS

Theme: Leading Staff

Subthemes

Context

Nature o f
Staff

Many older,
more experience,
concern for pay,
benefits &
retirement.

Conditions

Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Choices.

Meetings; open
and frequent
communications.

Information
bulletins;
problems with
spreading rumors.

Labormanagement
relations.

Adversarial
labor
relations.

Open
communications.

Independent; do
not always
comply with
directives.

Limits o f
discipline
system.

Follow-up.

Assume
directives will be
followed.

Communica
tion Norms

Negative
reactions to
straightforward
communication;
jargon; formal
style.

Staff
unaccustome
d to direct
style.
Stereotypes.

Communication
style adjusted.
Eliminate jargon
& formality.

Direct style
affects customer
& staff relations.
Jargon, formality
create barriers.

Classification
System

Established
(sometimes out
o f date) job
titles, job
descriptions, pay
rates; “Not my
job” syndrome.

Civil service
system; some
unresponsive
HR systems;
no latitude
for manager.

Lobby & work
within HR
system; improve
selection;
re-organization.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed by
Retired Officers,
Theme: Leading Staff, continued_____________________________________________

Subthemes

Context

Conditions

Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Retention

Lifetime
employment;
lack
mobility; pay
to keep
individuals.

Organization
in stagnation;
turnover as
negative.

Change attitudes:
turnover is good;
promote mobility;
pay what post is
worth.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.

Training and
Development

Most poor
levels o f
training. No
leadership
development.
“Shallow
bench.”

Expectations
that staff
know the job.

Increase training.
Add leadership/
career
development
programs.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.

Teamwork/
Camaraderie

Lack o f
established
structures.

Downsizing
environment.

Communicate
goals, delegation,
instill sense o f
ownership; team
recognition;
social gatherings.

Inner circles.

Managing
Performance

Limited
Limited
focus; not all effectiveness
-civ il service
managers
enforce rules. system.

Work with on
staff regardless o f
other managers.
Reorganization.
Use rewards
available.

Accepting &
criticizing status
quo.

Unearned
and
“blanket”
awards.

No merit
rewards.
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed
by Retired Officers,
Theme: Organizational Relations, continued__________________________________

Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Less control
over staff.
Cynicism o f
some staff.

Consciously
build reputation.
Communicate
carefrilly.
Follow-up.

Assume you
have a positive
reputation and
cooperation.

Lack o f
camaraderie
and internal
support.

Separate work
and personal
lives.
Focus on own
department.

Hold events.
Outreach.

No follow-up.
Accept status
quo.

Relations
with manager

Support boss.
Lack o f
training and
development
opportunities.
Mundane
assignments.

Multiple
stakeholders
complicate
decisions.
Historic lack o f
training and
development.

Find own
development
opportunities.

Don’t question
boss. Wait for
development
opportunities.

Relations
with
Executive
Leadership

Criticize at
meetings and
public
hearings.
Feelings o f
being
disrespected.
Insulated from
congress and
top
management.

CEO staff
probably does
not know your
job.

Build influence
relationships.

“Close to the
flagpole.”
Competition o f
department
heads. Citizen
involvement.

Enjoy influence.
Build
relationships.
Join political
committees.

Subthemes

Context

Staff
Relations

No established
reputation.
Leader is
questioned.
“Open door”
avoids chain o f
command.

Peer
Relations

Political
Relations

Conditions
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed
by Retired Officers
Theme: Organizational Relations, continued

Subthemes
Political
Process

Context
Multiple
approval
levels.
Competition
am on g

Conditions

Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Multiple
stakeholders.
Public
processes.
Takes longer.

Enjoy influence.
Build
relationships.
Join political
committees.

Avoid, try to
insulate self
from the
process.

department
heads.
Amount o f
Discretion

CEO staff
doesn’t know
the job.
Many
questions and
information
requests.

CEO and
elected
officials’ staff
are generalists.

Develop
relationships and
trust.
Build reputation.

Become
frustrated.

Decision
making

Limited
authority.
Slow,
indecisive
process.
Micro
management.
Not always
clear. Some
44___
me
orientation.

Multiple
stakeholders.
Others make
critical
decisions.

Accept change.
Build influence
relationships.
Find satisfaction
in the work
itself.

Become
frustrated.

Values &
Ethics

Conflicting
public goals.
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed
by Retired Officers, continued
Theme: Policies and Procedures

Subthemes

Context

Policies and
Procedures

Lacking in
many areas.
Applied
inconsistently.
Less
developed
than in federal
contracting.
Not always
consequences
for non*
compliance.

Conditions
Lesser priority.
Existing policies
and procedures
are often out o f
date or “on the
shelf.”

Theme: Encountering Stereotypes
Stereotypes
Stereotypes
Less public
include: rigid, contact and direct
bureaucratic,
experience with
not very
the military.
bright, clique- Rely on media
ish, trained in image.
psychological Not given
warfare.
appropriate
Experience o f assignments or
commensurate
retired
military not
pay.
understood or Barrier to
recognized.
implementing
change.

Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Less Effective
Strategies and
Practices

Bring in
practices from
the military.
Introduce
through
influence and
modeling.

Discuss solely
with the chief
executive and
rely on him/her
to implement.

Avoiding
military jargon
and formality.
Conscious
efforts to
counter
stereotypes.
Take on higher
level
assignments.
Educate co
workers and
demonstrate
abilities.

Actions that
reinforce
stereotypes,
e.g., using
jargon, issuing
too many
written policy
directives.
Rely on
superior to give
out
assignments.
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